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Abstract 
 
As a process to synthesize science and characterize potential ecological risks to 
inform decision making, ecological risk assessment (ERA) influences how the potential 
for harm is studied and is foundational to national and international decision making on 
genetically modified organisms and other technologies.  Existing literature has argued 
that ERA is built on values-based judgments that should be subject to critical scrutiny, 
and that conflicts about risk are influenced by competing understandings of what 
constitutes ecological harm, beneficial technology, desirable scientific research.  
However, there has been a lack of empirical work that explores the implications of these 
insights.  As a contribution to this work, I use interviews, document analysis and 
participant observation to explore three case studies involving plant genetic engineering 
and the contestation of risk.   
 
The first case study examines the differences between two competing ERA 
guidelines for assessing the impacts of genetically modified plants on non-target 
organisms.  Findings include that the guidelines proposed consequentially different 
processes for the study of potential risks as a result of divergent judgments about hazard 
identification, substantial equivalence, species selection, and indirect effects.  The second 
case study explores how expert stakeholders envision future environmental regulation for 
plants produced by novel, targeted genetic modification techniques.  Their views varied 
based on different underlying assumptions associated with what constitutes 
environmental risk and the adequacy of existing regulations.  For the third case study, I 
  vii 
participated in and studied a collaborative committee that, in response to issues 
concerning wild rice and the potential for its genetic engineering, is engaged in an 
anticipatory process to influence scientific research policy at the University of Minnesota.  
I found that the committee pursued the inclusion of Native American worldviews into 
wild rice scientific research by using a conceptual framework of “bridging worldviews” 
that made explicit how wild rice research is based upon contestable assumptions about 
risk, science, and the desired state of the environment.  Across three diverse case studies, 
this research demonstrates the importance of interrogating the values-based judgments 
and assumptions that underlie ERA and decision making processes for genetically 
modified plants and environmental issues more broadly.   
 
  viii 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... xii 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
Implications................................................................................................................. 9 
Chapter 1 – Delimiting the Study of Risk: Exploring Values and Judgments in 
Conflicting GMO Ecological Risk Assessment Guidelines ............................................. 13 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 13 
1.2 Judgment, conflict, and risk assessment guidelines ................................................ 18 
1.2.1 Participation in risk assessment ....................................................................... 20 
1.2.2 Understanding differences between risk assessment guidelines ...................... 22 
1.3 Methods: Studying conflicting GMO ERA guidelines ........................................... 29 
1.4 Findings: Different Judgments, Diverging Risk Assessments ................................ 31 
1.4.1 Hazard identification and substantial equivalence ........................................... 32 
1.4.2 Species Selection ............................................................................................. 40 
1.4.3 Indirect prey-quality effects ............................................................................. 44 
1.4.4 Competing understandings of agriculture and risk .......................................... 48 
1.5 Discussion: Implications of conflicting risk assessment guidelines ....................... 51 
1.5.1 Understanding conflicting guidelines: Unexamined harm .............................. 52 
1.5.2 Implications of conflicting approaches: GM plant environmental decision 
making....................................................................................................................... 56 
1.5.3 Challenges when seeking to change risk assessment guidelines ..................... 58 
  ix 
1.5.4 Scholarship on guidelines and risk assessment in environmental decision 
making....................................................................................................................... 60 
1.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 64 
Chapter 2 – Conflicting Futures: Environmental Regulation of Plant Targeted Genetic 
Modification ...................................................................................................................... 68 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 68 
2.2 Anticipatory governance ......................................................................................... 71 
2.2.1 Foresight .......................................................................................................... 72 
2.2.2 Engagement...................................................................................................... 74 
2.3. Future studies for emerging technology ................................................................ 75 
2.4 Reflecting upon the environmental regulation futures of plant TagMo ................. 78 
2.5 The conflicting futures of plant targeted genetic modification environmental 
regulation ...................................................................................................................... 82 
2.5.1 Pragmatic environmental regulation future ..................................................... 82 
2.5.2 Optimistic environmental regulation future ..................................................... 85 
2.5.3 Critical environmental regulation future .......................................................... 89 
2.6 Discussion ............................................................................................................... 91 
2.6.1 The regulation of plant TagMo ........................................................................ 92 
2.6.2 Anticipatory governance and regulation .......................................................... 95 
Chapter 3 – Protecting Wild Rice from Harm: A Collaboration to Reconceive Scientific 
Research – The Case of Genetic Engineering................................................................... 98 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 98 
3.2 Wild rice and the genetic engineering issue ......................................................... 104 
  x 
3.2.1 Underlying historical context: University science and the Ojibwe ............... 110 
3.3 Methods: Studying the wild rice collaborative committee ................................... 116 
3.4 Findings: Reconceiving scientific research .......................................................... 124 
3.4.1 Institutionalized understanding of scientific research .................................... 125 
3.4.2 Reconceiving scientific research: Process & Understandings ....................... 129 
3.4.3 Reconceiving scientific research: Pathways to change .................................. 140 
3.5 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 143 
3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 148 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 150 
Appendices ...................................................................................................................... 167 
Appendix A: GMO ERA interview guide .................................................................. 168 
Appendix B: Plant TagMo interview guide ................................................................ 170 
Appendix C: Wild rice collaborative committee interview guide .............................. 172 
Appendix D: Concept note from wild rice collaborative committee .......................... 175 
 
 
  xi 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary of the optimistic, pragmatic and critical environmental regulation 
futures of plant TagMo  .....................................................................................................81 
 
 
 
  xii 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Three models examining the relationship between risk assessment guidelines, 
the conducting of risk assessment, science and decision making  .....................................27 
 
Figure 2: Overview of key differences between eco-toxicological and ecological GMO 
ERA guidelines  .................................................................................................................34 
 
Figure 3: Plant targeted genetic modification and its relationship to first generation plant 
genetic engineering  ...........................................................................................................69 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
Conflicts over environmental risk are an important aspect of decision making for 
emerging technologies such as genetic engineering, as well as for environmental issues 
like climate change, invasive species, and fracking.  In addition to conflict over whether 
well-understood environmental risks influence decision making when weighed against 
economic or political priorities, another important site of conflict involves the very ways 
in which environmental risk is studied and articulated.  In other words, what types of 
potential environmental harms are recognized and how are scientific studies and risk 
assessments conducted to characterize the potential for that harm?  Although many 
scholars have argued for the need to critique the values-based judgments and assumptions 
that underlie risk assessment and risk discourse, there has yet to be adequate empirical 
research examining conflicts over these judgments and assumptions.  Furthermore, there 
is a need to not only identify where such values-based judgments have the greatest 
influence within risk assessment and risk discourse, but to reflect upon the consequences 
of these judgments, including what is at stake in how they are made.  This dissertation 
uses three case studies to explore how the contestation of risk influences the science, the 
governance, and ultimately the future of plant genetic engineering.   
 
Risk assessment is a topic of interest across a host of disciplines including public 
policy, the natural sciences, and the social sciences.  At its most basic, risk assessment is 
a process used to synthesize science to study and describe risks for decision making.  A 
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specific type of risk assessment, called ecological risk assessment (ERA), is employed to 
examine the potential for environmental harm (EPA 1998).  Ecological risk assessment 
consists of four major steps: problem formulation, exposure analysis, effects analysis and 
risk characterization.  Problem formulation is the first stage, where many foundational 
decisions are made including identifying the goals of the assessment as well as the 
hazards and valued ecological entities to be examined.  Exposure analysis seeks to 
determine if and how the valued ecological entity will be exposed to the hazard, while 
effects analysis seeks to determine how that exposure adversely affects the ecological 
entity.  An ecological entity must be both exposed and susceptible to the hazard for an 
adverse effect to take place.  Lastly, the risk characterization stage synthesizes the 
previous stages into information that is relevant to the original goals of the ecological risk 
assessment and to environmental decision making.   
 
ERA’s importance to public policy stems from its essential role in regulatory 
decision making for genetically modified plants and for environmental issues more 
broadly (McHughen and Smyth 2012; EPA 2004; EFSA 2010).  From the World Trade 
Organization to national environmental agencies such as the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency and the European Food Safety Authority, ERA is a privileged 
framework to inform and justify decision making (Bonneuil and Levidow 2012; EPA 
2004; EFSA 2010).  ERA is also a key synthesizing framework for diverse research in the 
natural sciences.  It provides a variety of approaches to deal with the complexities and 
uncertainties surrounding contemporary environmental stressors such as biotechnologies, 
nanotechnologies, and invasive species.  Using a risk assessment framework to help 
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organize the study of potential stressors is a way to make the findings relevant for 
decision making.   
 
Yet, interest in and critique of ERA has grown within the social science 
literatures.  For example, risk assessment’s privileged place in decision making is 
critiqued for how social and political concerns that involve technology can become 
marginalized when they are not compatible with a risk assessment framework (Wynne 
2002).  Scholars evaluate and critique how risk assessment has been understood and 
deployed as an objective process in order to justify decisions, in a way that marginalizes 
the values-based judgments that inform risk assessment (Winickoff et al. 2005).  Risk 
assessment has also been a focus for scholarship on public and stakeholder participation.  
Building upon the work that argues that risk assessment contains a set subjective of 
assumptions and decisions that can be opened to wider scrutiny (Jasanoff 1993; 
Thompson 2003; Jensen et al. 2003), there has been substantial scholarship arguing for 
and demonstrating the use of participatory principles in conducting risk assessment (Stern 
and Fineberg 1996; Kuzma and Besley 2008; Nelson, Andow, and Banker 2009).   
 
Literatures from fields such as science and technology policy and science and 
technology studies have also provided critical insights on how to further engage with and 
question risk assessment and its role in decision making.  For example, if values-based 
assumptions are acknowledged within the conduct of risk assessment, what other areas 
of, and approaches to, inquiry concerning risk assessment should be fostered?  There are 
three insights in particular that these literatures contribute, focused on the identification 
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and scrutiny of assumptions and judgments that inform decision making processes.  First, 
although the role of participation has been acknowledged and studied within risk 
assessment, this input has generally been restricted to the problem formulation phase.  
Less attention has been paid to the judgments that are made throughout a risk assessment, 
including the judgments that inform the analysis phase of risk assessment.  Furthermore, 
little focus has been given to examining the assumptions within the guidelines used to 
organize risk assessment, as opposed to the actual conducting of risk assessment.  Yet 
any differences among approaches to risk assessment are potentially consequential and 
should be open to examination and scrutiny (Dean 2010; Holifield 2009a).  It is necessary 
to explore, then, where important judgments are made throughout a risk assessment, what 
assumptions they are based on, what their implications are, and how they could be made 
otherwise.   
 
A second area of inquiry highlights the significance of discourse.  The specific 
meanings provided to risk, science, technology, and the environment can differ 
considerably (Lash, Szerszynski, and Wynne 1996).  These differences concerning what 
constitutes risk, what is desirable science and technology, and what is the desired state of 
the environment are consequential, as such understandings “by representing reality in one 
particular way rather than in other possible ways… make certain types of actions relevant 
and other unthinkable” (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002, 145).  For example, framing an 
environmental issue in terms of risk will privilege certain knowledge and certain actors 
and will marginalize other possible ways of providing meaning to the issue (Jasanoff 
1999).  Through the study of discourse surrounding risk, science, technology, and the 
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environment one can better call attention to the assumptions and implications of 
particular understandings.   
 
Finally, a third area of inquiry addresses the broader question of anticipatory 
governance of technology.  Instead of studying the potential consequences of a 
technology through risk assessment just prior to its release for broad use, how can 
potential social and environmental impacts of a technology be considered and 
incorporated into the early stages of the research process?  Many scholars have explored 
these questions (Barben et al. 2008; Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012; Von 
Schomberg 2012), yet there is a call within this literature for reflexive scrutiny of the 
assumptions that such anticipatory efforts are based upon.  Even when challenging 
reactionary technology assessment or risk assessment by pursuing an anticipatory 
approach to governance, it is necessary to hold “a mirror up to one’s own activities, 
commitments and assumptions, being aware of the limits of knowledge and being 
mindful that a particular framing of an issue may not be universally held” (Stilgoe, Owen, 
and Macnaghten 2013, 1571).  Without exploring the basic assumptions they are based 
upon, anticipatory efforts may unwittingly reinforce certain ways of considering the 
desired state of science, technology, and the environment at the expense of others.   
 
This dissertation explores how risk is contested by studying three diverse case 
studies involving plant genetic engineering.  Each chapter provides a different site for 
examining what is at stake in diverse assumptions and judgments concerning risk 
assessment, risk discourse, and technology governance.  In my first chapter, Delimiting 
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the Study of Risk: Exploring Values and Judgments in Conflicting GMO Ecological Risk 
Assessment Guidelines, I explored the consequential nature of values-based judgments in 
risk assessment for science and governance concerning genetically modified plants.  
Specifically, I examined the important judgments that differ between two competing risk 
assessment guidelines for studying the potential impacts of genetically modified plants on 
non-target organisms.  To inform this study I reviewed social science literatures that 
argue risk assessment builds upon a set of assumptions open to critique, influences how 
scientific studies on a topic are completed, and ultimately delimits what knowledge will 
influence decision making (Dean 2010; Elliott 2012; Jasanoff 1993; Holifield 2009a).  I 
also built upon this literature to develop a conceptual model that makes explicit how 
science, risk assessment guidelines, and the conduct of risk assessment relate to one 
another when values-based judgments are acknowledged in each.  I completed a 
document analysis and in-depth interviews with the scientists involved with each set of 
guidelines to examine the following research questions: How do values-based judgments 
within genetically modified organism ERA guidelines delimit the study of risks from 
genetically modified plants?  How do the scientists involved in conflicting ERA 
guidelines justify the judgments within their guidelines?   Findings from this chapter 
include that judgments about hazard identification and substantial equivalence testing, 
species selection, and indirect effects delimit how each set of guidelines examines the 
risks from GM plants, including influencing what scientific experiments are conducted.  
The divergences between the two approaches lead them to differ over which potential 
harms are in need of examination, with one approach designed to assess indirect effects 
that the other approach deems unnecessary to assess.  One of the implications of this 
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chapter is that without open scrutiny of risk assessment guidelines and their constitutive 
judgments, consequential judgments in risk assessments may not be realized and 
scrutinized, and may instead be informed by an unquestioned acceptance of the status 
quo, decided upon in a nontransparent fashion in favor of those who exert undue 
influence, or arrived at in an unsystematic, ad hoc manner.   
 
In my second chapter, Conflicting Futures: Environmental Regulation of Plant 
Targeted Genetic Modification, I studied new plant breeding techniques and how expert 
stakeholders understand their implications for environmental risk and regulation.  Novel 
targeted genetic modification (TagMo) techniques for plants have the potential to 
increase the speed and ease of genetic modification and fall outside existing regulatory 
authority (Podevin et al. 2012).  It is, however, unclear how regulatory agencies are going 
to address these techniques.  To inform this research I reviewed the tenets of anticipatory 
governance in light of future studies literature on emerging technology, focusing on how 
to contribute to reflexivity by making explicit the assumptions within envisioned futures.  
I conducted in-depth interviews with expert-stakeholders to explore the differing visions 
they have for the future of plant TagMo environmental regulation.  I specifically asked: 
How do expert-stakeholders provide meaning to the future of plant TagMo and its 
environmental regulation?  How do the articulated futures of plant TagMo regulation 
conflict?  Findings include that the environmental regulation futures articulated by 
expert-stakeholders could be classified into three categories – optimistic, pragmatic, and 
critical – based on their differing underlying assumptions concerning what constitutes 
environmental risk and the adequacy of existing United States genetically modified plant 
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regulations.  By gathering these diverse perspectives on the future and studying how they 
differ, this chapter furthers the anticipatory governance-informed engagement with 
regulation and fosters a productive discussion of plant TagMo regulation. 
 
 To inform my third chapter, Protecting Wild Rice from Harm: A Collaboration to 
Reconceive Scientific Research – The Case of Genetic Engineering, I participated in and 
studied a collaborative committee that, in response to issues concerning wild rice and the 
potential for its genetic engineering, is pursuing an anticipatory process to influence 
scientific research policy at the University of Minnesota.  Wild rice is a plant of great 
cultural, spiritual and economic importance to the Anishinaabeg (Ojibwe) of North 
America.  In the late 1990s, scientists at the University of Minnesota began to map the 
wild rice genome to aid in its conventional breeding.  No attempts were made to either 
inform or consult Tribal Nations or their community members as the mapping work was 
being proposed or implemented.  Although no genetically engineered varieties are 
currently being pursued by University of Minnesota scientists, the development of a 
genomic map that could be the basis for pursuing an engineered variety raises a host of 
concerns about the relationship between the University of Minnesota and the Ojibwe.  
The collaborative committee coalesced in response to these issues.  It was comprised of 
Ojibwe elders and community members, and University of Minnesota faculty, staff, and 
students who were interested in protecting natural stand wild rice and improving the 
relationship between the University of Minnesota and the Ojibwe.  Using participant 
observation, document analysis, and in-depth interviews, I examined the following 
questions: How can different worldviews inform anticipatory processes for public 
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scientific research?  How does scientific research need to be understood in order to 
require consideration of different worldviews?  What particular understandings of science 
and risk did the committee critique and draw upon as it reconceived scientific research?  I 
found that the committee challenged the understanding of scientific research that was 
used to justify the initial reaction by the University of Minnesota administration to the 
issues concerning wild rice and genetic engineering.  In its actions, the committee 
employed the theme of “bridging worldviews” to help make explicit how scientific 
research is not universally beneficial but can negatively impact communities, in addition 
to being based on contestable assumptions about the desired state of the environment and 
the desired ends of science.  This chapter shows the potential of anticipatory efforts to 
help foster a less harmful and more inclusive approach to scientific research when based 
on revealing and questioning the dominant assumptions informing scientific research.   
 
Implications  
 Several overarching implications of this research bear further discussion.  First, 
this research reinforces previous findings that values-based judgments inform risk 
assessment and the discourses around risk and technology in important ways.  The case 
studies in this dissertation provide three new examples of how contestations involving 
risk may influence the future of plant genetic engineering, specifically.  These case 
studies expose the consequences of underlying assumptions and judgments, from how 
differing judgments influence the ways in which the potential for harm is studied in GMO 
ERA, to how definitions of genetic engineering and environmental risk influence the 
regulation of novel plant breeding techniques, to how understandings of risk and science 
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influence the level to which the Ojibwe community is involved in decision making 
surrounding scientific research on wild rice.   
 
Second, this research highlights how such consequential judgments are obscured 
by objectivist views of risk assessment and universally beneficial views of science.  
There is no conceptual space for considering the role of judgments when risk assessment 
is seen as an objective process that is solely informed by experts and when scientific 
research is seen as best completed without consideration of its potential negative impacts.  
Yet only by viewing risk assessment in terms of its constitutive judgments was it possible 
to highlight the differences between the two approaches to GMO ecological risk 
assessment, and only by challenging the view of scientific research provided by the 
University administration could the collaborative committee build a different approach to 
scientific research.  Therefore, it is essential for research to continue the work of 
challenging objectivist notions of risk assessment and universally beneficial views of 
science by examining the impacts of, and values-based judgments underlying, risk 
assessment and science.  Without challenge, these judgments will continue to be made 
within a black box that prevents them from being interrogated.   
 
 A third finding of this research is that the judgments that underlie risk assessment, 
governance, and scientific research are unavoidable.  It is impossible to complete risk 
assessments, conduct scientific research, or determine regulatory policy without them.  
The goal then becomes not to remove these judgments or reduce their frequency, but to 
arrive at them in the best way possible.  This leads to the question: how should we best 
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make these judgments?  A beginning point, in line with the participatory paradigm, is to 
acknowledge that judgments exist, begin to identify the specific judgments being made, 
and open these judgments to deliberation from a relevant group of people (Stern and 
Fineberg 1996; Rowe and Frewer 2000).  Yet this assumes that participants in such an 
exercise would be able to discern what judgments align with their values and interests, 
which is not always the case, particularly in many risk-related areas where the processes 
and judgments are highly complex.  There is a need therefore, for research that helps 
foster and contribute to reflection concerning these judgments (Holifield 2012).  Research 
that helps explore what is at stake in one set of judgments as compared to another could 
subsequently inform decision making, societal discussions, or participatory processes 
taking place on such issues.  In this dissertation, I demonstrate an approach based on 
identifying consequential judgments and then exploring both their underlying 
assumptions and their implications.   
 
 Finally, this research has implications for discussions surrounding controversial 
environmental issues such as GMOs, fracking, invasive species, and climate change.  
Often the discourse around these issues is focused solely on the questions of whether 
scientific research is being conducted to examine potential risks, and whether the 
assessed environmental risks will outweigh political and economic interests in decision 
making.  As this dissertation shows however, assessments of potential environmental 
harm are foundationally dependent upon the assumptions used in these assessments.  
Therefore, equal attention should be paid to the question of how these assessments are 
conducted as is paid to whether these assessments are conducted.  And such scrutiny 
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should not be structured in terms of the objectivity of such assessments, but rather should 
be focused on identifying and reflecting upon the judgments and assumptions informing 
the assessments.  This type of transparency would move away from the paradigm of 
using objectivity as a shield from scrutiny, and could ultimately help improve the trust of 
environmental agencies and environmental science (Jasanoff 2003).  And as 
demonstrated by the wild rice collaborative committee, transparency surrounding these 
judgments and assumptions could also help open technology decision making to 
consideration of its negative impacts.  This dissertation points to the need for further 
research of this kind and provides an example of how this type of work can be completed.   
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Chapter 1 – Delimiting the Study of Risk: Exploring Values and 
Judgments in Conflicting GMO Ecological Risk Assessment Guidelines 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Recent conflicts surrounding environmental decision making for emerging 
technologies have brought a renewed focus to risk assessment.  From the national to 
international level, decision making bodies rely on risk assessment to study if and how 
proposed products or actions cause harm to the environment to inform decisions 
concerning those products or actions (EPA 1998; EFSA 2010).  Given the centrality of 
risk assessment in decision making, it is often a focal point for conflict.  One important 
issue in risk assessment conflict is how risk assessment guidelines are designed, or what 
specific steps are followed when conducting a risk assessment.  While some scholarship 
has viewed risk assessment as a largely objective process completed outside of values-
based judgments, other scholarship has demonstrated the existence and influence of 
subjective assumptions and judgments within risk assessment (Jensen et al. 2003; Meyer 
2011, among others).  Yet there remains a lack of work that explores the relationship 
between risk assessment, decision making, and scientific studies by focusing on the role 
of judgments within risk assessment guidelines.  This is a significant gap because the 
judgments within risk assessment guidelines influence what types of scientific studies are 
conducted and how they inform decision making.  There is a need, therefore, to explore 
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the judgments within risk assessment guidelines that delimit what science is completed 
and what information informs decision making.  To further the work on judgments within 
risk assessment, I study two competing sets of risk assessment guidelines for assessing 
the impacts of genetically modified (GM) plants on non-target organisms.   
 
Recent conflict focused on risk assessment spans a variety of issues with regard to 
agricultural biotechnology.  Internationally, risk assessment was at the center of the 
ruling from the 2003 World Trade Organization case brought by the United States, 
Canada and Argentina against the European Union for their banning of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs).  A key part of this ruling stated that the moratoria placed 
on GMOs were not legal because the decisions to do so were not based upon risk 
assessment (Bonneuil and Levidow 2012).  The ruling left open the possibility for 
restricting the use of GMOs if, through risk assessment, the potential for significant harm 
to human health or the environment was determined.  In another case, within the United 
States, the Center for Food Safety challenged the US Department of Agriculture’s 
environmental assessment for GM alfalfa, arguing, among other things, that the 
assessment did not adequately examine the impact on organic growers (Dickinson 2010).  
In the European Union (EU), environmental regulatory review is a primary site for the 
conflict concerning whether GMO use is allowed or not in different member states 
(Seifert 2010).  A recent exchange between Wickson and Wynne (2012a; 2012b) and 
members of the European Food Safety Authority (Perry et al. 2012) highlights the 
importance of whether subjective, values-based judgments are seen as existing within risk 
assessment.  In that case, understanding risk assessment to contain subjective judgments 
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influenced whether one could see different member states conducting legitimate risk 
assessments that led to differing conclusions.  Finally, conflicts in India surrounding the 
potential use of GM brinjal (eggplant) involved contestations over how risk assessment 
would be used to inform decision making (Gupta 2011).  This range of examples 
demonstrates how risk assessment is central to and yet contested in decision making 
regarding genetically modified organisms.   
 
At its most basic, risk assessment is a process used to synthesize science to study 
and describe risks for decision making.  In the particular, risk assessments are essential to 
GM plant decision making in oversight agencies such as the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (Johnson 
et al. 2007; EFSA 2010).  With regards to examining the potential for environmental 
harm, a specific type of risk assessment called ecological risk assessment (ERA) is used.  
As described in one influential report on ERA in the US (EPA 1998), ERA is used to:  
“systematically evaluate and organize data, information, assumptions, and 
uncertainties in order to help understand and predict the relationships between 
stressors and ecological effects in a way that is useful for environmental decision 
making” (p.1). 
 
Generally, risk assessment is made up of four major stages: problem formulation, 
exposure analysis, effects analysis, and risk characterization (EPA 1998).  Problem 
formulation is the first stage, where many foundational decisions are made including 
identifying the goals of the assessment as well as the hazards and valued ecological 
entities to be examined.  The problem formulation stage generates a conceptual model 
and analysis plan to examine how the stressor and valued ecological entities may interact.  
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The conceptual model and analysis plan are then examined in the exposure and effects 
analyses stages.  Exposure analysis seeks to determine if and how the valued ecological 
entity will be exposed to the hazard, while effects analysis seeks to determine how that 
exposure adversely affects the ecological entity.  An ecological entity must be both 
exposed and susceptible to the hazard for an adverse effect to take place.  Lastly, the risk 
characterization stage synthesizes the previous stages into information that is relevant to 
the original goals of the ecological risk assessment and to environmental decision 
making.  Depending on the specific scope, a risk assessment can be informed by existing 
scientific studies, if they adequately access what is needed, or by new studies conducted 
specifically for the assessment.   
 
Although I focus on conflict involving the structure of risk assessment guidelines, 
there exist many other types of conflict involving risk assessment.  For example, risk 
assessment’s privileged place in decision making is critiqued for how social and political 
concerns involving emerging technologies can become marginalized because they are not 
compatible with a risk assessment framework (Wynne 2002).  In addition, risk 
assessment is contested when it is framed as the objective and singular way to study the 
potential for environmental harm.  Risk assessment, due to its focus on demonstrable 
harm, has been critiqued for not being well suited to address unknown unknowns and for 
not being consistent with decision making based on the precautionary principle 
(Ahteensuu 2010).  Finally, once risk assessment guidelines are agreed upon, or once 
there is agreement upon the steps that should be completed during the assessment of risk, 
there is often conflict over whose values and priorities will inform the actual conducting 
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of the risk assessment.  So who is involved, and what values and priorities are privileged, 
in the actual conducting of the risk assessment is also a site of conflict (Kuzma and 
Besley 2008).   
 
Within these studies of risk assessment, there has been a lack of work engaged 
with risk assessment guidelines.  By focusing on an example of conflict between two 
competing sets of risk assessment guidelines, I further explore the role of values-based 
judgments in risk assessment guidelines and provide new insights on the relationship 
between risk assessment, science, and decision making.  Here I report on my study of two 
competing sets of risk assessment guidelines used to examine the potential impacts of 
GM plants on non-target organisms.  This study was guided by two overarching 
questions: 1) how do values-based judgments within GMO ERA guidelines delimit the 
study of risks from GM plants?  2) how do the scientists involved in conflicting ERA 
guidelines justify the judgments within their guidelines?  In this chapter, I first review 
scholarship on judgment and conflict in risk assessment.  I then outline the conceptual 
framework I use to structure this study of conflicting risk assessment guidelines.  Results 
are structured around three different consequential judgments in the conflicting risk 
assessment guidelines: hazard identification, species selection, and indirect prey-quality 
effects.  For each judgment I explore the implications of the differences between the two 
approaches as well as how those involved with each set of guidelines justified their 
judgments.  I conclude with an exploration of the implications of this work for 
environmental decision making and the study of risk assessment. 
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1.2 Judgment, conflict, and risk assessment guidelines 
 
Although risk assessment is sometimes understood as objective or value-free, 
judgment and the accompanying potential for conflict within risk assessment have been 
identified as issues in need of addressing as far back as the first influential study of risk 
assessment in the United States (National Research Council 1983).  This National 
Research Council (NRC) study was foundational to risk assessment in the United States 
(Suter 2008) and, most famously, is known for the call to separate risk assessment and 
risk management as a way to establish the credibility and accuracy of regulatory decision 
making (National Research Council 1983, 151).  However, the NRC report also argues 
that subjective values-based “risk assessment policy” or “judgments made in risk 
assessment” (p. 37) are integral to risk assessment itself.  This risk assessment policy is 
different from policy considerations used within risk management which include 
political, social and economic considerations used to inform decision making.  Risk 
assessment policy includes judgments made within the risk assessment process for each 
instance of “missing or ambiguous information on a particular substance and gaps in 
current scientific theory”(National Research Council 1983, 28).  These are instances 
where a choice must be made among “several scientifically plausible options,” named in 
the report as “inference options” (National Research Council 1983, 28).  A long list of 
judgments essential to risk assessment policy is provided in the report, including topics 
such as how to determine the value of studies with different results and how to make 
extrapolations (National Research Council 1983, 29–33).  The report recognizes that 
these necessary choices have implications for a risk assessment: “That a scientist makes 
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the choices does not render the judgments devoid of policy implications.  Scientists differ 
in their opinions of the validity of various options, even if they are not consciously 
choosing to be more or less conservative” (National Research Council 1983, 36).  It also 
recognizes how the factors that influence these decisions are not easily distinguished:  
“A scientist’s weighting of these variables may not easily be expressed explicitly, 
and the result is a mixture of fact, experience (often called intuition), and personal 
values that cannot be disentangled easily.  As a result, the choice made may be 
perceived by the scientist as based primarily on informed scientific judgment.  
From a regulatory official’s point of view, the same choice may appear to be a 
value decision as to how conservative regulatory policy should be, given the lack 
of a decisive empirical basis for choice” (National Research Council 1983, 36–
37). 
 
This report sees guidelines as instrumental for dealing with the issues that arise 
from the judgments within and subjective structure of risk assessment.  Risk assessment 
guidelines are proposed as a way to describe all aspects of risk assessment that are 
“subject to generic treatment” and provide “supplementary scientific discussion” for each 
point where a choice between inference options is needed.  In other words, risk 
assessment guidelines should identify the general processes of risk assessment as well as 
highlight and analyze areas where specific judgments are needed because there is no 
scientific consensus.  The NRC report provided numerous justifications for the role 
guidelines serve.  First, guidelines help “separate risk assessment from risk management 
considerations, improve public understanding of the process, foster consistency, and 
prevent oversights and judgments that are inconsistent with current scientific thought” 
(National Research Council 1983, 162).  Second, guidelines help ensure scientific studies 
provide relevant data for risk assessments.  By articulating how the assessment will be 
conducted and what type of data is desired, guidelines can provide researchers insights on 
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how to design their scientific studies to make them most relevant.  Third, guidelines can 
provide a singular approach to decision making, which is much more efficient and 
justifiable for the regulatory agencies, while allowing for necessary updates when 
needed.  As the report states, “guidelines themselves will help to foster evolutionary 
improvements by defining generic principles of risk assessment and focusing debate and 
empirical research on these principles” (National Research Council 1983, 169).   
 
Far from describing an objective and universal notion of risk assessment, the 
foundational ideas of risk assessment articulated within this report were steeped with 
concerns about what form risk assessment should take, how the necessary judgments 
should be made, and the potential for conflict.  Guidelines are used to deal with these 
judgments and they reveal at least two types of conflict within risk assessment.  First, 
since guidelines lay out the structure of risk assessment, they identify what questions 
need to be answered at each stage of the risk assessment.  As a consequence, there can be 
conflict over how the risk assessment guidelines should be structured, including what 
questions should be asked.  Second, once risk assessment guidelines are agreed upon, 
there can be conflict over how the steps in a risk assessment should be completed.   
 
1.2.1 Participation in risk assessment 
A variety of studies have focused on how to examine and understand judgments 
and conflict in risk assessment.  Early work challenged the distinction between risk 
assessment and risk management, and highlighted how risk assessment was a subjective 
and partial way to organize knowledge for decision making (e.g., Jasanoff 1993; Jasanoff 
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1999; Wynne 1996).  These studies examined how risk assessment provides a particular 
way of evaluating an issue and is based on a set of subjective assumptions that could be 
opened to wider scrutiny than when risk assessment is kept to scientific experts.  
Scholarship and methods development associated with GMO ERA worked to articulate 
and make more transparent the values-based choices and assumptions within GMO ERA 
(Thompson 2003; Jensen et al. 2003) and to find ways to deliberately consider these 
choices when conducting a risk assessment (Nelson et al. 2004; Nelson, Andow, and 
Banker 2009).  Thompson (2003) showed, for example, the values-laden nature of the 
decisions central to GMO ERA including choosing what ecological attributes to protect 
and determining how do deal with uncertainty.  Myhr argued that the scientist’s 
background or discipline will influence the choice of hypothesis, methods, and models, 
which can lead to differing data and disagreements as they conduct a risk assessment 
(2010).  This vein of work fits well within the participatory paradigm in science and 
technology policy that seeks to include the public and stakeholders within decision 
making to help interrogate and determine the subjective or values-based decisions.  Many 
risk assessment guidelines developed since the NRC’s 1983 report have been influenced 
by these ideas (e.g., Stern and Fineberg 1996; Presidential/ Congressional Commission 
on Risk Assessment and Risk Management 1997; Renn 2005).  Revised and new 
guidelines have emphasized the importance of deliberation and stakeholder participation 
as a way to improve risk assessment by incorporating a more diverse set of knowledge 
and by increasing the transparency and legitimacy of risk assessment.   
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1.2.2 Understanding differences between risk assessment guidelines 
The analytical framework I use to examine the differences between guidelines for 
GMO ERA is informed by scholarship on risk assessment and science developed by the 
fields of science and technology studies and governmentality (Dean 2010; Elliott 2012; 
Jasanoff 1990; Holifield 2009b).  This scholarship emphasizes the normative dimensions 
of risk assessment in that it provides a particular logic to envision and calculate potential 
harm, influences how scientific studies are conducted, and ultimately delimits what 
knowledge will inform decision making.  This approach to the conceptualization of risk 
assessment and science is well suited to understand the conflicting risk assessment 
guidelines examined here.     
 
The first insight from this scholarship emphasizes that risk assessment is a process 
that orders and makes sense of the world in a particular way at the expense of other ways.  
Dean argues that risk assessment is “a set of different ways of ordering reality, of 
rendering it into a calculable form.  It is a way of representing events in a certain form so 
they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for 
particular goals” (2010, 206).  To see the world in terms of hazards, endpoints and risk 
hypotheses is, then, not a natural or objective way to view the world and evaluate the 
potential for harm to the environment, but one that privileges certain experts, priorities, 
ways of knowing, and ways of thinking at the expense of others.  There are other ways to 
inform decision making using empirical studies (e.g. those based on the precautionary 
principle) that do not adhere to the same assumptions as risk assessment.   
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A second insight is although risk assessment approaches share a basic set of 
assumptions that represent a certain way to organize and study the world, there can still 
exist important differences among risk assessment guidelines.  Dean argues, for example, 
that “instead of assuming that the empirical varieties of risk are but instances of one type 
of instrumental rationality, it is possible to demonstrate that risk rationalities are not only 
multiple but heterogeneous and that practices for the government of risk are assembled 
from diverse elements and put together in different ways” (2010, 211).  In other words, 
risk assessment is not a singular practice or logic, and the differences among risk 
assessments guidelines are potentially significant for what they privilege and marginalize.  
One way to study these differences is by exploring the judgments made within risk 
assessment guidelines.  Differences between risk assessment guidelines exist for distinct 
topics (e.g. human health, invasive species, and genetically modified plants all take 
different forms), but different approaches also exist for the same topic.  How particular 
guidelines structure a risk assessment will influence what potential harms are examined 
and how they are studied.  Therefore, exploring how risk assessment approaches differ 
can provide important insights about how risk assessment influences decision making and 
what is at stake in different approaches to risk assessment.   
 
The implications from these differing risk assessment guidelines is further 
highlighted by considering a third insight, which emphasizes how scientific findings are 
dependent upon the assumptions and judgments used to derive them (Elliott 2012; 
Jasanoff 1990).  How scientific experiments are designed influences their results and 
scientists working on the same topic may design and conduct experiments differently, 
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and therefore, come to differing conclusions.  Elliott, for example, develops the notion of 
“selective ignorance” to explore “the wide range of often subtle research choices or 
‘value judgments’ that lead to the collection of some forms of knowledge rather than 
others” (2012, 331).  He argues that it is important to consider how these “decisions 
about what questions to ask, what metrics or standards to employ, what concepts to use, 
what research strategies to pursue, what technological applications to develop, and what 
information to disseminate” lead us to be selectively ignorant of complex phenomenon 
(2012, 329).  Holifield, in a study of how an indigenous community contested the human 
health risk assessment of a Superfund site, also emphasizes the need for reflection about 
what form a risk assessment takes and what questions are raised (2009b).  He argues that 
in addition to ensuring adequate inclusion within political decision making, there is a 
need to scrutinize the risk assessment and science itself:  “In the case of a Superfund risk 
assessment, this means that democracy and environmental justice require attending not 
just to who participates and how, but also—for example—to questions about how to 
sample and analyze soil or fish, or what to extrapolate from a series of lab rodent 
bioassays” (Holifield 2009b, 653).  This literature emphasizes the importance of 
judgments in both risk assessment and science.  Because risk assessment serves as the 
key framework for making sense of and interpreting science for decision making, the 
structure of a risk assessment influences what type of science is needed.  Different risk 
assessment guidelines, as a result, may call for distinct scientific studies.  The judgments 
within risk assessment guidelines, then, influence how the potential for harm is studied 
and what scientific studies are conducted.  The structure of a risk assessment framework, 
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therefore, delimits the science that is completed for risk assessment and that ultimately 
informs decision making.  
 
Building upon this literature, I developed a conceptual model for understanding 
the role of values-based judgments in risk assessment guidelines and the importance of 
guidelines for risk-related decision making (Figure 1).  I compare three different ways of 
understanding the relationship between risk assessment (RA) guidelines, the conducting 
of risk assessment, and science, by varying whether each aspect is considered to contain 
values-based judgments or not.  I contrast the model I build upon, shown in part C of the 
figure, with two other ways of understanding risk assessment and science.  In all three 
models (parts A through C), “decision making” involves combining broader social, 
political and economic values with the characterized risks provided by the risk 
assessment to determine whether and how the entity under consideration should be used.  
Part A of Figure 1 shows an objectivist model where science, risk assessment guidelines, 
and the conducting of risk assessment are all seen as objective, or not involving values-
based judgments.  This model is built on the assumption that there is an objective right 
way to conduct risk assessment and scientific studies outside of values-based judgments.  
Kuntz (2012) provides an example of an argument drawing upon this model.   
 
Part B shows the Values-based RA & Objective Science Model, where values-
based judgments are acknowledged in the risk assessment guidelines and in the 
conducting of the risk assessment.  Risk assessment guidelines can differ because of the 
differing judgments they are built upon.  These judgments delimit the study of risk in  
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A.  Objectivist Model: Science, risk assessment (RA) guidelines, and the conducting of risk 
assessment are all seen as objective, or not involving values-based judgments.  After the basic 
management context is provided (e.g. the product under consideration and the relevant 
regulations), there will be a single right way to characterize the risks outside of values-based 
judgments.  RA guidelines are seen as an objective way to synthesize objective science that exists 
or is created to address the question at hand.   
 
 
 
B.  Values-based Risk Assessment & Objective Science Model: Values-based judgments are 
acknowledged in the RA guidelines and in the conducting of the risk assessment.  RA Guidelines 
#1 and #2 contain differing judgments that delimit the study of risk in particular ways; for 
example, they may contain different steps or pose different questions in need of answering.  A 
and B represent two different parties using the same guidelines to conduct a risk assessment on 
the same topic.  A and B diverge because they answer the questions posed by each set of 
guidelines differently.  For example, if guidelines #1 provides a process for selecting which 
species to test, A and B would complete that process differently leading to differing 
characterizations of risk.  The characterization of risk, therefore, could vary based on the 
differences between guidelines #1 and #2 and based on the differences between parties A and B.  
Science, in this model is seen as completed outside of values-based judgments and as producing 
non-conflicting singular knowledge.   
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C. Values-based Judgments Model: Values-based judgments are acknowledged in science, RA 
guidelines, and the conducting of risk assessment.  In addition to the judgments described in part 
B, this model acknowledges the values-based judgments present within science.  Science, here, is 
dependent upon the judgments or assumptions that inform it (e.g. what questions are asked, what 
methods are used).  Furthermore, this model acknowledges how the judgments within RA 
guidelines can influence and delimit what form this science takes.  Scientific findings can be 
different and potentially conflicting based upon the judgments informing them.   
 
Figure 1: Three models examining the relationship between risk assessment (RA) guidelines, the 
conducting of risk assessment, science and decision making.  The role of values-based judgments 
differs between these models.  Dashed lines indicate the model assumes there are values-based 
judgments present in that aspect, solid lines indicate the model assumes the aspect can be 
objectively completed outside of values-based judgments.  The management context 
acknowledges that even within the objectivist model there is a need for some decision making or 
management context to determine the scope of the risk assessment and science (e.g. product 
under consideration and regulatory context).  The management context in these models does not 
represent a full problem formulation; this would be included under the “Conducting risk 
assessment.”  By extension, the objectivist model does not recognize the values-based judgments 
within problem formulation that could lead two parties to come to diverging characterizations of 
risk.  Although decisions during the conducting of the risk assessment are made that influence 
what science is completed, the models here focus on the impact of the guidelines themselves.   
 
particular ways and may take a variety of forms (e.g. asking different questions, using 
different steps).  This model also distinguishes between risk assessment guidelines and 
the divergences that can occur through conducting a risk assessment informed by those 
guidelines (indicated by A and B).  This conceptual model emphasizes that two groups of 
risk assessors (A and B) using the same guidelines for the same topic and context may 
still come to different characterizations of risk (indicated by characterized risks #1 vs. 
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#2), based on the values-based decisions made during the risk assessment (e.g. which 
species are most important to protect).  Science, in this model, is seen as completed 
outside of values-based judgments and as producing non-conflicting and singular 
knowledge.  This model is arguably the closest to that proposed in the previously 
discussed NRC report (1983), where values-based judgments are made in risk assessment 
guidelines to help structure how scientific studies should be synthesized and how to deal 
with the limitations and gaps within existing scientific knowledge.   
 
Part C of Figure 1 is the model used to inform this work.  In this model, values-
based judgments are acknowledged within risk assessment guidelines, the conducting of 
risk assessment and science.  There are multiple possible guidelines for risk assessment 
due to the different, possibly conflicting, judgments within risk assessment guidelines.  
The science deemed relevant for a risk assessment may differ due to the judgments made 
in the competing risk assessment guidelines, and the scientific findings provide partial, 
and potentially conflicting, knowledge based upon their assumptions.  In other words, the 
conceptual model for this paper is built upon the idea that the results from scientific 
studies are dependent upon the assumptions that were used to produce them.  Similarly, 
decision making, instead of informed by the outcome of a pre-determined risk assessment 
framework, must implicitly or explicitly consider how competing assumptions within risk 
assessment guidelines lead to different characterizations of risk.  Therefore, decisions 
should be made through a consideration of the characterization of risk as well as the set 
of assumptions it is based upon.  Competing risk assessment guidelines influence what 
type of science is relevant and conducted, ultimately delimiting what type of studies will 
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inform the characterization of risk and decision making.  The challenge, as I describe 
next, is to examine how competing risk assessment guidelines differ by exploring the 
divergence of key judgments within the guidelines and the science they call for.   
 
1.3 Methods: Studying conflicting GMO ERA guidelines  
 
As a case study I examined two competing sets of risk assessment guidelines for 
assessing the potential impacts of GM plants on non-target organisms.  GMO ERA for 
non-target impacts examines how GMOs, and in this case GM plants, affect organisms 
that are not the target of the trait they are genetically modified to express.  Much of the 
existing non-target impact work has examined plants engineered to express transgenes 
that produce insecticidal toxins from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), used to 
provide protection against certain types of Lepidoptera caterpillar and Coleoptera beetle 
insect pests.  Non-target GMO ERA examines how GM plants may impact other 
organisms that are not the targeted Lepidoptera or Coleoptera pests.  Non-target GMO 
ERA contributes to environmental oversight by assessing whether GM plants have a 
significant negative effect on non-pest organisms.   
 
The two differing non-target GMO ERA guidelines I studied are each supported 
by a different group of scientists.  I refer to the two competing guidelines as they have 
been identified elsewhere: the ecotoxicological approach and the ecological approach 
(Meyer 2011).  The ecotoxicological approach builds largely upon the risk assessment 
paradigm developed for toxicological testing of chemical substances, while the ecological 
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approach builds upon critiques of that paradigm concerning its inability to capture the 
complexity of living biological organisms as stressors.  Supporters of each of these 
approaches have published at length on their approach to ERA, providing insights on how 
to complete risk assessment using their guidelines and arguments as to why their 
approach is better than the other approach.  Existing scholarship that has engaged with 
these guidelines singles out some of the differences between the two approaches, 
including how species are identified for testing, how risk hypotheses are determined, and 
when different types of experiments (e.g. lab, semi-field and field) are needed (Hilbeck et 
al. 2011; Meyer 2011).  I build upon this work by further exploring the differences 
between and judgments within these risk assessment guidelines, considering the 
implications of these differences, and examining how those supporting the differing 
guidelines justify their approach.  Specifically the analysis was guided by two 
overarching research questions: 1) how do values-based judgments within GMO ERA 
guidelines delimit the study of risks from GM plants?  2) how do the scientists involved 
in conflicting ERA guidelines justify the judgments within their guidelines?   
 
I utilized two main methods, a document analysis of the published material 
surrounding the ERA guidelines and interviews with the scientists involved with the two 
approaches.  I conducted a document analysis of the publications supporting the two non-
target GMO ERA guidelines to identify general differences between the two approaches 
and their implications.  I organized this analysis by examining on how, though based in 
risk assessment, each set of guidelines proposed a distinct approach for assessing risk 
based on differing judgments.  I tracked the steps a GM plant goes through when 
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considered by each set of guidelines in order to identify, for example, what questions 
were asked during the risk assessment stages and what studies were called for.  With this 
basic information, I then conducted interviews with the scientists involved to confirm the 
significant differences between the approaches.  I also examined how the scientists 
justified their approach and what they thought were the implications of the differences 
between the approaches.  In-depth, semi-structured interviews were completed with 10 
scientists actively involved with the differing guidelines, and each interview lasted 
approximately one to two hours (Appendix A).  The interviews were transcribed and the 
qualitative analysis software Atlas.ti used to help analyze the key judgments and their 
justifications.  Once the key differing judgments and their justifications were identified, I 
explored how they structured the risk assessment guidelines and the scientific studies that 
were called for.  In other words, I explored how the guidelines delimited the study of 
potential harm from GM plants.   
 
1.4 Findings: Different Judgments, Diverging Risk Assessments 
 
Here I describe three key judgment areas – hazard identification and substantial 
equivalence, species selection, and indirect prey-quality effects – that emerged from my 
analysis of the two risk assessment guidelines for non-target effects of insect resistant 
GM plants.  I focused on these judgment areas because they represent decisions that most 
significantly lead to divergences between the conflicting guidelines and that also delimit 
how the potential for harm from GM plants is studied.  For each of these three judgment 
areas I explore both the justifications for the judgments provided by the scientists I 
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interviewed as well as some of the implications of the differences between the two 
guidelines.  Finally, in section 4.4, I review the underlying understandings of agriculture 
and risk that helps explain why those supporting each approach made the judgments they 
did.   
 
1.4.1 Hazard identification and substantial equivalence 
Hazard identification is the step of risk assessment where the entity that could 
cause harm is identified so that its relationship to valued ecological entities can be 
analyzed.  In non-target GMO ERA this involves deciding what parts of the insect-
resistant GM plant may cause harm to the environment and need to be studied.  The two 
approaches differ over whether the Bt toxin, inserted in the plant genome to give the plant 
the insect resistant trait, can be singled out as the only hazard.  The eco-toxicological 
approach is built upon the judgment that substantial equivalence testing can be used to 
ensure that the genetically modified plant is similar to the conventional plant in all ways 
other than the insertion of the Bt toxin.  According to the eco-toxicological ERA 
framework, if the insertion of the Bt toxin is determined to be the only significant novel 
change in the GM plant, then the Bt toxin can be identified as the only hazard of concern.  
As described below, this then allows for a tiered approach that privileges laboratory 
testing of the Bt toxin in the analysis phase.  The ecological approach, conversely, does 
not make the judgment that substantial equivalence testing can adequately determine that 
a Bt GM plant is similar to a conventional plant in all ways other than the Bt toxin.  The 
ecological ERA framework, therefore, is open to including other hazards, such as the 
whole genetically modified plant based on the argument that potential unintended 
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changes may have occurred within the plant during the modification process.  A broader 
set of risk hypotheses may then exist, requiring a different set of procedures in the 
laboratory and field testing.   
 
With the eco-toxicological approach, the Bt toxin is singled out as the hazard in 
need of assessment through substantial equivalence testing (Romeis et al. 2008; Romeis, 
Meissle, and Bigler 2006a).  Substantial equivalence testing relies upon testing a number 
of compositional and agronomic characteristics of a GM plant to determine if there are 
any significant differences compared to its non-GM counterpart (EuropaBio 2003).  If no 
significant differences are found through these tests, then one can identify the Bt toxin as 
the only hazard in need of addressing.  If, however, a GM plant was found not to be 
substantially equivalent to its non-GM counterpart, whatever characteristics of the plant 
were found to be different would need to be analyzed as potential hazards.  Once 
substantial equivalence of the GM plant has been established, the Bt toxin can then be 
analyzed like a chemical pesticide using a tiered approach that begins with worst-case 
exposure lab testing and proceeds to more realistic field testing only if the potential for 
adverse effects is found at the lower tiers of exposure.  Figure 2 provides an overview of 
this approach and how it differs from the ecological approach.  Worst-case exposure lab 
testing involves conducting a toxicity test that exposes an insect species to the Bt toxin in 
its purified form using an artificial diet at many times the highest level that would be 
encountered in the field.  If no adverse effect is observed when insects are exposed to this 
level of toxin, then no further information is needed to determine that there is no  
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Figure 2: Overview of key differences between eco-toxicological and ecological GMO 
ERA guidelines.  With eco-toxicological approach: 1) The hazard is identified as only the 
Bt toxin, using substantial equivalence testing to ensure that the presence of the Bt toxin 
is the only difference between the Bt and non-Bt variety; 2) Laboratory tests are 
conducted on surrogate species using worst case toxin exposure with isolated Bt toxin; 3) 
If no adverse effects are found in the worst case toxin exposure laboratory tests, then no 
additional field tests are needed to adequately characterize the risk; 4) If an adverse effect 
is found in the worst case toxin exposure laboratory tests then additional semi-field and 
field tests are called for to examine whether the adverse effects are found under more 
realistic conditions.  With the ecological approach: 1) The hazard is identified as the Bt 
toxin and the transformed plant; 2) Laboratory tests are conducted on local key species 
using isolated Bt toxin and plant material to examine direct effects; 3) If no adverse 
effects are found in the laboratory tests examining direct effects, semi-field and field tests 
are conducted to examine indirect and direct effects not well able to be studied in the 
laboratory; 4) If severe enough adverse effects are found in laboratory tests, then no 
additional studies are needed to adequately characterize the risk.   
 
significant risk to that species.  Only in the event that an adverse effect is found within 
these worst-case exposure laboratory studies would you then continue to semi-field, or 
greenhouse, studies to see if under more realistic exposure scenarios – with lower levels 
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of Bt toxin – the adverse effect is still found.  And it is only after finding an adverse 
effect in laboratory and semi-field studies that you would continue to field studies to see 
if the adverse effect is found under the most realistic exposure scenario.   
 
The ecological approach to non-target GMO ERA, conversely, uses a different 
tiered approach and does not make the judgment that substantial equivalence testing is an 
adequate way to assess the potential differences between a GM plant and its conventional 
counterpart (Andow, Lovei, and Arpaia 2006; Andow, Hilbeck, and Tuat 2008).  Instead, 
the ecological approach is built around constructing and analyzing risk hypotheses for the 
most important possible adverse effects.  These risk hypotheses are chosen by 
considering the possible hazards that could result from the GM plant and considering the 
non-target species that could be impacted by these hazards.  These risk hypotheses 
consider hazards that could cause both direct and indirect effects.  Direct effects include 
how the inserted Bt toxin, itself, could come into contact with, and negatively impact, 
non-target species.  Indirect effects include potential negative impacts on non-target 
species resulting from both changes in the plant caused by the genetic modification 
process and changes in ecosystem dynamics caused by the GM plant (e.g. predators being 
harmed by having less Bt-susceptible prey to consume).  Because the ecological approach 
considers adverse effects that could result from aspects of the genetically modified plant 
other than the Bt toxin itself, the genetically modified plant itself may be included as a 
stressor in this approach.  To consider the GM plant a stressor means that semi-field or 
field studies need to be conducted to examine the stressor – one of the reasons a strict 
tiered approach would not work for the ecological approach.   
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1.4.1.1 Justifications 
In examining the justifications for each approach, the adequacy of substantial 
equivalence testing emerged as a key point of contention.  Supporters of the ecological 
approach argued that substantial equivalence testing is inadequate for capturing the 
potential changes caused in the genetically modified plant.  They argued that the 
compositional and agronomic characteristics of a plant measured in substantial 
equivalence testing cannot discern the nuanced changes in a genetically modified plant 
that may lead the plant to interact differently with its environment.  As one scientist said:  
“What we have never gotten to agree on is, is the GMO just an addition of a gene 
and the only new thing is the [Bt] chemical, so you only test the chemical? If you 
view this as only a chemical and everything else is going to be picked up under 
the substantial equivalence thing, yeah, then it is stringent to say all I need to test 
is the Bt protein, then life is fine with me and I picked up everything I need to 
know.  So what you presume there is that if there is any difference caused by the 
transformation process, you would pick it up from the ash content or the total 
protein or amino acid, and that’s roughly it. So that is a very crude and naïve view 
of how organisms function.” 
 
Yet the supporters of the eco-toxicological approach viewed substantial equivalence 
testing as a legitimate way to discern any significant unintended differences between a 
GM plant and its conventional counterpart.  In articulating this view, one interviewee 
cited the history of substantially equivalence testing as one that has not revealed 
differences between GM and non-GM plants:  
“We are feeling more and more comfortable because look at the whole substantial 
equivalence testing. This was basically initiated because people were worried 
about this new type of technology, that it could do something to the plant.  I think 
this was a very valuable risk hypothesis like 20 - 30 years ago…  There is not a 
single example today where a plant that has been transformed and made it to 
market or to a late stage was not substantially equivalent.  This, in my opinion, 
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tells us that the transformation process might create a few strange things, like 
conventional breeding as well, but this, coupled with the conventional breeding 
and plant selection afterwards, gives us considerable safety without any testing...  
It will still go through the [substantial equivalence testing], but we probably don’t 
even need that.” 
 
In these contrasting statements we see how the competing judgments about the adequacy 
of substantial equivalence testing are built on differing views of its past use.  On the eco-
toxicological side, the history that substantial equivalence testing has not found any 
evidence of significant differences between GM and non-GM plants, other than the 
desired trait, stands as evidence that plant genetic engineering techniques and selection 
processes rarely produce a plant that has unintended changes.  This evidence supports an 
attitude that any unintended changes are being adequately addressed by the current 
system.  The supporter of the ecological approach, conversely, was not reassured by a 
history of substantial equivalence testing that has not found significant differences 
between GM and conventional plants because the interviewee’s attitude was that testing 
was incapable of capturing the biological nuance of potential changes within a GM plant.  
They assert that to address these inadequacies, methods need to be developed to capture 
the nuances.  A key point of contention, then, involves how the potential unintended 
changes within a GM plant from the engineering process are tested for – a topic I return 
to in the discussion.  
 
1.4.1.2 Implications 
These differences involving hazard identification have implications for the 
transferability and specificity of the results from the scientific studies called for in the 
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different guidelines.  Scientists justified their approach to hazard identification in terms 
of either reasonableness or effectiveness.  With the eco-toxicological approach, 
substantial equivalence testing is used to determine that the only significant difference 
between the GM and non-GM plant is the toxin.  Therefore, the toxin is the only hazard.  
With this foundational judgment established, the results of laboratory studies on that 
toxin can be transferred to other GM plants engineered with the same toxin.  That is, if 
you have a Bt corn plant engineered to express the Cry1Ab toxin (a particular type of Bt 
toxin), then the laboratory studies you conduct on that toxin to evaluate if the Bt corn 
plant will harm ladybird beetles can also be used to study if ladybird beetles will be 
harmed by a GM cotton plant engineered to expresses the same Cry1Ab toxin.  As long 
as you establish substantial equivalence in all cases, the laboratory experiments 
examining how a specific Bt toxin affects an insect species are relevant whenever that 
toxin is being used in another plant.   
 
With the ecological approach’s method for hazard identification, the results from 
the studies conducted for the risk assessment are more specific to the GM plant under 
consideration.  For the same reasons, however, the results from the studies for one GM 
plant do not have the same transferability to risk assessments for other GM plants.  This 
emerges from the ecological approach’s consideration of how the genetic modification 
may influence the plant and how the transgene may express itself in ways that are not 
well mirror by purified Bt toxin.  In examining indirect effects using field studies 
involving the whole plant, the results are specific to that particular variety of GM plant 
being tested, as well as to that recipient agro-ecosystem.  For example, an insect resistant 
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GM corn plant engineered with the Cry1Ab Bt toxin will potentially act differently a 
particular agro-ecosystem than a similar variety of corn plant engineered with different 
type of Bt toxin or than a soybean plant engineered with the same Cry1Ab toxin.  In 
examining direct effects from the Bt toxin in a GM plant, using parts of the GM plant 
itself instead of the purified Bt protein will make the results more realistic, but also 
specific to that particular GM plant.   
 
Those supporting the eco-toxicological approach argued that the specificity of this 
ecological approach is unreasonable and that their approach is reasonable in terms of 
resources and safety:  
“Now if you take the plant as the stressor, because there are strange interactions 
going on between the toxin and the plant compounds, you would basically have to 
do a risk assessment for every single maize hybrid… I think Spain has 50 Bt 
hybrids, you would have to do a risk assessment for all of them…  I think we 
accept that we cannot have 100% safety.  That in the end we have to do a 
reasonable risk assessment in a reasonable amount of time, and there are 
limitations in terms of time and money.  And I think within this frame we are 
trying to do a risk assessment that is as good as possible.” 
 
Those supporting the ecological approach, on the other hand, argued that the selection of 
the most important risk hypotheses for each specific risk assessment can lead to a 
reasonable and effective assessment of the risk.  They argued that the tiered approach 
using substantial equivalence testing is not an effective way to characterize the risk from 
a GM plant because it leaves out a significant set of potential risk hypotheses, as one 
scientist said:  
“Well, the whole purpose of these papers… is about whether or not we assess 
things properly…  [If we use the other approach] it would mean that for a large 
class of things, we wouldn’t really be assessing risks.  We’d be sort of going 
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through motions. I think over the long haul, maybe it would start to erode the 
legitimacy of risk assessment as a decision making tool.” 
 
Overall, those supporting the ecological approach argue that the eco-toxicological 
approach’s use of simpler and easier lab testing is too limiting in the types of risks that it 
examines and in the ecological nuance it allows for.  Therefore, it is not effective in 
examining potential risks.  Conversely, those supporting the eco-toxicological approach 
make a case for their approach based upon its reasonableness.  It does not capture all risk 
hypotheses, but enough to have adequate safety.   
 
1.4.2 Species Selection 
The two approaches also differ over species selection – choice of which insect 
species to study in experiments to adequately characterize the risk from a GM plant.  
There are far too many important non-target insect species potentially impacted by a GM 
plant to conduct studies on them all.  As a result, those who conduct risk assessments 
need to choose the insect species to use for evaluation of the potential for significant 
harm to non-target species.  Each risk assessment guideline proposes a different process 
or set of criteria for choosing the species to be tested.  The eco-toxicological approach 
supports the use of surrogate species – species easily reared in the laboratory and whose 
results are extrapolated to the non-target insect species of concern.  Conversely, the 
ecological approach follows a process that selects key insect species for testing based on 
the specific qualities of the GM plant under consideration and the potential release 
environment.    
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Surrogate species have been used in studies for a variety of toxicological testing, 
including for pesticides (Barrett et al. 1994).  The eco-toxicological guidelines adapt this 
established use of surrogate species for testing insect resistant GM plants.  Surrogate 
species are species that are relatively easy to rear and use in laboratory testing but that 
can indicate whether the key non-target organisms would be adversely affected by the 
stressor under consideration.  As Carstens et al. describe, “Surrogates must be easily 
reared under controlled, standardized conditions to provide large numbers of consistent 
individuals having a high level of fitness; they must perform well on an artificial diet and 
be amenable to manipulation under laboratory conditions; and validated test protocols 
must be available that produce consistent, statistically robust data”(2014, 4).  Utilizing 
surrogate species for species selection helps the eco-toxicological approach address one 
particular complicating factor it faces: not all insect species can be easily raised and used 
in a laboratory setting, a precondition for the laboratory-based tiered approach.  If the 
surrogate species are not adversely impacted when exposed to a worst-case level of the Bt 
toxin in the laboratory, the eco-toxicological approach does not call for additional testing 
to judge that there is no significant risk to non-target species.  The eco-toxicological 
approach proposes that surrogate species should represent key functional groups of non-
target insects such as herbivores, pollinators, natural enemies, and decomposers.  
Information taken into account in the selection of surrogate species includes the risk 
hypotheses examined, and information about the plant, the Bt toxin, and the feeding 
habits of the potential test species (Romeis et al. 2008).   
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Instead of choosing surrogate species to represent important non-target organisms, 
the ecological approach uses a prioritization process to identify the most important insect 
species to study in the risk assessment given the specific GM plant and the local 
ecological context.  This prioritization process begins by determining the appropriate 
functional groups (e.g. non-target herbivore pests, predators, parasitoids, or pollinators) 
in need of examination based on the novel trait of the transgenic crop, the characteristics 
of the crop, and the environment it will be released into (Hilbeck et al. 2008, 119).  
Species within each functional group are prioritized to determine a limited number of 
most important insect species that should be tested.  This prioritization process to 
determine ‘most important’ considers each insect species association with the crop and 
their functional significance in the crop, associated crops, and natural areas.  Criteria for 
association with the crop include, for example, “geographic distribution in the cropping 
regions, prevalence on the crop, abundance on the crop, phonological (temporal) overlap 
between the crop and taxon, and habitat specialization during the crop cycle” (Hilbeck et 
al. 2008, 122).  Overall, functional significance considers the ecological importance of 
the insect species in the agro-ecosystem.  The goal, then, is to determine the most 
important insect species for testing given the specific transgenic trait, type of crop, and 
local environment.   
 
The consequential differences between these two approaches can be further 
comprehended by considering the specificity and transferability of their results.  If 
species tested are specific to the local conditions, as in the ecological approach, then 
extrapolation from surrogate species is not needed, but the results are specific to that 
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local context.  Use of local species may help reveal adverse effects that result from a 
local species being uniquely susceptible to a GM plant in ways a surrogate species may 
not be.  Studies examining how closely related species display significantly different 
susceptibilities to hazards have challenged the idea that surrogate species can adequately 
represent the diversity of non-target species (Banks et al. 2011; Lang et al. 2011; Banks, 
Ackleh, and Stark 2010; Stark, Banks, and Vargas 2004).  From the point of view of the 
eco-toxicological approach, however, local species are not a requirement for adequate 
risk assessment and in addition, they may pose unnecessary challenges such as limited 
species knowledge compared to well-studied surrogate species or the practical difficulties 
of rearing the species in a laboratory.  As those who support the eco-toxicological 
approach have argued in a publication,  
“The [ecological approach] has major drawbacks because the main criterion for 
the selection of species is the (regional) importance of the natural enemy in a 
given crop. Especially in tropical and subtropical countries, the natural enemy 
species are often not sufficiently described in taxonomic terms, cannot be reared 
in the laboratory or are not well studied in terms of their biology (e.g., prey 
spectrum) and function. Selecting such species for testing will cause serious 
problems with regard to the quality of such data and not increase the certainty and 
feasibility of the risk assessment” (Romeis, Meissle, and Bigler 2006b). 
 
Whereas, one supporter of the ecological approach explained that the specificity in the 
ecological approach is its strength, “the concept is to try to figure out the specific case, a 
specific crop, the specific traits, and the specific receiving environment.  And then you 
choose the species that are more likely able to indicate to you that something is going 
wrong.”   
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1.4.3 Indirect prey-quality effects  
The third area of divergence I identify involves how each approach considers 
indirect, prey-quality effects.  Indirect, prey-quality effects are those impacts on 
beneficial insects caused by a decrease in the quality of their prey as a result of the prey 
being negatively impacted by a GM plant.  This has implications for the risk hypotheses 
each approach examines and under what conditions each approach conducts laboratory or 
field studies.  For example, is it necessary to consider the potential adverse effects from a 
reduction in natural enemies, if their populations decline because GM plants kill a pest 
species that the natural enemies feed upon?  In other words, if a ladybug that normally 
feeds on a lepidopteran caterpillar pest is negatively impacted when those lepidopteran 
caterpillars are killed by a Bt crop, do you need to conduct studies to consider how 
ladybugs are impacted by having fewer lepidopteran pests to feed on and the potential 
adverse effects from having fewer ladybug natural predators to consume other pests?  
Those supporting the eco-toxicological approach make the judgment that it is 
unnecessary to conduct studies to examine potential reductions in predator species due to 
a reduction in Bt susceptible pests.  They maintained that if Bt plants were not used, then 
non-target prey species would still be adversely affected from the pesticides that would 
need to be used to control pest species.  In other words, they argued that the existing 
status quo or baseline for comparison would be one that involves pesticides that hurt 
natural enemies.  As one scientist supporting the eco-toxicological approach put it during 
an interview:  
“People who weren't working in conventional agriculture and thought that organic 
or something like that was much more the right path anyhow, would tend to want 
to look at a comparison of Bt crops compared to no insecticide sprays.  And under 
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those circumstances you'd say, well look, if a Bt [crop] does anything at all its 
risks are greater than having nothing out there.  Where the people who were much 
more steeped in conventional agriculture would say, well hang on, the reality is if 
you haven't got Bt out there, you got 12 sprays, and there are no beneficial 
[insects] and you're probably going to kill birds as well, right?  If you put a Bt 
crop out there, it's true, maybe there won't be as many Braconid [parasitoid 
natural predator] wasps because there isn't as much to eat as if you grew a non-
GM crop that wasn't sprayed, but let's be realistic here, what are 99 percent of 
growers really going to do, they're going to grow a crop and spray when the bugs 
turn up.” 
 
To support this argument supporters of the eco-toxicological approach also contend that 
the reduction of pests is the obvious goal of any crop protection method, and that “such 
effects on natural enemies, that are a consequence of an intended effect (that is, control of 
a pest), are common for all pest control methods, including insecticides, biological 
control and conventional host-plant resistance and are generally not regarded as a risk” 
(Romeis, Meissle, and Bigler 2006a, 69).  The goal of pest management is the reduction 
of pest species, no matter the method used, so the risks from the reduction in pest species 
are not unique to GM plants and do not need assessing (Romeis et al. 2008, 206–207).   
 
Therefore, those supporting the eco-toxicological approach believed, that because 
the agricultural status quo as they see it contains similar or more severe prey-quality 
indirect effects on natural enemies, it is not necessary to assess those risks.  As a 
consequence, the eco-toxicological risk assessment guidelines do not provide a 
methodology for assessing the indirect prey-quality risks.  This judgment aligns with the 
focus on laboratory testing privileged in the eco-toxicological approach, because 
assessing the risk from prey-quality indirect effects is most effectively done using field 
studies that capture the complex ecological interactions between natural predator species, 
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herbivore species, and plants.  As echoed by someone who supports the ecological 
approach,  
“You very rarely have a linear tritrophic food chain, for example… So then in my 
view, because of the ecological complexity, there could be very significant 
interactions or changes in conditions which you simply cannot reasonably mimic 
or model in a [laboratory] setting which is lower in complexity.” 
 
Requiring field studies to adequately assess the risk of a GM plant conflicts with the 
tiered approach central to the eco-toxicological approach but does not conflict with the 
ecological approach.   
 
Those who support the ecological approach, conversely, believe that prey-quality 
indirect effects should be potentially included within the overall risk assessment (Andow, 
Lovei, and Arpaia 2006).  Although they believe the decision to do so should be left to 
those conducting the risk assessment, they cite two justifications for why prey-quality 
indirect effects could be included (Pham et al. 2008).  First, supporters of the ecological 
approach highlight the significance of biodiversity for agroecosystems, especially the role 
of natural enemy insect species that help keep pest populations under control (Pham et al. 
2008).  They argue that one should not just assume that a change in an agroecosystem, 
such as a drastic reduction in a particular pest species, would not cause significant 
adverse effects.  They maintain that whether a reduction in natural enemies may cause an 
outbreak of another pest would certainly be useful information that would inform 
decision making surrounding a particular GM plant.  Furthermore, they argue that the 
significant negative impacts from damaging pesticides should not keep one from 
examining the impacts from a potentially harmful GM crop technology, even if the 
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associated harm is found to be less severe.  As a supporter of the ecological approach 
said,  
“If something is causing a bad thing to happen, that doesn’t mean that anything 
that gets in its way is good.  You want to look at why it’s being caused and how 
you can keep that from happening...  [If pesticides are causing a problem you 
should look at] the pesticide problem.  The other attitude is the way of getting 
solutions that actually bring bigger problems along with them.” 
 
A second reason that those supporting the ecological approach believe prey-
quality indirect effects should be considered is because they disagree with the judgment 
that a pesticide intensive agricultural practice is always the appropriate status-quo 
baseline for comparison (Andow, Lovei, and Arpaia 2006).  The baseline for comparison, 
in this reasoning, needs to be made in the problem formulation phase and should be 
founded on “policy goals of the regulatory authorities, the potential users of the 
technology and the potential affected parties” (Andow, Lovei, and Arpaia 2006, 750).  If, 
for example, one was to examine the potential impacts of a GM plant from the baseline of 
an organic or non-pesticide intensive conventional agricultural system, it would not be 
reasonable to assume that natural enemies would necessarily be significantly adversely 
affected in the status quo.  Furthermore, in these types of organic and non-pesticide 
intensive methods, the importance of natural enemies for pest control becomes more 
significant.  And to study these indirect effects, conducting field studies may often be the 
most useful approach.   
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1.4.4 Competing understandings of agriculture and risk  
 In sections 1.4.1 – 1.4.3 I outlined some of the most consequential differences 
between the two risk assessment guidelines and the specific justifications provided by 
those scientists for the judgments that they made.  Through the interviews, I also 
identified differences in the underlying understandings of agriculture and risk that helped 
explain why those supporting each approach made the judgments they did.  Although 
scientists from both approaches agreed that GMO ERA should be used to protect agro-
ecosystems and to inform agricultural decision making, they differ over how the current 
state of agriculture and the ease of interpretation should influence risk assessment.   
 
Those supporting the eco-toxicological approach viewed the use of GM plants in 
agriculture (especially insect resistant GM plants – those that have been of most concern 
for non-target impacts) as an obvious improvement to using harmful pesticides in 
conventional agriculture.  They viewed insect resistant GM plants as desirable given that 
conventional farmers would otherwise rely upon more harmful pesticides to address these 
pests.  They argued that by utilizing sound judgments (e.g. not considering indirect prey-
quality effects) and widely accepted assumptions for risk assessments of other 
agricultural hazards such as pesticides (e.g. surrogate species and privileging laboratory 
testing) their approach adequately assesses the potential risks associated with GM plants.  
In addition, they viewed their approach as much more practical and reasonable than the 
ecological approach.  In discussing what form risk assessment should take to best inform 
decision making, those supporting the eco-toxicological defended their practicality 
argument by defending an understanding of risk assessment that privileges scientific 
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studies that are easily replicable and easily interpreted.  As one supporter of the eco-
toxicological approach stated:    
“I’ve had lots of debates with the EFSA… they want these plant studies 
[examining the plant as a stressor] because they are more confident in the risk 
assessment… I think this will not help risk assessment, it will create confusion 
because you will occasionally see some effects, and you have no idea what that 
tells you. What I learned now in risk assessment: only ask for data where you 
know how to use it, which hypotheses they address and how to interpret the data. 
Everything else costs money and disturbs. That does not only cost money to the 
company, but when I have to review that as part of the regulatory process, it costs 
my time to look at them and it confuses me.” 
 
This interviewee is arguing, in short, that the full plant studies and field studies are more 
likely to find effects that fall outside of well understood risk pathways, and therefore their 
effects are harder to interpret and may not be of importance or attributable to a direct 
effect from the Bt toxin.  With the eco-toxicological approach’s focus on direct effects, 
many indirect effects are deemed not important to assess because they would occur in 
pesticide intensive conventional agriculture.  The argument is that for the goal of 
studying direct effects, it is easier and more precise to interpret a laboratory study where 
you find that insects do or do not die at a significant rate when exposed to Bt toxin than it 
is to interpret a field study of a Bt plant where a population of a beneficial insect is 
negatively affected.  In a field study there are many more possible factors at play, 
including those considered indirect.  In addition, it is easier to run replicates and gain 
statistical significance with laboratory experiments than it is to run replicates of field 
experiments.   
 
 50 
Those supporting the ecological approach questioned both the assertion that GM 
plants were the best path forward for agriculture and the assumption that pesticide 
intensive conventional agriculture is the harmful but needed status quo.  They believed 
that the adverse ecological effects from all types of agriculture should be well assessed to 
inform decision making.  They also believed that the assumptions made within the eco-
toxicological approach that allows it to privilege laboratory work excludes many 
important potential harms from its purview, leading it to inadequately assess the risks 
from GM plants.  Supporters of the ecological approach viewed their approach as the best 
way to adequately and thoroughly assess the risks on non-target organisms from GM 
plants.  In explaining their approach to risk assessment, those supporting the ecological 
approach highlighted their emphasis on direct and indirect adverse effects.  In complex 
ecological systems, they argued, the presence or absence of an adverse effect is the most 
important consideration, even if it results from an indirect pathway or the exact dynamics 
that caused it are not fully understood.  As someone supporting the ecological approach 
stated,  
“When I think about it, I’m thinking about direct and indirect effects.  I also think 
about it in terms of effects, not necessarily causal pathway… If all you do is think 
about the causal pathway, then you don’t pick up harms that may be occurring 
outside of that causal pathway. That’s, I think a lot of why risk assessment doesn’t 
focus only on causal pathway… You could be missing [things].” 
 
Given the differences in how the approaches view indirect effects, these 
contrasting views about risk and decision making are not surprising.  With the eco-
toxicological approach’s focus on direct effects and well established risk pathways, the 
outcome of the scientific studies are more likely to be straightforward and easily 
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interpretable, something that will not “create confusion.”  The ecological approach, by 
including the study of many different types of indirect effects through whole plant and 
field studies, is more likely to find potential adverse effects that are poorly understood 
and, therefore, potentially more confusing and in need of further study.  Yet to 
understand the breadth of possible adverse effects for a range of agricultural systems, 
those supporting the ecological approach argue that these effects need to be assessed.  
Therefore, a key tension between the two approaches concerns the ease of design, 
transferability, and interpretation of scientific studies versus the breadth of potential harm 
examined.  Those supporting the eco-toxicological approach believe their approach 
adequately assesses the potential adverse effects in a much more practical way, while 
those supporting the ecological approach view the assumptions of the eco-toxicological 
approach as overly limiting the types of harms examined.   
 
1.5 Discussion: Implications of conflicting risk assessment guidelines 
 
 This discussion reveals four key areas of insight, by exploring the potential harms 
studied within one approach but not the other, demonstrating how guidelines have 
already refined decision making, highlighting the challenges faced by efforts to change 
risk assessment guidelines, and finally, examining what the study results mean for the 
study of guidelines and risk assessment in environmental science and decision making.   
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1.5.1 Understanding conflicting guidelines: Unexamined harm 
The judgments made within these risk assessment guidelines delimit what types 
of potential ecological harms are examined and how they are studied.  Even though these 
two guidelines use a risk assessment framework for examining the potential harms to 
non-target organisms from GM plants and share many assumptions, they are not the 
same.  Our findings show how empirical varieties of risk assessment are heterogeneous 
and consequentially so (Dean 2010).  Previous research revealed how values-based 
judgments influence GMO risk-related science (Levidow 2003; Myhr 2010), but the 
results presented here highlight how consequential judgments are present within risk 
assessment guidelines themselves.   The same arguments used to support the use of 
deliberative and participatory methods to help inform how values-based decisions are 
made while conducting a risk assessment can be used to support deliberative and 
participatory approaches to deciding upon guidelines and their constitutive judgments 
(e.g., Meghani 2009; Stern and Fineberg 1996).  To inform discussions about what form 
risk assessment guidelines should take, it is important to explore the implications of 
differing judgments.  In the context of the study presented here, one way to understand 
the implications of the different judgments used by the conflicting guidelines is in terms 
of what potential risk hypotheses are examined in one set of guidelines but not in the 
other.  This emphasizes what knowledge on potential ecological harms would be 
excluded from decision making and the societal discussion about GM plants.  The point 
of this exercise is not to imply that all possible risk hypotheses should be examined; 
which, as stated before, is not possible.  Nor is it to imply that an approach that examines 
the largest number of risk hypotheses should be assumed to be most desirable – shear 
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number does not ensure those of most import are included.  Rather, it is to call attention 
to how judgments within risk assessment guidelines have implications for what potential 
harms will be studied and how – insights useful to consider when deciding upon risk 
assessment guidelines.  In this study, critical judgments that delimit risk hypothesis – 
leaving potential harms unexamined – involve indirect effects, substantial equivalence, 
and species selection.   
 
First, there are potential harms through indirect pathways that the ecological 
approach deems necessary to assess but that the eco-toxicological approach does not.  
The ecological approach promotes the use of semi-field or field studies to analyze the 
indirect ways that the Bt toxin from the insect resistant GM plant may negatively impact 
beneficial non-target organisms. For the eco-toxicological approach, if substantial 
equivalence is established and laboratory testing with purified Bt toxin reveals no direct 
impacts on the non-target organisms, then no field testing is needed to characterize the 
risk as insignificant.  Under those conditions, the potential indirect ways a GM plant may 
negatively impact beneficial insects – those that could become measureable through field 
experiments – would not be studied.   
 
 Second, the eco-toxicological approach’s reliance upon substantial equivalence 
testing may leave unexamined potential harms from any unintended changes in GM 
plants.  The eco-toxicological approach promotes using substantial equivalence testing 
that measures compositional (e.g. protein, fat, ash, moisture, carbohydrates, fatty acids, 
amino acids, minerals, vitamins, anti-nutrients) and agronomic (e.g. plant count, time to 
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flowering, yield, susceptibility to pests and disease) characteristics of both the GM plant 
and its non-GM counterpart (Romeis, Meissle, and Bigler 2006b; EuropaBio 2003).  
Only if this testing reveals a biologically relevant significant difference between the GM 
and non-GM plant is further study call for on the potential effects from unintended 
changes in the GM plant on non-target organisms.  The use of substantial equivalence 
testing to establish similarity between GM plants and their non-GM counterparts for 
safety studies is an essential part of GM plant regulation but has not gone without critique 
(Millstone, Brunner, and Mayer 1999; Kearns and Mayers 1999; Kuiper et al. 2002; 
Herman and Price 2013).  For example, Kuiper et al. (2002) highlight the difficulties of 
finding adequate non-GM plants for comparison, determining when differences between 
GM and non-GM plants become significant, and bringing into common use profiling 
methods that could identify potential protein and genetic changes between GM and non-
GM plants.  Herman and Price (2013), conversely, argue that the studies examining 
compositional similarity between GM and non-GM plants may no longer be justified 
given that past studies have always found that such equivalence exists.   
 
Yet, how does using substantial equivalence testing affect the study of risks to 
non-target organisms from potential unintended changes in GM plants?  Substantial 
equivalence testing restricts the conditions under which the eco-toxicological approach 
would use semi-field or field studies to examine the potential effects on non-target 
organisms from unintended changes in the GM plant.  Unless substantial equivalence 
testing finds significant differences between GM plants and their non-GM counterpart in 
the compositional and agronomic characteristics listed above (something Herman and 
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Price (2013) argue is unlikely to happen), the whole GM plant, and any unintended 
changes, will never be studied to see how it impacts non-target organisms.  This means 
that no semi-field or field tests would be conducted to study the impacts of unintended 
changes in the plant on non-target organisms.  Whereas, the ecological approach supports 
using semi-field and field studies to examine ways the whole GM plant (and any 
unintended changes) may impact non-target organisms, the eco-toxicological approach 
only calls for such studies if the results from substantial equivalence testing do not 
establish equivalence.  What this assumes, then, is that the characteristics of the plant 
measured in substantial equivalence testing would indicate any significant, and 
potentially harmful for non-target organisms, unintended change in the GM plant.  It also 
assumes then that any changes to the GM plant not captured by the substantial 
equivalence measures must not be significant and therefore need not be studied.  
Substantial equivalence testing, then, limits the focus on unintended changes to those that 
would emerge through substantial equivalence testing instead of those that would emerge 
through semi-field and field studies designed to study non-target organisms.   
 
Finally, species selection influences the study of potential harm by affecting how 
the scientific studies examining the risk hypotheses are conducted.  Specifically, using 
surrogate species in laboratory studies instead of testing local non-target species increases 
the likelihood that the differences between surrogate species and local species will lead to 
erroneous characterizations of risk.  In selecting local insect species for testing, the 
ecological approach addresses the potential that local species may react differently and 
more severely than the surrogate species.  There is evidence to question the assertion that 
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surrogate species can adequately represent the diversity of susceptibilities of non-target 
species (Banks et al. 2011; Stark, Banks, and Vargas 2004; Peacock et al. 1998).  In 
promoting the use of local species and removing the need for extrapolation from 
surrogate species, the ecological approach is privileging the local context in its study 
design.  Although this does not necessarily expand the risk hypotheses being examined (if 
the risk hypothesis involves the GM plant adversely effecting natural predators – the 
question may just concern which natural predator is used, a surrogate species or a local 
species), it does lead the study design to address the potential specificity of the local 
species.   
 
As we see from these three examples, the ecological approach to non-target GMO 
ERA considers a broader set of potential harms by examining risk hypotheses involving 
indirect risk hypotheses and potential undesired changes in the modified plant, and by 
privileging the local context through not using surrogate species.  As outlined in section 
4, those supporting the eco-toxicological approach argue that the additional information 
gained by the ecological approach is not necessary for adequately assessing risks in non-
target GMO ERA, while those supporting the ecological approach believe it is necessary.   
 
1.5.2 Implications of conflicting approaches: GM plant environmental decision 
making 
 As national governments are faced with decisions about whether and under what 
conditions to allow for the cultivation of GM plants, they will need to decide upon, and 
reexamine, processes for characterizing the potential for environmental harm from such 
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plants.  And in order to be deemed legitimate under WTO agreements, such processes 
will need to be based in risk assessment (Bonneuil and Levidow 2012).  Multiple risk 
assessment guidelines with their constitutive judgments clearly identified and described 
can inform relevant agencies that there are choices to be made and potentially help them 
make such choices.   
 
For example, environmental agencies with existing risk assessment guidelines for 
GM plants, like the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and USEPA, can draw upon 
insights from both approaches for non-target GMO ERA if and when they revisit their 
guidelines.  The more the distinct approaches publicly air their differences and deliberate 
about the implications of these differences, the more insights these environmental 
agencies will have to build on.  At this point in time, the United States environmental 
agencies seem committed to an approach built upon the eco-toxicological approach for 
the risk assessment for non-target impacts of insect-resistant GM plants (EPA 2007), but 
EFSA has revisited their non-target GMO ERA building partially upon the ecological 
approach (Devos et al. 2012).  For example, a recent scientific opinion from EFSA states 
that when exploring potential indirect effects from undesired changes within the GM 
plant, there is a need to go beyond the compositional and agronomic testing that normally 
informs substantial equivalence testing.  Specifically they call for an extended 
compositional analysis “which focuses on plant parts (e.g. pollen, nectar, leaves, stem, 
roots) that are consumed by NTOs and which are not always considered under food/feed 
safety assessments” (EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms 2010, 33).  This 
scientific opinion also calls for the study of “plant-environment interactions” that focus 
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on examining how non-target organisms are impacted by the GM plant material itself 
(EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms 2010, 33–34).  Both these proposals 
can be seen as efforts to address the concerns raised within the ecological approach, that 
the traditional compositional and agronomic substantial equivalence testing is not 
adequate to examine unintended changes in a GM plant.  Another area where this EFSA 
scientific opinion drew upon the ecological approach was in their guidance on species 
selection.  Instead of using a standard set of surrogate species as promoted in the eco-
toxicological approach, it calls for a prioritization process with ecological and practical 
considerations to select the most suitable non-target organisms from the specific 
ecosystem under consideration.  The EFSA example demonstrates that a diversity of 
articulated approaches to ERA can help call attention to judgments that need to be made 
and highlight new risk hypotheses in need of consideration in order to inform decision 
making.   
 
1.5.3 Challenges when seeking to change risk assessment guidelines  
 Even if the potential for a multiplicity of legitimate risk assessment guidelines is 
realized, there remain challenges facing efforts to change risk assessment guidelines.  I 
explore these issues in three parts: guidelines deemed inadequate, establishing alternative 
guidelines, and the normative assumptions that delimit the scope of the assessment.  First, 
once a set of guidelines is established, the burden of proof to demonstrate that the 
guidelines are in need of change generally falls to those critiquing them (Demortain 
2013).  Once in use, many are reluctant to change them without strong evidence that they 
could be problematic.  Proof of possible inadequacies – e.g., the potential for significant 
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unassessed adverse effects – can be difficult to garner when, as shown in this study, the 
judgments within risk assessment guidelines delimit what type of science is completed.  
Put differently, you cannot find empirical evidence that risk assessment guidelines are not 
assessing a significant adverse effect if no studies look for such an effect.  You cannot 
find what you do not look for.  For example, if there were indirect effects on beneficial 
predators from an insect resistant GM crop, yet there were no studies conducted that 
could reveal these effects, it would be impossible to gather evidence that these effects 
should be examined.  Furthermore, I found that justifications for the status quo ERA 
guidelines often relied upon arguments focused on “practicality” and “reasonableness”.  
This leads to the tension that without strong evidence of an unassessed adverse effect, it 
appears unreasonable to change approaches; yet, you can only find such evidence of an 
unassessed adverse effect by changing approaches.   
 
 Second, changes to risk assessment guidelines can be done in an incremental or 
foundational fashion.  Incremental changes (e.g., increasing the number of non-target 
species tested or increasing study length (see Marvier 2002)) may be straight forward, but 
changes involving foundational assumptions of existing guidelines (e.g. incorporating 
indirect effects or not relying upon substantial equivalence testing) can involve 
developing a coherent set of alternative risk assessment guidelines and may require a 
significant amount of time and resources.  Although not the focus of this article, 
conversations with those who developed the ecological approach revealed that it took 
years of work and significant funding to develop the alternative risk assessment 
guidelines they support.  And this competing approach helped make explicit the 
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judgments that delimit the study of risk, their implications, and how they could be made 
differently.  Given this investment level, it is unclear if, and how, current risk assessment 
guidelines will come under critical review.  A final impediment to change involves the 
foundational assumptions about the status quo that inform judgments used within the 
guidelines.  Disagreement may not center on the potential for adverse effects, but instead, 
on whether adverse effects are significantly worse than the status quo.  Judgments about 
the status quo can influence whether particular potential changes to risk assessment 
guidelines are deemed as necessary and, as a result, should be rigorously scrutinized.   
 
1.5.4 Scholarship on guidelines and risk assessment in environmental decision 
making  
 Insights from this study of risk assessment guidelines and their constitutive 
judgments contribute to the current conversations about risk assessment and decision 
making.  In particular, I focus on two recent discussions, one involving whether the 
European Union should move the assessment of environmental risk from member states 
to the European Food Safety Authority (Wickson and Wynne 2012a; Perry et al. 2012; 
Wickson and Wynne 2012b) and another about what constitutes relevant and quality 
scientific studies for GM plant ERA (Romeis, McLean, and Shelton 2013a; Wickson et 
al. 2013; Romeis, McLean, and Shelton 2013b).  In both cases a key component of the 
disagreement revolves around differing understandings of risk assessment and risk 
assessment guidelines.   
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In the first case, Wickson and Wynne (2012a; 2012b) argue against a proposal by 
the European Commission to separate the environmental and health risk considerations 
from socio-economic considerations when member states make decisions on whether to 
cultivate GM crops.  The European Commission’s proposal, Article 26b in directive 
2001/18/EC, would allow member states to make their own decisions on whether to 
cultivate GM crops, but only based on socio-economic considerations.  The European 
Union’s scientific advisory body, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), would 
evaluate the environmental and health risks.  The desire to separate the scientific 
assessment of risk from the normative socio-economic arguments around GM plants was 
part of an effort to help reduce the conflict and controversy surrounding GM plant 
decision making.  Wickson and Wynne argue that by choosing to see risk assessment as a 
singular and objective process that could be adequately completed by EFSA for all 
member states is to neglect how “the processes of scientific RA [risk assessment] are 
inevitably shaped by normative commitment, which as a matter of institutional, policy 
and scientific integrity must be acknowledged and inclusively deliberated” (2012b, 483).  
Perry et al., a group of current or past members of the EFSA GMO Panel, respond to 
Wickson and Wynne by defending the approach used by EFSA for assessing the risks of 
GM plants (2012).  They argue, for example, that concerns about the ability of EFSA to 
address the specific conditions within member states are already covered by the existing 
ERA guidance document that mandates they address separate receiving environments.  In 
addition, Perry et al. (2012) defend the process used to assess risk, pointing out that 
comments from stakeholders and representatives from member states are included.  
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Finally, they reassert the distinction between risk assessment and risk management, 
arguing that risk assessment and not risk management is the responsibility of EFSA.   
 As Wickson and Wynne explore in their rebuttal to the response, although Perry 
et al. defend EFSA’s approach to risk assessment, they do not address the “normative 
commitments inevitable in risk assessment” (2012b, 482).  Perry et al. argue that the local 
conditions can be considered within a risk assessment and even that stakeholders can be 
allowed to comment on the risk assessment itself, but these types of reassurances do not 
acknowledge that there exists foundational values-based judgments within risk 
assessment that influence how the potential for harm is examined.  Yet, as my findings 
show, judgments that delimit how the potential for harm is studied are present as risk 
assessments are conducted but also initially in the risk assessment guidelines, themselves.  
These findings help make explicit where such judgments exist and begin a conversation 
about the implications of differing judgments.  These results reinforce the argument made 
by Wickson and Wynne concerning the importance of highlighting the existence of 
values-based judgments in risk assessment and, in addition, show the need for scrutiny to 
extend to risk assessment guidelines themselves.  These guidelines should be openly 
discussed, debated, and ultimately decided upon by individual member states that will use 
the resulting risk assessments to inform their decision on whether and how to cultivate 
GM plants.   
 
 The second case I examine involves contestations about which scientific studies 
are legitimate and relevant for decision making surrounding GM plants (Romeis, 
McLean, and Shelton 2013a; Wickson et al. 2013; Romeis, McLean, and Shelton 2013b).  
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Here I specifically focus on the role of risk assessment guidelines within this exchange.  
Romeis et al. (2013a), including at least some authors who have expressed support of the 
eco-toxicological approach, argue that scientific studies that gain attention in the media 
are often not well designed and many times largely irrelevant to risk-related decision 
making.  They argue that more attention must be paid to whether the studies are relevant, 
saying:  
“it is essential that regulatory authorities, or the scientists that evaluate data on 
their behalf, be discriminating about the legitimacy of the studies that they 
consider during the evaluation process, irrespective of their source.  This 
evaluation should include both the quality of the study itself as well as its 
relevance to the risk assessment process as described in the regulations and 
associated guidance” (Romeis, McLean, and Shelton 2013a, emphasis added). 
 
In response, Wickson et al. (2013) argue that determination of what constitutes relevant 
scientific studies for risk assessment will influence the outcomes of a risk assessment and 
is dependent upon values-based assumptions.  Therefore, this decision should not be 
made by a group of experts but should be open to wider scrutiny and deliberation.  What 
neither side acknowledges, however, is that the “associated guidance” that Romeis et al. 
(2013a) refer to as criteria for narrowing the desired set of scientific studies would 
include risk assessment guidelines, such as those I studied.  And given the values-based 
judgments within risk assessment guidelines that delimit how the potential for harm is 
studied, these risk assessment guidelines also need to be scrutinized.  In other words, 
there are judgments in both risk assessment guidelines and in the conduct of risk 
assessment itself that determine what scientific studies are relevant and how risks are 
characterized.  If one is committed to critical examination of the values-based judgments 
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that influence how risks are studied to inform decision making, it is necessary to consider 
both risk assessment guidelines as well as the conduct of the risk assessment, itself.   
 
1.6 Conclusion  
 
“Guidelines very different from the kinds described could be designed to be 
devoid of risk assessment policy choices.  They would state the scientifically 
plausible inference options for each risk assessment component without 
attempting to select or even suggest a preferred inference option.  However, a risk 
assessment based on such guidelines (containing all the plausible options for 
perhaps 40 components) could result in such a wide range of risk estimates that 
the analysis would not be useful to a regulator or to the public.  Furthermore, 
regulators could reach conclusions based on the ad hoc exercise of risk 
assessment policy decisions” (National Research Council 1983, 77) 
 
 This statement from the 1983 National Research Council report on risk 
assessment emphasizes the importance of judgments made within risk assessment 
guidelines by articulating how problematic guidelines would be without them.1  This 
statement supports the argument that if important risk assessment policy choices are 
identified and established within risk assessment guidelines, then it reduces the 
possibility that those conducting the risk assessment would inadequately make such 
choices.  In this way, risk assessment guidelines have the potential to ensure that the 
foundational judgments in risk assessment are recognized as values-based judgments, 
reflected upon, and made in a deliberate, defensible way.  This NRC statement aligns 
                                                 
1
 It is questionable whether it is useful to frame this question in terms of being able to remove all risk 
assessment policy choices or being able to drastically reduce the number of risk assessment policy choices 
by making explicit all of the possible options for many of these choices.  It seems possible to argue that if 
you remove all risk assessment policy choices completely, there is nothing of significance remaining.  Or at 
the very least you will be left with needing to create a distinction between what is innately essential to risk 
assessment and what aspects of risk assessment are choices that could be made in different ways.   
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with the idea that those concerned with risk assessment guidelines should not try to make 
them devoid of risk assessment policy choices, but should help ensure that the guidelines, 
and judgments within them, are interrogated and take the best form possible.   
 
 My results confirmed the importance of judgments in risk assessment by finding 
that differing judgments exist within conflicting risk assessment guidelines and that these 
judgments delimit, or determine the boundaries of, the study of potential harm to the 
environment.  Specifically, I found that judgments about hazard identification and 
substantial equivalence testing, species selection, and indirect effects delimited how each 
set of guidelines examined the risks from insect-resistant GM plants.  In addition, I found 
that judgments within risk assessment guidelines also influenced what science was called 
for to inform the risk assessment.  In other words, risk assessment guidelines influence 
not only how scientific studies are synthesized for decision making, but also what 
scientific studies are conducted and how they are conducted.  Furthermore, these 
judgments that delimit the study of potential harm cannot be avoided; they are a 
necessary condition of empirical studies to inform decision making.  It is not possible to 
study all the potential ecological entities that could be adversely impacted by a GM plant, 
or other potential stressors.  Judgments are needed to focus scientific studies and to 
ensure they provide useful information for risk assessment and decision making.  
Recognition of the importance of risk assessment guidelines and the judgments that 
constitute them is vital for risk assessment-informed decision making.  Without open 
scrutiny of risk assessment guidelines and their constitutive judgments, decisions could 
be made through an unquestioned faith in the status quo, could privilege the interests of 
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powerful actors over those of the public good, or could be arrived at in an unsystematic, 
ad hoc manner.  To ensure the integrity of environment-related decision making and 
science, then, risk assessment guidelines must be a site of critical inquiry.   
 
This study also revealed potentially fruitful areas for future research.  First, there 
is a need to better understand the factors that influence efforts to retain or challenge 
existing risk assessment guidelines.  Beyond the assumptions about agriculture and risk 
assessment policy that I documented in this study, how do other policies or priorities 
influence what form judgments within risk assessment guidelines take?  For example, 
how do institutional priorities, disciplinary norms, or personal interests lead scientists, 
decision makers, and risk assessors to defend or challenge particular risk assessment 
guidelines?  Second, there is a need to further examine the limitations of current 
judgments within risk assessment guidelines, even those that are not challenged by a 
competing set of guidelines.  I examined several of the key judgments in non-target GMO 
ERA by exploring two competing sets of guidelines, yet one can also question the role of 
judgments in any set of risk assessment guidelines.  What judgments within risk 
assessment guidelines limit certain risks, or potential harms, from examination?  How do 
these judgments influence what scientific studies are completed and how they are 
completed?  What justifications are used for why those risks shouldn’t be examined and 
for why those studies shouldn’t be used?  One can use these insights on the limitations of 
current risk assessment guidelines to inform incremental change within them and to make 
decision makers and society more broadly, aware of the fundamental limitations of how 
we currently make decisions.   
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As risk-based approaches continue to be privileged within science, technology, 
and environment-related decision making, it is important for scholars to study how risk 
assessment delimits the study of potential harm.  Studies, like the kind I conducted here, 
can identify judgments in need of reflection and deliberation, and help foster a greater 
societal awareness of the processes used to inform decision making and the limitations of 
these processes.  Awareness of how sometimes seemingly minor judgments within risk 
assessment guidelines can consequentially influence science and decision making 
processes, makes it possible to better understand how risk-related decisions are made and 
how they could be made in light of different values-based judgments.   
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Chapter 2 – Conflicting Futures: Environmental Regulation of Plant 
Targeted Genetic Modification
2
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Plant targeted genetic modification (TagMo) is a term we use to describe a variety 
of emerging technologies that are poised to significantly change plant genetic 
engineering.  Targeted genetic modification, also called “targeted genome editing” and 
“new biotechnology-based plant breeding techniques,” refers to techniques that create 
more precise changes in DNA than the relatively random changes made in the first 
generation of plant genetic engineering (Figure 3).  TagMo techniques will likely 
improve the efficiency of plant genetic engineering and increase the number of traits and 
plant species that can be engineered (Porteus 2009; Bogdanove and Voytas 2011).  In 
addition, because TagMo techniques fall outside existing United States (US) regulatory 
definitions for genetically engineered plants, it is uncertain how US regulatory agencies 
will handle plant TagMo products.  The US Department of Agriculture has already ruled 
that certain TagMo-derived plants will not be regulated as genetically engineered 
organisms in the United States (Waltz 2012).  Many other regulatory agencies across the 
world are also grappling with how they will address plant TagMo products (Podevin et al. 
2012). 
                                                 
2
 This chapter was submitted as a journal article co-authored with Professor Jennifer Kuzma.   
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First generation techniques for plant genetic engineering randomly insert DNA sequences 
containing desired traits into plants using Agrobacterium or biolistics-based methods.  
The random nature of this insertion means that many insertions are needed to arrive at a 
plant that expresses the desired trait.  As a result, much effort is required to determine 
when the inserted DNA leads to the successful expression of the desired trait within the 
transformed plants.  The plants expressing the desired trait then needed to be bred with 
conventional plant varieties to produce plants suited for commercial use.  First generation 
modification techniques are the dominant methods used to create herbicide tolerant and 
insect resistant traits used in existing genetically modified crop varieties that in 2013 
made up 90% of cotton, 93% of soybean and 90% of corn grown in the US (USDA 
2014).   
 
We use the term plant TagMo to represent a set of genetic engineering techniques, such 
as those using zinc-finger nucleases, meganucleases, olionucleotides, and transcription 
activator-like (TAL) effectors, that all rely upon similar mechanisms for creating changes 
in a plant’s genome.  These techniques use molecules that read DNA sequences and that 
create double-strand breaks at precise places within DNA (Townsend et al. 2009; Shukla 
et al. 2009; Gao et al. 2010; Bogdanove and Voytas 2011).  The double-strand breaks 
within a plant’s DNA activate the cell’s own repair mechanisms that can then be used to 
alter the targeted gene within a plant’s DNA.  If a DNA fragment is provided that shares 
sequence similarity with the broken site in the DNA, the cell repair mechanism will use 
this fragment as a template for the repair.  This can allow for the insertion of foreign 
DNA in a similar yet more precise and efficient way than the first generation of plant 
genetic engineering.  More specific changes, down to a single nucleotide, can also be 
made with TagMo techniques.  These changes can be used to create small insertions or 
deletions that can alter or delete gene function. 
 
Figure 3: Plant targeted genetic modification and its relationship to first generation plant 
genetic engineering 
 
Plant TagMo is still in the early stages of development and basic understandings 
of what plant TagMo is, plant TagMo’s potential future, and how it should be governed 
are being established and contested (Podevin et al. 2012; Lusser et al. 2012).  As part of a 
larger project examining plant TagMo oversight, we explored differing ways of 
understanding how plant TagMo should be addressed by environmental regulation.  We 
gained insights into the possible futures of plant TagMo environmental regulation 
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through in-depth individual interviews with thirty-one expert-stakeholders from 
academia, industry, government and non-governmental organizations.  In designing and 
conducting this work we drew upon governance approaches developed at the intersection 
of the fields of science and technology policy and science and technology studies (STS), 
including upstream public engagement (Wilsdon and Wills 2004) and anticipatory 
governance (Barben et al. 2008).  Much of the scholarship on anticipatory governance 
has focused on how to move societal engagement with technology beyond the regulatory 
realm by, for example, encouraging societal deliberation on emerging technology during 
the initial stages of technological development (Selin 2011).   We believe, however, that 
the principles of anticipatory governance can also inform efforts to improve 
environmental regulation itself.   
 
In this paper, we begin by reviewing the tenets of anticipatory governance and 
exploring their implications for our analysis of plant TagMo’s environmental regulation.  
We highlight the importance of the concept of reflexivity in anticipatory governance and 
draw upon the STS subfield of future studies in exploring how to engage with futures in a 
way that contributes to reflexivity.  Building upon these ideas, we contribute to a 
reflexive engagement with the environmental regulation futures of plant TagMo, as 
articulated by expert-stakeholders, by exploring how they conflict.  We outline how these 
futures are built upon contrasting understandings of what constitutes environmental risk 
and of the adequacy of existing genetically modified (GM) plant regulation in the US.  
We conclude by exploring the implications of our findings for the regulation of plant 
TagMo and for anticipatory governance. 
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2.2 Anticipatory governance 
 
Anticipatory governance is an approach to technology development and 
governance that builds upon the principles of foresight, engagement and integration.  It 
seeks to insert reflection into technological development in an upstream manner so as to 
guide development towards desired societal outcomes and away from undesired ones 
(Barben et al. 2008).  At their most basic, anticipatory governance’s three founding 
principles can be summarized as follows:   
 Foresight describes the process of developing plausible and evolving 
scenarios of possible futures that can be the subject of the public deliberation  
 Engagement encompasses the suite of activities that stimulates public 
deliberation 
 Integration brings the engagement and foresight activities into the domain of 
scientific practice in order to enhance reflexiveness (Sarewitz 2011, 103)  
 
Anticipatory governance builds upon critiques and ideas developed within the field of 
STS, and has informed how science and technology policy scholars engage with 
emerging technologies such as biotechnology and nanotechnology (Karinen and Guston 
2010; Kuzma et al. 2008).  To better understand anticipatory governance and the 
intervention it is making within science and technology policy, it is helpful to take a 
closer look at two of its foundational principles: foresight and engagement.  Both ideas 
emerge from a lineage of scholarship and critique developed at the intersection of STS 
and science and technology policy.   
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2.2.1 Foresight 
The critiques built upon in the principle of foresight involve moving technology 
assessment from a reactionary position to a proactive one (Guston and Sarewitz 2002).  
Within the classical paradigm of technology assessment, technology development is 
largely unquestioned and takes place outside of the realm of societal influence.  Instead 
of substantively influencing a technology’s development, technology assessment is used 
only to advise society how best to react to the consequences of technology.  Some of the 
initial critiques of technology assessment emerged from scholars developing constructive 
technology assessment and real-time technology assessment (Schot and Rip 1997; Guston 
and Sarewitz 2002).  They argued for incorporating technology assessment activities into 
the research and development decision making processes to proactively improve 
technology.  Instead of reacting to technologies already developed and on the market, 
they proposed generating knowledge concerning the potential societal impacts of 
potential technologies and pursuing mechanisms to incorporate that knowledge into 
existing decision making concerning research and development.  Schot and Rip (1997) 
locate constructive technology assessment within a trajectory of thought that has 
challenged the “two-track” regime of societal technology management that separates 
promotional activities from control and regulation.  They see constructive technology 
assessment as critiquing the “sequential approach of optimizing the technical before 
considering uptake, use, and effects” (Schot and Rip 1997, 263), creating and maintaining 
a space for sociotechnological criticism, and challenging the conflation of social progress 
and technological progress.   
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Although the scholarship surrounding constructive technology assessment, real-
time technology assessment and anticipatory governance share an interest in “foresight”, 
they do not share a clear definition of its meaning.  One concept essential to the meaning 
of foresight is “reflexivity”.  Barben et al. (2008) argue that anticipatory governance’s 
foresight principle “aims to enrich futures-in-the-making by encouraging and developing 
reflexivity in the [decision making] system.”  Genus (2006, 18) states that a central 
characteristic of constructive technology assessment is that “actors should be ‘reflexive’ 
about the processes of co-evolution of technology and society, of technology and its 
impacts” and that without such reflection stakeholders will be “reluctant to accept close 
scrutiny of their positions by others, or themselves to probe the assumptions which 
underlie their own viewpoint.”  Sarewitz, writing about the experience with real-time 
technology assessment and nanotechnology, argues that  
“reflexivity moves innovation towards more socially desirable outcomes and 
away from undesirable ones, as diverse decision makers reflect more deeply on 
the context of their decision.  And this of course can happen either through a 
change in innovation paths, or through a change in the conceptions of desirability, 
or, more likely, through the interaction of both” (2011, 103). 
 
These articulations of anticipatory governance share the idea that revealing and 
scrutinizing previously uninterrogated assumptions concerning the future of technologies 
will improve technology related decision making.  Engagement is integral to an 
anticipatory governance based approach to reveal and scrutinize such assumptions.   
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2.2.2 Engagement 
The principle of engagement builds upon the vast scholarship developed on 
participation in science and technology policy (Jasanoff 2003; Hagendijk and Irwin 2006; 
Lengwiler 2008).  In anticipatory governance, engagement, or participation, is an 
essential part of critiquing and reflecting upon the development of technology.  We see 
two distinct goals for participation within anticipatory governance, exemplified in the 
following quotation:  
“The aim of such [anticipatory governance] exercises [is to]… [a] increase 
dialogue about and current understanding of the range of possible technological 
trajectories and respective alternative governance frameworks, and to [b] 
elaborate how these two future projections should develop interactively” (Karinen 
and Guston 2010, 228, emphasis added). 
 
The first goal (part (a) above) is to expand the number and type of potential 
futures taken into consideration.  Underlying this goal is the belief that by broadening the 
discussion of possible futures, potential technology and governance options will be better 
understood and the best possible future will be articulated and thus potentially achieved.  
Involving stakeholders with a diverse set of values, worldviews, and epistemologies will 
help achieve this.  Explicit conflict here is minimal in the sense that the goal is not to 
narrow or distinguish desired futures, but only to gather and better understand possible 
futures.   
 
The second goal (part (b) above) is to determine what types of futures are 
desirable.  Underlying this goal is the idea that in order to influence technological 
decision making in a positive way, there must be discussion and discrimination between 
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the types of futures that are desired and those that are not.  This goal is fraught with 
conflict-prone normative questions concerning the desired state of the world.  If the first 
goal produces a variety of possible technological and governance futures, with some of 
them undoubtedly resembling the course of technological development initially critiqued 
by anticipatory governance, how does anticipatory governance ensure better societal 
outcomes?  The anticipatory governance literature relies upon the idea of reflection, 
including critique and the interrogation of assumptions, to ensure that a better decision is 
arrived upon.  So there is a close relationship between foresight, participation, and 
reflexivity.  Without foresight, there is no way to leave reactionary technology 
assessment.  Without participation, there is no way to ensure that a sufficiently broad set 
of futures and concerns are available for consideration.  Yet without reflexivity, there is 
no way to ensure that participation and foresight will lead to better technology-related 
decisions.  And it is in thinking about reflection, critique, and the interrogation of 
assumptions in futures that we find it useful to turn to insights from future studies 
scholarship.  
 
2.3. Future studies for emerging technology 
 
Building upon the STS work examining the role of expectations and promises in 
technology development (e.g. Van Lente 1993; Brown and Michael 2003), the STS 
subfield of future studies has produced a wealth of recent work examining emerging 
technologies.  Many insights have been made concerning how to understand and 
interrogate the potential futures of emerging technologies through the study of 
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expectations (Borup et al. 2006), legitimacy and narrative (Lopez 2008), hopes and affect 
(Anderson 2007), utopian dreams and apocalyptic nightmares (McGrail 2010), and 
futures more broadly (Selin 2008; Venkatesan 2010; Tutton 2011).  This is in addition to 
the vast literatures developed by other social science disciplines on related topics, 
including, for example, technological futures and computing (Kinsley 2011) and 
potentiality in biomedicine (Taussig, Hoeyer, and Helmreich 2013).   
 
As Groves states, “that the future is uncertain is a precondition of both political 
and ethical action” (2009, 1).  If the future was given, there would be no need or ability to 
discuss and influence how the future should be.  Our ability to influence the future 
invites, and perhaps obliges, us to consider what type of future we want to live in, with 
respect to technology or otherwise.  A foundational assumption of future studies is that 
how we think about, discuss, and give meaning to the future influences how it 
materializes.  In other words, how we envision what will happen to an emerging 
technology substantively influences what will become of this technology; such 
discussions legitimize, inspire, enroll actors, mobilize resources, dampen dissent or force 
silences concerning a technology (Anderson 2007; Selin 2008).  In addition, futures not 
only influence how things will be, but also how things are in the present moment.  
Futures assign relationships among actors that mediate across scales, levels, times and 
communities (Borup et al. 2006).  So when we talk of a possible “future” of a technology 
(or multiple possible “futures” of a technology) we are referring, broadly, to the 
understanding of how a technology could influence, and be influenced by, the social and 
natural world.   
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To elaborate upon what constitutes futures, why they are consequential and how 
we should study them, we highlight two insights developed by the futures studies 
literature.  First, futures do not emerge from nothing but are partially constituted through 
already existing discourses and narrative strategies (Lopez 2008).  Lopez states that, 
“approaching an emergent technology in this way allows us to understand how the not-
yet-materialized (which all emergent technologies are) becomes not only thinkable but 
also invested with cultural authority and social legitimacy” (2008, 1269).  Analyzing the 
narratives and meanings used to construct futures provides a way to see how futures build 
upon and challenge particular understandings of the past and present.  For example, for 
hype to exist around the future of a new technology, both the contingencies that may 
disrupt its development and the continuities tying the technology to past technologies 
need to be marginalized (Borup et al. 2006).  In the context of environmental regulation, 
one can explore how a certain approach to regulation comes to be seen as appropriate for 
an emerging technology by studying what meanings are privileged and marginalized 
within a particular future.   
 
Second, conflict is an essential part of futures.  As Tutton argues, “every future is 
predicated on others to be avoided” (2011, 412).  Furthermore, Lopez (2008) emphasizes 
that it cannot be assumed that differing narratives concerning the future will easily 
converge in a complementary way.  Venkatesan (2010) emphasizes the importance of 
considering the diversity within society and social existence when determining the 
desired form of emerging technologies.  People are influenced by and desire technology 
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differently and it is important to consider what values, meanings, and assumptions are 
privileged in particular futures.  These values, meanings, and assumptions within futures 
will influence what forms the future will and will not take.  By calling attention to these 
values, meanings, and assumptions and what is at stake in them, we can move from 
merely listing the potential paths a technology could take to interrogating and reflecting 
upon them.  For example, in making sense of nanotechnology and its role in the world, 
one can draw upon a variety of meanings concerning the desired state of nature and how 
nanotechnology influences it (Wickson, Grieger, and Baun 2010).  Whether one draws 
upon a narrative that sees nanotechnology as threatening or treating nature will influence 
how one considers nanotechnology, including how it should be governed.  Furthermore, 
each narrative supports and is supported by a set of beliefs, assumptions and values.  By 
examining and making explicit the implications of these beliefs, assumptions and values, 
it is possible to highlight the underlying issues and to pursue a more transparent 
deliberation about technology development (Wickson, Grieger, and Baun 2010).   
 
2.4 Reflecting upon the environmental regulation futures of plant TagMo 
 
Insights from the anticipatory governance and futures studies literatures informed 
our study of plant TagMo regulation futures.  First, the articulated futures of plant TagMo 
environmental regulation will influence current and forthcoming decision making, and it 
is therefore desirable to study these futures and their implications.  Second, these 
regulatory futures will conflict in that each will privilege certain understandings and 
assumptions at the expense of others.  Third, to study the breadth of possible futures 
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(with their differing implications and assumptions) it is necessary to engage with people 
holding a diversity of views, beyond those views that are most prevalently held.  In our 
case we did this by conducting interviews with a diversity of expert-stakeholders 
knowledgeable of plant TagMo and genetically modified plant environmental regulation.  
Finally, reflection on plant TagMo’s environmental regulation futures can be fostered by 
exploring the understandings and assumptions they privilege and their implications.   
 
Our in-depth interviews with expert-stakeholders were guided by two overarching 
questions: How do expert- stakeholders provide meaning to the future of plant TagMo 
and its environmental regulation?  How do the articulated futures of plant TagMo 
regulation conflict?  Given that we wanted to examine the diversity of plant TagMo 
futures that exist, we selected expert-stakeholders from a diversity of backgrounds and 
disciplines to represent the breadth of possible understandings.  Conducting individual in-
depth interviews also facilitated uncovering this diversity as each interviewee could 
articulate his or her specific understanding of plant TagMo’s future.  We conducted 
thirty-one qualitative, semi-structured interviews with expert-stakeholders knowledgeable 
of the technical, environmental, social, and/or governance aspects of TagMo and first 
generation GM plants.  Interviewees included TagMo scientists, GMO policy expert-
stakeholders, social scientists and natural scientists from the affiliations of academia, 
industry, government and non-governmental organizations.3  These interviews took place 
                                                 
3
 Affiliations of our interviewees (with frequency in parentheses) included: NGO (3), Law (1), Industry (3), 
Government (5), Academia – TagMo researcher (5), Academia – other (14).  Primary area of expertise 
included: Biology (3), Biosafety (2), Ecology (2), Economics (1), Entomology (1), Genetics (1), TagMo 
researcher (5), Genome engineering (1), Molecular Biology (3), Public policy (7), Risk assessment (3), and 
Social Studies of Science (2). 
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between October 2010 and February 2011 and averaged about one hour each.  To help 
interviewees understand how we defined plant TagMo, in advance of the interview we 
provided interviewees a document outlining the methods we considered TagMo (based 
on Kuzma and Kokotovich 2011, Figure 1) and an article from the journal Nature 
discussing zinc-finger nucleases, one type of TagMo (Porteus 2009).  To elucidate 
interviewees’ understandings of plant TagMo’s future we discussed their definition of 
plant TagMo, key concerns and opportunities surrounding plant TagMo, the potential 
impact of plant TagMo, and their desires for plant TagMo regulation (Appendix B).  We 
transcribed and coded the interviews using Atlas.ti and guided our analysis with insights 
provided by our review of the fields of anticipatory governance and future studies, as 
described below.   
 
First, we identified the overall differences in how interviewees thought plant 
TagMo products should be addressed by environmental regulation.  From interviewee’s 
responses we were able to identify 5 types of suggested changes to the existing 
environmental regulatory system in the US to make it adequate for plant TagMo products 
(Table 1).  We classify these 5 suggested change into the three categories: pragmatic that 
sought to address plant TagMo products with the existing environmental regulatory 
paradigm with possible minor changes; optimistic that sought for plant TagMo products 
to be regulated as conventionally bred plant products rather than as GM plants; and 
critical that sought to reconfigure and strengthen the existing regulatory paradigm to 
make it adequate for plant TagMo products.  Drawing upon the insights from the 
anticipatory governance and future studies literature, we sought to further explore how  
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Table 1: Summary of the optimistic, pragmatic and critical environmental regulation 
futures of plant TagMo. 
 
Plant TagMo 
Environmental Regulation 
Futures 
Plant TagMo 
environmental risk 
Existing environmental 
regulation 
Optimistic Govern as non-
GM plants  
Plant TagMo products are 
more natural than first 
generation GM plants and are 
significantly less risky 
Adequate; tiered approach 
needed to not over regulate  
Pragmatic 
Incrementally 
ease   
↕  
 Keep status quo  
↕ 
Incrementally 
strengthen 
Risks surrounding plant 
TagMo lessened due to 
increase insertion precision 
Adequate but tiered approach 
needed to not over or under 
regulate 
Increased precision will not 
reduce risk 
Adequate: No major issues 
have emerged 
New traits and species will 
pose new risks 
Inadequate: Coordinated 
Framework lacking 
Critical  Reconfigure, 
increase rigor 
New traits and species and 
increased ease of production 
will worsen risks  from 1
st
 
generation and pose new 
risks 
Paradigm inadequate: Not 
capturing harm & not 
independent 
 
these futures conflicted by examining how the assumptions and understandings they were 
built upon differed.  For example, we looked for how interviewees drew upon differing 
understandings of past and present events, and how they understood what constituted 
harm to the environment.  We found two key underlying understandings that noticeably 
differed between the optimistic, pragmatic and critical categories: how the environmental 
risks associated with plant TagMo products differ from those associated with first 
generation GM plants and the adequacy of current GM plant regulation in the United 
States (Table 1).  We examined the differing assumptions across these underlying 
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understandings and their implications for environmental governance.  Finally, we 
identified the institutional affiliation and area of expertise of interviewees to better 
understand the contexts that influence particular futures.   
 
2.5 The conflicting futures of plant targeted genetic modification environmental 
regulation 
 
2.5.1 Pragmatic environmental regulation future 
The vast majority of interviewees, representing a diversity of affiliations and areas 
of expertise, believed that to best address plant TagMo environmental regulation, existing 
GM plant environmental regulation should be kept the same, incrementally strengthened, 
or incrementally eased.  We classified these futures as pragmatic because they generally 
viewed the existing regulatory paradigm as sound and argued for incremental changes to 
the existing GM plant regulation to best address plant TagMo products.  Interviewees 
articulating pragmatic regulation futures held a diverse set of views concerning the 
environmental risks associated with plant TagMo products.  One group of interviewees 
viewed plant TagMo as providing increased genetic engineering precision but not 
decreasing the environmental risk of plant TagMo products compared to first generation 
GM plant products.  They viewed plant TagMo as one of many techniques for plant 
improvement, all of which can cause adverse environmental effects.  They diminished the 
role of genetic engineering technique for environmental risk and instead focused on the 
plant’s resulting phenotype.  As one natural scientist in academia said,  
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“Traditional crop improvement occasionally leads to weedier weeds, evolution of 
new invasives, and the endangerment of species at risk of extinction, and there’s 
no reason to assume genetically engineered organisms would be any different.  
There’s no reason to assume that species improved through targeted modification 
would be any different.  I mean, they’re the techniques but they are not the 
phenotypes.  So these sort of risks depend on phenotypes and - yeah, the risks 
depend on the phenotype, not on the technique.” 
 
Other interviewees viewed plant TagMo as increasing genetic engineering precision and 
incrementally reducing the environmental risk from GM plants by lowering the 
likelihood of off-target effects during the genetic engineering process.  As an academic in 
trained in public policy explained, “By reducing some of the uncertainty associated with 
traditional recombinant DNA engineering, I think [TagMo] helps to remove some of the 
concerns that have been raised about the potential risks of the technology by allowing us 
to be more comfortable with predictions about how the plant will in fact behave and 
perform in the environment.”  
 
Finally, others believed that plant TagMo would facilitate the creation of new 
traits and species and, as a result, would pose new risks.  For example, one plant TagMo 
researcher in academia stated with regard to environmental risk,  
“As we’re able to modify plants more and more… essentially, we will be able to 
modify these plants more and more from their standard configurations.  Especially 
with gene addition, we can completely rewire a number of these plants.  So I 
guess the one concern I have is that if we’re creating plants before we really know 
what the sort of products are…we really could rewire these to the point that 
they’re not really the same plant anymore.  Is it going to be toxic to insects that 
are still going to recognize it as a food, but it’s no longer really a food for them?”   
 
Even within this pragmatic category, we see a variety of differing understandings 
concerning how plant TagMo will influence environmental risk.  A tension emerged in 
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the pragmatic futures with regard to environmental risk between plant TagMo’s ability 
for increased insertion precision and its ability to produce new phenotypic traits.  Some 
justified their view that plant TagMo would reduce environmental risk by arguing that 
plant TagMo’s increased insertion precision would reduce the off-target effects of genetic 
engineering.  With fewer unpredicted changes in plants as a result of their genetic 
engineering, the potential for significant environmental risk will be reduced.  Others 
within this category argued that it is the resulting phenotypic traits, and potential new 
phenotypic traits, that are more of a concern for environmental risk than imprecise 
genetic engineering.  They believed that plant TagMo should be scrutinized because of its 
potential to create new phenotypic traits that may negatively impact the environment.   
 
Interviewees articulating pragmatic futures viewed the regulation of first 
generation plant genetic engineering as successful or as adequate and in need of only 
incremental adjustments.  Those who viewed it as successful believed that there had been 
no major problems resulting from the existing regulation, as this academic in public 
policy said,  
“I think if you look at the record to date, we clearly have in the United States, 
we’ve clearly witnessed the introduction of a widely adopted technology without 
any apparent health or environmental problem, so to that extent, you can argue 
that the regulatory system has been adequate and has worked well, because we’ve 
had the benefits of the technology, and we’ve avoided any potential risks.” 
 
Those who viewed existing GM plant regulation as adequate but in need of incremental 
change cited a variety of existing problems within the regulatory system.  These changes 
sometimes were framed in terms of increasing or decreasing the stringency of the 
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regulatory system and sometimes simply framed in terms of correcting existing problems.  
One frequent suggestion, for example, was to implement a tiered approach to regulatory 
oversight that would allow products similar to those already deemed safe to move 
through regulatory review with less scrutiny, allowing more attention to be placed on 
newer and potentially more risky products.  Another set of suggestions involved 
addressing the regulatory gaps and other issues resulting from the United States 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology that divided the responsibility 
for regulating biotechnology between the Food and Drug Administration, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Agriculture (Office of Science 
and Technology Policy 1986).   
 
2.5.2 Optimistic environmental regulation future 
A smaller subset of interviewees, mostly consisting of researchers in the plant 
TagMo field and members of the plant TagMo-related industry, stated optimistic futures 
for plant TagMo and its environmental regulation.  We identified these futures as 
optimistic because they foresaw plant TagMo leading to drastic improvements in plant 
genetic engineering including not being able to distinguish between plant TagMo 
products and those derived through conventional breeding.  We see this view articulated 
in the following quote by a plant TagMo researcher:   
“As long as you’re able to keep the [TagMo agents] from actually integrating into 
the genome, there is no evidence as to how that particular mutation was made.  So 
in that sense, when people get worked up about that type of genetic engineering, 
it’s largely unfounded because you've just sped up what was essentially a natural 
process.  If you can’t distinguish between the natural product and the unnatural 
product, there really isn’t any basis for concern between the two.  Or at least any 
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additional concern than what we've been accepting as standard practice for the last 
thousand years.” 
 
When describing the implications of plant TagMo for environmental risk, these 
interviewees describe the modifications from plant TagMo techniques as being more 
natural, and therefore less risky, than first generation techniques.  These views emerge 
from seeing plant TagMo techniques not as a new form of first generation genetic 
modification, but as a new form of mutation breeding.  Mutation breeding, also known as 
induced mutagenesis or classical mutagenesis, creates improved plant varieties by 
exposing plants to radiation or mutagenic chemicals and developing the resulting plants 
that contain random genetic mutations (Shu, Forster, and Nakagawa 2012).  Thousands of 
plants with these random mutations are grown to screen and select for those that may 
contain desired traits.  The vast majority of these plants will contain undesirable changes, 
but a small number may, by chance, result in desirable traits.  Naturally occurring random 
genetic mutations occasionally result in desired traits in plants, and selecting plants with 
beneficial natural mutations is the foundational way to pursue improved crop varieties.  
Mutation breeding, then, can be seen as a way to induce random genetic mutations in 
plants instead of waiting for natural mutations to occur.  The first plant variety created by 
mutation breeding was released in 1936 and the use of mutation breeding took off 
worldwide in the 1960s, including in Europe, Japan, India, and China – areas that have 
been much more skeptical of GM plants than the United States.  To date, over 3,000 
varieties of plants across 190 plant species have been created through mutation breeding 
(Shu, Forster, and Nakagawa 2012).   
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Although genetic mutations are artificially induced in plants using radiation and 
chemical mutagens, mutation breeding never received the regulatory scrutiny that 
genetically modified plants have.  In the United States and many other countries, plants 
derived from mutation breeding are not differentiated from plants derived from 
conventional breeding.  In the United States plants derived from conventional breeding, 
and as a result mutation breeding, fall outside of regulatory scrutiny.  As McHughen and 
Smyth explain, “the US does not routinely regulate safety of new crop cultivars, relying 
instead on breeders and developers to exercise due diligence and prudence in their 
evaluations” (2012, 37).  McHughen and Smyth go on to argue that this system has 
worked remarkably well because so many mutation breeding derived varieties have been 
made “none of which have had the relevant DNA mutations fully characterized, and none 
of which have had to be removed from the market for safety reasons” (McHughen and 
Smyth 2012, 37).  Others, however, have argued that this exclusion of all conventionally 
bred crops from regulatory oversight is questionable since the broad set of plant breeding 
techniques that are considered conventional can produce crops that have substantial 
negative environmental impacts (National Research Council 2002, 86).   
 
Since plant TagMo techniques can create desired traits by creating changes in a 
plant’s own DNA, without the insertion of foreign DNA, this optimistic group of 
interviewees argued that TagMo techniques should be seen as a better, more deliberate, 
more precise form of mutation breeding.  With this understanding, plant TagMo is an 
improved version of mutation breeding, which itself is a process to speed up naturally 
occurring mutations.  First generation genetic modification is a more risky and less 
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natural plant breeding technique because it relies upon the insertion of DNA from other 
species to obtain desired traits.  Within this line of thought, the long precedent of 
regulatory acceptance and environmental safety for plants resulting from mutation 
breeding provides a clear justification for treating TagMo-derived plants as conventional 
plants.   
 
Interviewees in this category largely viewed the existing environmental regulation 
for first generation GM plants as being adequate.  A few echoed the sentiment that a 
tiered approach to regulation should be implemented to prevent products from being 
over-regulated.  Interestingly, regulation of first generation GM plants was not as 
important to their understanding of the desired regulation for plant TagMo products, 
because they viewed plant TagMo products outside of the lineage of first generation GM 
plants.  As one interviewee from the plant TagMo industry said, “Anything that is similar 
to products that can be obtained by mutagenesis or tilling, should be considered as a non-
regulated article.  If the product is similar to what can be obtained by other methods 
which are non-regulated, I don’t see why this product should be [regulated as a GM 
plant].”  In other words, if regulatory agencies have trusted breeders to ensure that only 
safe products from mutation breeding are released, and if certain applications of plant 
TagMo are similar to versions of mutation breeding, shouldn’t certain regulatory agencies 
treat products from plant TagMo in a similar way?   
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2.5.3 Critical environmental regulation future 
Interviewees stating a critical future of plant TagMo and its environmental 
regulation made up the smallest group of interviewees and were affiliated with either 
academia or a non-governmental organization.  We classified these futures as critical 
because they were based on understanding plant TagMo as a continuation of first 
generation GM plants, which were seen as both inadequately regulated and causing 
significant adverse effects.  They viewed the existing regulatory paradigm as not 
adequately independent and not adequately assessing the environmental consequences 
caused by GM plants.  As one natural scientist in academia described,  
“Well, there’s not enough testing, there’s definitely no independent testing, the 
testing that is done is really voluntary and done by the same people who stand to 
profit from the application of these things.  The testing that is done is also 
inadequate, even if it was done properly and independently… there are molecular, 
ecological, social, economic consequences that are specific to the transgenic 
manipulation that are really excluded from the testing that happens and the 
regulations that are in place.”  
 
This future stems from the belief that the first generation GM plants provided few 
benefits while producing many negative environmental effects such as the development 
of herbicide tolerant weeds, adversely affecting non-target species, and the impacts from 
the increased application of the herbicide glyphosate used with herbicide tolerant crops.  
Plant TagMo is seen as not addressing the negative impacts of first generation genetically 
modified plants and as likely leading to further risks and negative impacts through the 
creation of new plant traits.  
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The existing regulatory paradigm was deemed inadequate because of how 
regulatory agencies operate and what type of testing is completed.  As an interviewee 
affiliated with an NGO explained,  
“They [the USDA] are not properly assessing environmental impacts… And I 
know in my own interactions with them over the years that it’s - my saying is 
pretty much that they haven’t met a genetically engineered plant they wouldn’t 
approve… the agency, the scientists, many that I’ve talked to, are proponents of 
genetic engineering.  They think it’s good, think it’s good for U.S. agriculture, 
and their biases inform their analyses… I pay close attention to risk assessments, 
the environmental assessments that they do, and I still am amazed that they cannot 
see where their assurances are not supported by data.” 
 
One set of concerns expressed by these interviewees involved the influence of industry 
on US regulatory decision making.  As examples of this, interviewees cited the lack of 
independent analysis resulting from the acceptance of industry’s safety data in regulatory 
review as well as the conflicting priorities that arise from the USDA’s role as both 
regulator and promoter of US agriculture.  The interviewee above argues that the USDA 
and its employees have such convictions of the safety and benefits of first generation GM 
plants that it biases the assumptions and interpretations of their analyses.  Another set of 
concerns involved the types of tests completed for environmental safety testing.  The lack 
of long-term and post market safety studies were deemed part of a wider decision not to 
look for and therefore not to possibly find potential negative impacts from first 
generation GM plants.  An additional example given of this inadequacy was the failure to 
comprehensively examine how GM plants differ from other plants by, for example, 
conducting proteomic profiles to examine how a genetically modified plant’s entire set of 
proteins may have changed through the modification process.  Interviewees articulating 
these critical futures felt that the fundamental problems they saw would not be addressed 
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by plant TagMo, and therefore they viewed plant TagMo and first generation GM plants 
as similar in all consequential ways.   
 
2.6 Discussion 
 
 In line with the future studies literature (Tutton 2011; Lopez 2008; Borup et al. 
2006), we found that conflict was central to the plant TagMo futures, as demonstrated by 
differences in the interviewees’ desired forms of environmental regulation and in the 
related understandings and assumptions concerning risk and existing regulation.  With 
regards to environmental regulation for plant TagMo products, futures varied from 
calling for incremental changes to existing regulations, to calling for significant 
strengthening of existing regulations, to calling for plant TagMo products not to be 
regulated as genetically modified plants.  We helped reflect upon these futures by 
analyzing the understandings and assumptions that these perspectives were built on.  For 
example, we examined how diverging understandings of what constitutes environmental 
risk (captured in how risks associated with plant TagMo would differ from those 
associated with first generation GM plants) and of the adequacy of existing GM plant 
regulations aligned with desires for plant TagMo environmental regulation (Table 1).  
These findings can help focus and refine discussions about the future of plant TagMo 
environmental regulation because they identify the consequential understandings and 
assumptions that plant TagMo regulatory futures are built upon.   
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2.6.1 The regulation of plant TagMo 
With the exception of the interviewees articulating optimistic futures – who were 
all plant TagMo researchers or in a plant TagMo related industry – our interviewees 
largely believed that all TagMo-derived plants should face no less regulatory scrutiny 
than first generation GM plants.  Recent decisions by US regulatory authorities, however, 
are not in line with this belief.  The United States Department of Agriculture gains its 
authority for regulating genetically engineered plants from the federal Plant Protection 
Act (PPA) of 2000 which states that a plant should be regulated as a GMO if recombinant 
DNA (rDNA) from a listed “plant pest” organism is used in the process of creating the 
modifications or inserted into a plant to achieve a desired trait, or if the USDA 
administrator has reason to believe the resulting genetically engineered plant is a plant 
pest.  Most first generation genetic engineering both uses such rDNA in the process of 
creating GM plants and inserts this rDNA to confer a particular trait (e.g. promoters with 
viral genes or constructs with bacterial genes).  TagMo techniques, however, do not need 
to do so (Podevin et al. 2012; Kuzma and Kokotovich 2011).  Plant TagMo techniques 
can be used to insert rDNA from a differing species, but they can also be used to create 
genetic modifications that do not use rDNA and therefore fall outside the existing 
regulatory definitions within the United States.  This may lead to the situation where 
certain TagMo derived plants will only be regulated by the USDA when the administrator 
decides the resulting GM plant poses a significant risk.   
 
Since our interviews took place, documents released by the USDA through a 
Freedom of Information Act request demonstrate that, in at least two instances, the 
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USDA has in fact excluded TagMo derived plants from regulatory scrutiny because of a 
lack of reason to believe that they are or were created using plant pests (USDA 2011; 
Waltz 2012).4  In the first instance, the company Cibus was told by the USDA in 2004 
that their products created by the TagMo technique olionucleotides would not be 
considered GM plants.  Cibus is currently using the technique to create herbicide-tolerant 
canola.  In the second instance, DOW AgroScience created a corn product containing less 
phytate, an anti-nutritional component of feed grain, using the zinc-finger nuclease 
TagMo technique.  This product was deemed to be non-GM by USDA in 2010.  In both 
examples, products derived from plant TagMo techniques will be allowed onto the 
market as conventional varieties, without the regulatory review typically given to 
genetically engineered plants.  USDA justified these decisions by saying that the 
techniques fell outside of their regulatory definitions.  In the case of Cibus, USDA called 
the technique in question a “mutagenesis technique” to explain why it has no authority to 
regulate the products.  Therefore it seems that the USDA is considering certain plant 
TagMo techniques to be equivalent to mutation breeding.  Although we began this project 
seeking to help proactively begin and advance a conversation about how plant TagMo 
should be regulated, the regulatory decisions treating plant TagMo as a form of classical 
mutagenesis began, without transparency, as early as 2004.  This lack of openness 
surrounding regulatory decision making demonstrates how anticipatory governance-
based engagements with regulation are impeded by a lack of transparency and a lack of 
opportunities for stakeholder participation.  Without transparency and an opportunity for 
participation, the assumptions and potential implications of these decisions cannot be 
                                                 
4
 This decision by USDA was revealed after our interviews and was not discussed within our interviews.   
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exposed to scrutiny, eliminating the potential for an anticipatory governance-based 
approach.   
 
Our examination of plant TagMo’s environmental regulation futures also 
highlights some of the broader issues surrounding the regulation of crops in the US.  To 
begin, it emphasizes the tensions concerning how to differentiate GM and non-GM 
plants, and how to regulate the environmental risks of GM and non-GM plants.  In the 
United States regulatory system, whether a product is classified as genetically modified 
or not has important consequences, as it will, in most cases, determine whether the 
product comes under expensive regulatory scrutiny.  Yet in the era of plant TagMo 
techniques that can create novel traits without the use or insertion of rDNA, the existing 
Untied States regulatory definition of what constitutes a GM plant seems arbitrary.  If 
plant products with novel traits of similar significant risk to those created from first 
generation genetic modification can also be created from mutation breeding or plant 
TagMo, how can the differing levels of regulatory scrutiny be justified?  This point 
speaks to previously raised concerns about the regulation of conventional plants in the 
United States (National Research Council 2002).  The United States regulatory system 
provides extra attention to the environmental risk associated with the use of rDNA in the 
plant modification process, yet, as has been convincingly argued, significant 
environmental risks can emerge from phenotypic traits resulting from conventional or 
genetic modification based breeding (National Research Council 2002).  Other regulatory 
systems, as a point of contrast, are structured to address some of these concerns – 
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Canada’s, for example, regulates plants based on whether they contain novel features, no 
matter the technique used to create them.   
 
If plant TagMo products fall outside of existing regulatory definitions and the 
USDA administrator’s judgment becomes the only way for a plant TagMo product to 
receive regulatory scrutiny, it is unclear how these judgments would be made or whether 
they would be made in a transparent and participatory way.  The recent example in which 
regulatory decisions concerning plant TagMo products only became public in response to 
a FOIA request is not encouraging in this regard.  Finally, and building upon the concerns 
articulated by those interviewees supporting the critical future, one may ask how 
consequential it is for TagMo derived plants to fall under regulatory scrutiny if the 
regulatory process is currently inadequate.  A more important initial goal would be to 
address existing inadequacies within GM plant environmental regulation in the United 
States.  We believe that the attention given to whether products from plant TagMo 
techniques should be regulated as GM should not draw attention away from highlighting 
and addressing the inadequacies of the existing GM plant environmental regulation (e.g. 
Jasanoff 2005; Snow et al. 2005; Kuzma, Najmaie, and Larson 2009).   
 
2.6.2 Anticipatory governance and regulation  
We conclude by discussing the potential for anticipatory governance and future 
studies based insights to inform the study of environmental regulation.  Such an 
approach, as we demonstrated here, is based on the notion that how future regulations are 
discussed and argued for influences existing thought as well as present and future 
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decision making.  As a result, it is important to garner and scrutinize these “futures” and 
the understandings and assumptions that they are built upon.  To garner these futures 
involves reaching out (e.g. through public or stakeholder engagement exercises, focus 
groups, or interviews) to the diversity of people holding differing views about the 
regulation in question, not only those holding the most prevalent views.  This will help 
ensure that the breadth of current thought is well represented.  Scrutinizing the diversity 
of ways people imagine these futures can take multiple forms.  Certain scrutinizing, or 
reflection, can be completed through scholarship that systematically analyzes the 
assumptions and understandings that underlie differing futures.  This type of work can be 
informed by the future studies literature and can help comprehend what understandings 
and assumptions inform stances on regulation, where conflict exists concerning 
regulation, and where consequential assumptions reside that should be subject to further 
societal reflection.  Designing engagement exercises where stakeholders and the public 
can scrutinize the gathered futures and their implications can foster further forms of 
reflection.   
 
Our findings were put to use during a follow-up stakeholder workshop on plant 
TagMo oversight that took place in June 2013 (Korslund et al. 2013).  Insights from this 
study helped identify specific questions and tensions that were then further examined and 
reflected upon by expert-stakeholders at the workshop.  By revealing some of the 
differing assumptions concerning risk and the adequacy of existing regulation found in 
the plant TagMo environmental regulation futures, this study introduced some 
foundational, perhaps previously unconsidered, tensions to the workshop participants that 
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they were then able to grapple with.  These included, for example: how plant TagMo’s 
increased insertion precision may or may not be seen as decreasing environmental risk 
depending on how risk is conceived; how plant TagMo is similar to and different from 
classical mutagenesis, and whether this should influence decisions about regulation; and 
how unresolved questions about the inadequacies of current genetically modified plant 
regulation complicate considerations of how to regulate plant TagMo.   
 
Through studying the potential futures of plant TagMo environmental regulation 
we sought to demonstrate the promise of anticipatory governance principles for engaging 
with regulation.  This work contributes to efforts to expand the use of anticipatory 
governance and related principles beyond the laboratory (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 
2013).  As Wynne argues, “there are significant actors and conditions in the external 
context of laboratory science which shape those scientific practices themselves, and the 
innovations which come from them” (2011, 793).  As one of the factors shaping what 
form innovation takes, regulation will continue to be an important site influencing 
emerging technologies.  And as regulatory systems change to address these novel 
products, anticipatory governance-based approaches, like the one outlined here, will be 
vital for ensuring the efficacy and integrity of regulatory decision making.   
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Chapter 3 – Protecting Wild Rice from Harm: A Collaboration to 
Reconceive Scientific Research – The Case of Genetic Engineering 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  
Public scientific research has long been subject to deliberation concerning what 
ends it should work towards and what considerations should inform it (Kevles 1977; 
Kleinman 1995; Sarewitz 1996).  Recent scholarship has crystalized a set of concerns and 
questions that are well situated to contribute to this continuing deliberation.  This 
scholarship has emerged from a variety of trajectories, but shares a common goal of 
examining the values-based judgments and assumptions that influence science, risk 
assessment, and environmental decision making.  This work – including literatures 
regarding anticipatory governance, critiques of risk assessment, and indigenous studies – 
scrutinizes these assumptions to help inform how they are decided upon.  Anticipatory 
governance builds upon an acknowledgement of the values-based judgments that inform 
scientific research and technology development and argues that they should be informed 
by a consideration of their impacts.  The literature critiquing risk assessment 
demonstrates how risk assessment is built upon values-based judgments that need to be 
questioned and decided upon.  And the indigenous studies literature argues that the 
assumptions built upon in scientific and environmental agencies are often not informed 
by, or compatible with, indigenous worldviews.  I begin by reviewing the three areas of 
scholarship. 
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First, scholarship on anticipatory governance (Barben et al. 2008; Sarewitz 2011) 
and responsible research and innovation (Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012; Stilgoe, 
Owen, and Macnaghten 2013) has, at its broadest, argued that science should be informed 
by the consideration of its potential societal impacts.  These literatures build upon work 
that questions the distinction between basic and applied science and the ability of science 
to be self-governing (Jasanoff 2003).  Because science is increasingly tied to 
technological application and societal influences, it is important to examine factors that 
influence the direction of science and to engage in deliberation about which potential 
paths for science and technology are desirable.   
 
The literature on anticipatory governance develops the principles of foresight, 
engagement, and integration to help direct science and technology towards desirable 
outcomes and away from undesirable ones (Barben et al. 2008).  This work seeks to 
critique the paradigm of technology governance where the potential environmental, 
human health, and societal impacts of a technology are not considered by stakeholders, 
regulators, and other parts of society until a technology is going through regulatory 
review, long after its research and development process is complete.  Such a reactionary 
paradigm eliminates the potential to substantively impact the technology development 
process itself through upstream discussions about the potential impacts of a technology.  
At their most basic the three principles of anticipatory governance can be summarized as:  
 Foresight describes the process of developing plausible and evolving 
scenarios of possible futures that can be the subject of the public deliberation  
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 Engagement encompasses the suite of activities that stimulates public 
deliberation 
 Integration brings the engagement and foresight activities into the domain of 
scientific practice in order to enhance reflexiveness (Sarewitz 2011, 103) 
 
The principle of engagement recognizes that people will differ in their judgments of how 
a technology may develop and impact the world, in addition to differing over which of 
those potential paths is desirable.  Involving a diverse set of participants in well-designed 
anticipatory exercises can help ensure a broad and adequate set of a technology’s 
potential paths are envisioned and rigorously critiqued.  In recent years, this literature has 
established a substantial focus on governance efforts around emerging technologies such 
as biotechnology and nanotechnology (Karinen and Guston 2010; Kuzma and Tanji 
2010).   
 
The literature from the related area of scholarship known as “responsible research 
and innovation” shares with anticipatory governance the desire to engage stakeholders in 
deliberations over the desirability of potential research and innovation and their impacts, 
and to insert these considerations into design and development processes (Von 
Schomberg 2012; Van Oudheusden 2014).  Two particular ideas that are further 
developed by scholars working in the area responsible research and innovation, however, 
are reflexivity and responsiveness (Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012; Stilgoe, Owen, 
and Macnaghten 2013).  First, the argument is that there is a need to reflect upon not only 
the potential unintended and intended impacts of science and technology, but also on the 
underlying purposes and motivations associated with a technology.  It is important to 
keep the purview of anticipatory efforts on science and technology open to broader 
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questions such as, “why do it, who might benefit and who might not” (Owen, 
Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012, 754)?  Second, there is a need for institutional 
reflexiveness and responsiveness regarding the anticipatory efforts themselves, ensuring 
that they are open to change and critique.  Stilgoe et al. define reflexivity as “holding a 
mirror up to one’s own activities, commitments and assumptions, being aware of the 
limits of knowledge and being mindful that a particular framing of an issue may not be 
universally held” and argue that institutional efforts to engage in anticipatory governance 
efforts need to be subject to reflexive scrutiny (2013, 1571).  Therefore, there is both a 
need for anticipatory and participatory efforts to inform science, while at the same time 
being reflexive concerning the commitments and assumptions utilized and their 
limitations.  Third, building individual and institutional reflexivity around science and 
innovation can change how scientists view their moral responsibilities.   Reflexivity can 
challenge “assumptions of scientific amorality and agnosticism.  Reflexivity asks 
scientists, in public, to blur the boundary between their role responsibilities [as scientists] 
and wider, moral responsibilities” (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013, 1571).  As 
scientists become aware of the implications of their work through formal and informal 
practices of reflexivity, they may realize that it is both undesirable and impossible to see 
their responsibilities completely outside of the moral and ethical realm. 
 
 A robust literature critiquing practices of risk assessment offers a second avenue 
into examining the dilemmas of evaluating the potential impacts of scientific research or 
technology.  Scholarship developed in public policy and the social sciences has shown 
how the assessment of risk is a values-based process dependent upon the judgments 
 102 
utilized within it (Holifield 2009a; Jensen et al. 2003; Kokotovich 2014; Thompson 
2003).  Authors working in this area argue that there cannot be an objective or values-free 
way to assess whether a potential technology is likely to cause harm.  In the context of 
environmental risk assessment, judgments such as which risk pathways are examined, the 
desired state of the environment, and what testing protocol are utilized all influence what 
form the final characterization of risk will take (Meyer 2011; Kokotovich 2014).  To 
produce empirical knowledge on the potential adverse effects from a particular 
technology, certain normative judgments and assumptions must be made.  And how these 
judgments are made will delimit how the potential for harm is studied and what 
information is produced to inform decision making.  The bottom line is that efforts to 
explore the potential impacts of a technology also need to consider issues of public or 
stakeholder participation when determining how to make the judgments consequential to 
the assessment of risk for a technology.  So there is a need for participatory deliberation 
on the desired paths for science and its technological applications, as well as on the 
methods used (e.g. risk assessment) to examine the potential for significant harm from 
such technology.   
 
 The third area of literature supporting the analysis emerges from the field of 
indigenous studies and has shown how the decision making processes utilized in 
scientific and environmental agencies and institutions often are founded on worldviews 
and epistemologies that are not compatible with Native American worldviews and 
epistemologies (Arquette et al. 2002; Richmond et al. 2013; Smith 2012).  Worldview 
refers to the basic beliefs and assumptions that inform one’s understanding of the world 
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and epistemology refers to theories of knowledge including what counts as knowledge 
(Hassel 2006; Ogawa 1995).  This rapidly growing domain of indigenous studies 
scholarship emphasizes that careful attention must be paid to the worldviews and 
epistemologies that are privileged within any research affecting indigenous peoples, 
including the design of anticipatory governance and risk assessment processes (Holifield 
2009b).  Awareness that anticipatory governance or risk-based paradigms are themselves 
grounded in specific worldviews and epistemologies becomes problematic when these 
foundational assumptions are not opened to scrutiny.  There is a need, therefore, for 
scholarship that explores how anticipatory processes for science and technology can be 
informed by indigenous worldviews and epistemologies not compatible with those 
normally taken-for-granted in a western science context.   
 
 When placed in conversation, these three bodies of scholarship offer insights that 
inform both public scientific research and the analysis within this paper.  First, a clear 
foundation of research has been built that supports the notion that scientific research 
should be informed by the consideration of its impacts and implications in an 
anticipatory, participatory, and reflexive way (Barben et al. 2008; Owen, Macnaghten, 
and Stilgoe 2012; Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013).  Second, once the need for an 
anticipatory approach to public scientific research is realized, there are challenges posed 
by the values-laden nature of anticipatory efforts and decision making frameworks like 
risk assessment (Holifield 2009a; Jensen et al. 2003; Kokotovich 2014).  Because efforts 
to study the potential impacts of a technology or to design an anticipatory process to 
inform scientific research will always be based upon particular assumptions, how these 
 104 
processes are designed and who is involved in determining such assumptions will 
influence their outcome.  Third, those holding differing worldviews and epistemologies 
can be marginalized when foundational assumptions within anticipatory and participatory 
processes used to inform scientific research remain presupposed and not subject to 
conscious attention and scrutiny (Arquette et al. 2002; Richmond et al. 2013).  At the 
intersection of these literatures lie a host of critical questions and tensions in need of 
study, including the overarching questions I use to guide this study: 1) how can different 
worldviews inform anticipatory processes for public scientific research? and 2) how does 
scientific research need to be understood in order to require consideration of different 
worldviews?   
 
3.2 Wild rice and the genetic engineering issue 
 
 To contribute to this literature, I study a collaboration formed in response to 
issues concerning wild rice and the potential for its genetic engineering.  Wild rice is a 
plant of great cultural, spiritual and economic importance to the Anishinaabeg (Ojibwe) 
of North America.  Wild rice, known by the scientific name Zizania palustris and in the 
Ojibwe language as manoomin, is an aquatic grass that produces an edible grain and 
grows naturally in lakes and slow moving rivers in Minnesota, other parts of the upper 
Midwest, and Canada.  An annual plant that develops each spring from seeds that fell into 
the water the previous fall, ecologically, it provides a key source of nourishment and 
shelter for many fish and wildlife species (Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 
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2008).  Wild rice is an especially sacred plant to the Ojibwe, as demonstrated in the 
following statement from six of Minnesota’s Ojibwe Nations:  
“Manoomin is an inherent part of being Ojibwe.  Our lifestyles and cultural 
identity are intimately bound to manoomin, spiritually, physically, and 
economically.  The importance of manoomin to the Ojibwe people cannot be 
overstated as it holds a central position in the lives and rich history of the Ojibwe 
people.  It is more than just another grain or crop; it is a cultural resource of 
indescribable importance.  It is a sacred gift from the creator to our people and is 
used for sustenance, ceremonial and commercial purposes” (Bois Forte Band of 
Chippewa et al. 2008) 
 
Many Ojibwe see the need to protect wild rice as not only a sacred moral obligation, but 
as a matter of cultural existence as a People.  Accordingly, the right to wild rice on ceded 
lands outside of reservations was protected in the treaties of 1837, 1854, and 1855 and 
recently reinforced by the United State Supreme Court (Walker and Doerfler 2009; 
Preserving the Integrity of Manoomin in Minnesota 2011; Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band 
of Chippewa Indians 1999).  This type of sacredness may be hard to comprehend from a 
Western context, but a starting point can be thinking in terms of key religious practices 
and relics.   
 
A major change in the relationship with wild rice came in the late 1960s and 
1970s when the first successfully cultivated varieties were developed.  This push for 
cultivation was driven by cultural norms and values including economic development, 
productivity, efficiency and human control over nature (Oelke 2007).  Cultivated 
varieties of wild rice were produced using conventional breeding techniques that 
developed traits so that wild rice could be grown in drainable paddies similar to white 
rice varieties.  Cultivated varieties have been developed with a range of traits that 
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allowed for easier, more bountiful harvesting in paddies, such as increased yield, uniform 
ripening, and disease resistance (Oelke 2007).  Efforts to successfully develop cultivated 
wild rice varieties were initially conducted by small-scale European-American farmers 
working to grow wild rice as a commodity crop in northern Minnesota.  The University 
of Minnesota became involved after these farmers requested help.  The University 
responded as it had with other commodity crops by conducting research and creating 
many distinct cultivated wild rice varieties from the 1970s to the 2000s (Oelke 2007).   
 
The impacts of cultivated varieties on the wild rice market were not favorable for 
Ojibwe hand-harvesters of wild rice.  By 1990, large-scale production of cultivated wild 
rice had reduced natural-stand wild rice harvests to just 10% of the global market supply 
(Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 2008).  Before 1970, Minnesota provided 
half of the global supply of wild rice and the majority was produced from hand harvested 
natural stands.  Now California, where wild rice does not grow naturally, is the largest 
producer of wild rice in the country due to its favorable weather for cultivated wild rice 
(Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 2008).  One critical concern is the 
economic impact this had on wild rice harvested from natural-stands.  Whereas an 
unprocessed pound of wild rice in the 1960s before the rise of cultivated varieties could 
at times garner upwards of $13 (adjusted for inflation), by 2008 the price per pound was 
closer to a tenth of that (Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 2008).   
 
In the late 1990s, scientists at the University of Minnesota embarked on a research 
agenda to map the wild rice genome to aid in its conventional breeding (Kennard et al. 
 107 
2000; Kennard, Phillips, and Porter 2002).  No attempts were made to either inform or 
consult Tribal Nations or their community members as the mapping work was proposed 
and implemented.  Once the Ojibwe nations learned of the research taking place, the 
President of Chippewa Tribe (an overarching tribal government for 6 of the 7 Ojibwe 
Nations in Minnesota) wrote a letter to the President of the University of Minnesota 
expressing their concern, saying in part:    
“We object to anyone exploiting our treaty wild rice genus for pecuniary gain.  
The genetic variants of wild rice found naturally occurring on the waters in the 
territories ceded by the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe to the State of Minnesota are a 
unique treasure that has been carefully protected by the people of our tribe for 
centuries. Rights to the rice has been the subject of treaty, and is a resource that 
enjoys the federal trust protection… We are of the opinion that the wild rice rights 
assured by treaty accrue not only to individual grains of rice, but to the very 
essence of the resource. We were not promised just any wild rice; that promise 
could be kept by delivering sacks of grain to our members each year. We were 
promised the rice that grew in the waters of our people, and all the value that such 
rice holds…  We are prepared to undertake every legal and lawful measure to 
protect our interests in this matter. I hope you do not feel we do so merely to stop 
the progress of our general society. (We are all too aware of the historical 
outcome for Indians when the general society feels we are in the way of their 
progress.) I assure you, our interest is only in protecting the few rights and 
advantages that we have granted at such great costs” (Deschampe 1998). 
 
Although the University of Minnesota researchers involved expressed no desire to pursue 
a genetically engineered variety of wild rice, the development of a genomic map that 
could be the basis for pursuing an engineered variety raised a host of concerns about the 
relationship between the University of Minnesota and the Ojibwe and the potential 
impacts of a future engineered variety (Laduke and Carlson 2003; Noll 2005; Preserving 
the Integrity of Manoomin in Minnesota 2011).  First, as a public land-grant institution, 
the University of Minnesota arguably has a responsibility to the people of Minnesota, 
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including the Ojibwe, to act for their benefit when conducting research and teaching.
5
  
After the negative effects of wild rice cultivation and the disregard of the Ojibwe with 
regards to the genetics based work on wild rice, it was clear the Ojibwe were not fully 
recognized for either the sacredness of their relationship to the manoomin or for their 
standing as a People with a right to be informed and consulted regarding the University 
of Minnesota research agenda.   Such a stance by University of Minnesota researchers 
and administration precluded any consideration, inclusion, or respect within research 
related decision making.  There is no evidence that there were any institutional efforts 
within the University of Minnesota to engage with these issues, and certainly none based 
on principles consistent with those espoused by the literatures of anticipatory governance, 
responsible research and innovation, or indigenous studies.  
 
This continued neglect within University of Minnesota decision making from the 
early days of cultivated wild rice to genome mapping in the late 1990s led to further 
mistrust between the University of Minnesota and the Ojibwe.  The poor quality of this 
relationship was displayed by the University’s lack of response to a request by members 
of the Ojibwe community for information on the on-going wild rice research (the plant 
they held as sacred and had treaty rights to).  After not responding to the request for 
multiple years, in 2003 the Dean of the College of Agricultural, Food and Environmental 
Sciences provided the community members a box of unsorted documents.  There were 
also concerns about the potential impacts on natural wild rice stands from a genetically 
                                                 
5
 As stated in University of Minnesota Board of Regents policy, one part of the University of Minnesota’s 
mission is “To generate and preserve knowledge, understanding, and creativity by conducting high-quality 
research, scholarship, and artistic activity that benefits students, scholars, and communities across the state, 
the nation, and the world” (University of Minnesota 2008). 
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engineered variety.  Gene flow between an engineered variety and natural stands could 
introduce a trait that might be beneficial within the context of cultivated wild rice grown 
for commodity production, but could be harmful to natural stands.  Given the sacredness 
of the natural stands of wild rice that the Ojibwe have tended and relied upon for 
centuries, this would be not only unacceptable, but an affront to cultural integrity and 
survival (Preserving the Integrity of Manoomin in Minnesota 2011).  Finally, the 
patenting of an engineered variety would appropriate indigenous knowledge and practices 
that had successfully cared for natural wild rice stands for centuries.   
 
Within the University of Minnesota a disparity of reactions and perspectives 
existed regarding how to approach the complex issues surrounding wild rice and the 
relationship between the University of Minnesota and the Ojibwe of Minnesota.  In 2006, 
a leadership change within the college most centrally involved with the wild rice issues 
previously described allowed for an ad-hoc committee to coalesce from pre-existing 
relationships between a few Ojibwe community members and several empathetic faculty 
and staff employed at the University of Minnesota (for part of this backstory see Clancy 
and Adamek 2005).  This ad-hoc committee gained further institutional support when the 
new Dean of this college traveled to one of the Ojibwe reservations to meet with and hear 
the concerns of the Tribal community firsthand.  The committee grew to be comprised of 
Ojibwe elders and community members, University of Minnesota faculty, staff, and 
students empathetic to Ojibwe perspectives, and non-Ojibwe community members.  Over 
the years the faculty spanned a range of disciplines from the natural sciences to the 
humanities, including those who had worked with wild rice.  From 2011 to 2014, there 
 110 
were approximately one dozen core members of the committee who regularly attended 
meetings, and closer to 20 people who were involved with the committee at some point.  
The commonly agreed upon goals guiding the committee include: to protect natural stand 
wild rice and to improve the relationship between the University of Minnesota and the 
Ojibwe of Minnesota and the upper Midwest.  The committee began work to pursue these 
goals through a variety of means, including regular meetings to develop relationships and 
explore potential courses of action for pursuing policy changes at the University of 
Minnesota.  
 
3.2.1 Underlying historical context: University science and the Ojibwe 
 Although the wild rice collaborative committee formed in response to the 
contemporary issues surrounding wild rice and genetic engineering, the importance of the 
underlying historical context cannot be ignored.  Members of the Ojibwe community 
viewed the issues concerning wild rice and genetic engineering not as an isolated 
incident, but one more example of a pattern of behavior characterized by arrogance, an 
inability to understand or appreciate Native worldviews, and negative effects from 
University activities on Native life (Laduke 2005; Laduke and Carlson 2003).  One 
example of this conflict-laden history was the cultivation of wild rice.  The drive to 
cultivate wild rice was based upon: 1) a perspective that considered wild rice a 
commodity crop to be improved upon while disregarding the Ojibwe’s view that it is a 
sacred gift from the creator, perfect in its current form, and 2) disregard for the impact of 
domestication research on Ojibwe natural-stand wild rice harvesters.  The arguments for 
cultivating wild rice also built upon notions that the Ojibwe’s use of wild rice was 
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inadequate and that the Ojibwe would not be adequate contributors to the Minnesotan 
economy until wild rice was exploited as a commodity crop.  This notion was captured 
most directly in a report conducted by the Minnesota Resources Commission for the 
Minnesota Legislature in 1969.  As part of a statement included as the only Appendix to 
this report, the Iron Range Resources & Rehabilitation Commission argued the following 
(Edman 1969, vii):   
“There is no doubt that this grain which long was a staple of the Indian diet is 
being exploited by the white man.  To take the attitude of some sociologists and 
welfare agents that “the rice should be left to the Indian” is to close the eyes to the 
facts.  Once the white man tasted the grain it was no longer left to him – it became 
a delight of anyone’s diet.  So the white man will eventually domesticate the 
grain!  To curb the trend by stubborn, lethargic, do-nothingness will be to lose the 
business to another state with vision and the will to prosper its agricultural 
community. 
 
If the Indian is to be raised to a level of equality, respectability and become a self-
supporting part of the Minnesota economy, it is a criminal neglect to let him 
waste his heritage and make no effort to better the one natural resource that is 
uniquely his.  The Nett Lake tribe, to take one area as an example, could with 
proper management of their lands, be a proud asset of the State, totally self-
supporting, and devoid of any reason to fear the cultivation of wild rice by their 
neighbors, whose skins are prone to sunburn!” 
 
Here, the desire to modernize is extended both to the wild rice and to the Ojibwe 
themselves.  In addition, the implied rationale is that the one way the Ojibwe can avoid 
the negative impacts of treating wild rice as a commodity crop is to cultivate wild rice 
and treat it as a commodity crop before and more efficiently than those around them.  
Modernization and commoditization cannot be questioned within this understanding; 
rather, they must be exploited for one’s own gain.  Other arguments existed at the time, 
however, that pointed out the likely negative impacts from the cultivation of wild rice on 
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Minnesota harvesters of wild rice.  The report recounts one such argument made at a 
hearing in 1967 (Edman 1969, 76):  
“If there is developed a [cultivated] shatter-proof agricultural species of wild rice, 
I think there is every reason to believe that much of it will be grown in other parts 
of the nation and other parts of the world… For the Legislature of the State of 
Minnesota or any agency of the State of Minnesota, to appropriate money to 
develop a product which would deprive us of almost a monopoly, seems to be a 
little less than idiotic.” 
 
Another important historical context that influenced the relationship between the 
University of Minnesota and the Ojibwe was the role of Anthropology Professor Albert 
Jenks during land dispossession in the early 20
th
 century.  Albert Jenks was a physical 
anthropologist and a professor at the University of Minnesota from 1906 to 1938.  He 
founded and served as chair of the University of Minnesota’s Anthropology Department 
for its first twenty years of existence from 1918 until his retirement (Soderstrom 2004).  
He believed, as was accepted by his discipline at the time, that it was possible to make 
judgments about race by measuring and observing physical characteristics and by 
scratching people’s skin and hair (Beaulieu 1984).  He also believed in a racial hierarchy, 
arguing that certain races were more primitive, and that physical anthropology could help 
improve the American race (Soderstrom 2004).  As one University of Minnesota 
newspaper article highlighting his research stated:  
“[His] researches are continued among primitive peoples, mainly for the purpose 
of getting at human cultural beginnings: never before has the student of present 
social conditions so appreciated the necessity of starting at the bottom of the 
ladder of human culture, if he would understand the social life, at any of the 
higher steps of the ladder… He believes that when the scientific facts of human 
heredity become common knowledge (such facts as are known of plants and 
animals) such educated public opinion will gradually impel people toward a 
rational improvement of the race of man” (The Minnesota Alumni Weekly 1909, 
4). 
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Although ideas concerning a racial hierarchy, measurement of physical characteristics to 
determine race, and the improvement of the American race through eugenics were widely 
shared throughout his discipline and with many key administrators at the University of 
Minnesota at the time (Soderstrom 2004), they have since been widely rejected.  Yet their 
“truth” at the time allowed Jenks to use these ideas in the name of University of 
Minnesota scientific research for ends detrimental to Minnesota’s Ojibwe.   
 
Earlier in Minnesota history, in 1889, US Congressman Knute Nelson, a 
representative from Minnesota and a Regent at the University of Minnesota, secured 
passage of the “Act for the Relief and Civilization of the Chippewa Indians of 
Minnesota” or what came to be known as the Nelson Act.  In addition to calling for 
relocation of Minnesota’s Ojibwe people to two reservations in western Minnesota and 
for the elimination of all other reservations, this act called for the allotment of the 
remaining reservation land to individual Ojibwe and for the selling of excess tribal lands 
(Beaulieu 1984; Doerfler 2009).  As Beaulieu (1984) describes, the intention of this act 
was to benefit individual settlers and speculators in land and timber, but also to increase 
the property values of non-Indian lands surrounding reservations and to increase tax 
revenues through elimination of reservation lands and through improvements to the land 
by European farmers.  The sale of Ojibwe land was heightened by further legislation in 
1906 and 1907 that removed restrictions to the sale, incumbrance or taxation of 
allotments held by “mixed-blood” adults, those having partial European ancestry.  
Although all of this legislation was created to help further the interests of timber and land 
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speculators, there was massive fraud in deals that were made with “mixed bloods” and 
with illegal purchases from “full-bloods” and minors. This led to an investigation in 1909 
by a special representative of the United States Attorney General and a resulting lawsuit 
involving 142,000 acres of land (Beaulieu 1984).  Those who had purchased the land 
defended themselves by saying that all the land they bought had been sold by “mixed 
bloods”.   
 
The initial investigation by the United States Attorney General had difficulty 
establishing who of the Ojibwe in question were “mixed blood” because the idea of a 
blood quantum-based notion of race and identity was not used or accepted by many 
Ojibwe (Doerfler 2009).  As a result, in 1915 Professor Jenks and Dr. Ales Hrdlicka, 
from the Smithsonian Institute, were called in to use their methods to scientifically 
determine who was “mixed blood” and therefore outside of official concern for how their 
land was obtained.  Jenks was sure that he could definitively identify whether someone 
had any white blood in them by sampling hair, rubbing skin, and measuring faces, noses, 
and heads (Beaulieu 1984; Soderstrom 2004).  Through his examinations based on the 
scientific paradigm he was steeped in, he found that over 90% of the people examined 
were “mixed-blood” and therefore outside of concern for how their land was obtained.  
The implications of these findings were disastrous for the Ojibwe and beneficial for those 
who gained from these lands, as highlighted by a University of Minnesota newspaper 
article:  
“90% of the 300 Indians examined show unmistakable evidence of mixed-blood. 
The results of the government suits so far tried with aid of anthropological 
evidence are decidedly favorable to the citizens of Minnesota; if the defendants 
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continue to win their cases, farming lands now valued at more than $1,500,000 
will, it is conservatively estimated, within ten years increase in value by 
improvements four hundred percent. They will be worth $6,000,000 and taxable 
by the state” (The Minnesota Alumni Weekly 1916). 
 
As a result, scientific anthropological evidence, since completely discredited, was used 
by a University of Minnesota professor to contribute to the dispossession of thousands of 
acres of land from the Ojibwe.   
 
 This historical context was foundational to the common understandings that the 
collaborative committee was seeking to establish.  How could one begin to comprehend 
the Ojibwe’s understandings of the University of Minnesota, academic science, and the 
issues around wild rice and genetic engineering without becoming aware of and 
acknowledging the Ojibwe’s past experiences with the University of Minnesota and its 
science?  Whether the legacies of an anthropologist poking and measuring or a plant 
breeder seeking to improve through cultivation the use of a plant that was used 
successfully for centuries was deemed perfect and a gift from the creator – many Ojibwe 
have experienced University public science as something that is not universally 
beneficial.  Rather, they experience it as a colonizing and disrespectful force based upon 
racist presuppositions used by authoritative outsiders to: inform people of their “correct” 
ancestry, justify the dispossession of land, and disrespect a sacred plant in the name of 
efficiency and progress.  This history helps make clear the tensions and histories of 
conflict that served as the background for the wild rice collaborative committee’s actions.  
It took the committee about three years of meeting 2 to 3 times a year before sufficient 
trust had been built to plan and organize a large three day cross-cultural symposium held 
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in August 2009 at White Earth Nation, one of the Ojibwe nations and reservations.  This 
2009 symposium was sufficiently successful that the committee continued to organize 
symposia that were held in 2011, again at White Earth, and in 2013 at Mille Lacs 
Reservation.   
 
3.3 Methods: Studying the wild rice collaborative committee 
 
 The wild rice collaborative committee, heretofore referred to as the committee, 
continues to work proactively to protect natural wild rice from genetic engineering and to 
improve relationships between the University of Minnesota and the Ojibwe.  Arguably 
then, the committee is pursuing an anticipatory process to influence scientific research 
policy at a public research institution.  And given that a key aspect of the process it 
follows involves acknowledgement and engagement with different worldviews and 
different understandings of science and harm, the committee’s experience can contribute 
rich insights to the scholarship on scientific research and anticipatory governance.   
 
 My engagement with and study of the committee took place in many parts.  First, 
I attended the 2009 symposium organized by the committee as a trainee in the University 
of Minnesota’s National Science Foundation Integrative Graduate Education and 
Research Traineeship program on Risk Analysis for Introduced Species and Genotypes 
(IGERT-ISG).  Graduate students from this program were invited to participate in the 
2009 symposium because of its relevance to the study of risk concerning genetically 
modified organisms, a theme of the IGERT-ISG program.  After that symposium and 
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subsequent conversations with members of the committee, I expressed interest in 
becoming involved with the committee and in studying the committee as a case study for 
my dissertation.  Over several months in the spring of 2011, I worked with a couple of 
committee members to determine an appropriate process to join the committee.  As part 
of this process, I attended a committee meeting to share why I wanted to join the 
committee and how I planned to draw upon my experience to inform my dissertation 
research.  I also obtained a letter of support from one of the tribal governments actively 
involved with the committee.  As further described below, my methodology for studying 
the committee lasted from 2011 to 2014 and involved participant observation in the 
committee’s meetings, in-depth interviews with committee participants, and document 
analysis of relevant documents concerning the committee and the history of the issues 
surrounding wild rice.   
 
As I worked with and observed the committee, I refined and narrowed my 
research questions based upon what I learned.  One benefit of using participant 
observation to engage with a group over a long period of time is that it allows a 
researcher to adjust their study’s direction as they learn more about the group, helping the 
researcher formulate sensible questions (Bernard 2013).  I had a broad interest in how the 
committee dealt with different understandings of harm and risk that exist around the wild 
rice issue.  But during my time working with the committee, I became more interested in 
foundational questions concerning the committee’s anticipatory approach to wild rice 
governance and the reconceived notion of scientific research that informed it.  The 
committee’s process of reconceiving scientific research required bringing into the 
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foreground certain questions and concerns.  Examining the understanding of scientific 
research that the committee questioned and the one that emerged through its work was a 
useful way to explore the committee’s specific anticipatory approach to engaging with 
the issues around wild rice and genetic engineering.  This reconceived notion of scientific 
research emerged from the committee’s specific critiques of science and risk and from its 
particular approach to collaboration.  The specific research questions for this paper 
include: How did the committee reconceive scientific research?  What particular 
understandings of science and risk did it critique and draw upon as it reconceived 
scientific research?   
  
 The methodology I used to complete this study had three components: participant 
observation as a member of the committee, in-depth interviews with 14 committee 
members, and a document analysis of relevant materials.  First, I completed participant-
observation as a member of the wild rice collaborative committee for three years, from 
2011 to 2014.  During this time I regularly took part in committee meetings and 
contributed to planning efforts for the symposia in 2011 and 2013.  The committee met 
between 6 and 12 times a year with more frequent meetings surrounding symposia 
planning.  Bernard (2013) cites 5 reasons why participant observation is a particularly 
valid method for studying groups of people.  First, participant observation enables the 
collection of different kinds of data than interviews or surveys – primarily observed 
behavior rather than self-reported behavior after the fact.  Second, participant observation 
over a long period reduces reactivity, or the likelihood that people will change their 
behavior around a researcher.  With regards to these two points, participant observation 
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allowed me to witness firsthand, and repeatedly, discussions taking place within the 
committee.  I was able to experience how certain ideas influenced the discussions within 
the committee and reactions of committee members to discussions over time.  Third, 
because it allows for an extended interaction with a group, participant observation can 
help formulate sensible questions for inquiry.  Through my work with the group I was 
able to determine the key tensions the committee faced, how to ask about them in formal 
interviews and informal conversations, and how to look for them within meetings.  
Fourth, participant observation helps facilitate sound interpretation of observations.  For 
example, the backstories and context that I learned through my work with the committee 
informed my interpretation of what I experienced and the committee’s actions.  Finally, 
participant observation is often the only method well suited to address certain research 
problems.  While participant observation is time-consuming, it yields knowledge 
captured in real time that cannot be gained through any other method, and any method 
coming close to allowing the garnering of such knowledge would be even more time 
consuming and thus prohibitive.  In my case, it would have been prohibitively time 
consuming to try to use personal interviews to keep up with the committee’s process, 
ideas, and outcomes over the course of three years.   
 
I conducted the participant observation as an “overt full member” of the 
committee (Bryman 2012, 441), as I informed other members of the committee of my 
research and I participated as a full member of the committee.  I was, however, acutely 
aware of the tensions and limitations within this method such as ensuring anonymity and 
considering that participant observation research to some extent changes the situation 
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being studied (Platt 2004; Cook 2005).  I was mindful of the potential impact of this 
research itself on the committee when I was choosing my specific research questions.  In 
both research design and my participation on the committee I sought to act in ways that 
were both beneficial for the committee and for the areas of scholarship I sought to 
contribute to.  By focusing on the overarching process of the committee in my research 
questions, I was able to better ensure the anonymity of the data I collected and 
conversations I had.  With regard to my actions on the committee, in addition to 
contributing to the committee through organizational tasks such as a post-symposium 
survey of participants, I sought to contribute conceptually through verbal comments and 
feedback on written documents: clarifying when issues or perspectives were not clear, 
making explicit where sources of conflict or divergence were among committee 
members, and highlighting points from previous discussions when they were relevant for 
current discussions.  This conceptual work aligned well with my concurrent goal of 
learning about the committee’s functioning and its reconceiving of scientific research.  
As part of the participant observation I conducted at committee meetings and the 
symposia in 2011 and 2013, I took notes, paying particular attention to discussions and 
interactions having to do with research, risk, and science.  As part of my analysis and 
reflection on these experiences I regularly reviewed these notes.  I describe the analysis 
process below.   
 
To complement the participant observation, I also conducted semi-structured 
interviews and a focused document analysis.  I conducted in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews (Bernard 2013, 189) with 14 of the most active members of the wild rice 
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collaborative committee.  These interviews, conducted in the summer of 2011, were 
broad in scope, and lasted from 2 to 4 hours.  Longer interviews were conducted in two 
sessions.  In addition to providing specific insights for my research questions, these 
interviews served to inform my participant observation.  In particular, these interviews 
helped me learn about the committee’s work, key issues, and tensions that existed up 
until I started participating in 2011.  This helped me better understand what I experienced 
on the committee, especially at first.  During the interviews, I asked committee members 
about: the history of the committee and the issues around wild rice, their experience with 
the committee, the committee’s process, challenges faced by the committee, key actions 
of the committee, the understandings of harm that exist around the wild rice issue and the 
impacts of the committee (Appendix C).  These interviews were transcribed to aid in my 
analysis, described below.   
 
Finally, I analyzed documents relevant to the wild rice and genetic engineering 
issue.  Specifically, I obtained literature that provided insights on the following historical 
periods: 1) Prof. Jenks and the University of Minnesota’s role in land dispossession; 2) 
the context surrounding wild rice cultivation; 3) the reactions to the genomic work on 
wild rice – both from the University of Minnesota administration and from the Ojibwe 
tribes; and 4) the committee and its activities and process.  I found these documents 
through previous literature that cited them, discussions with those currently involved with 
wild rice related issues, internet searchers, and scholarly search engines.  These 
documents, as cited in my results, included previous historical studies, a report published 
by a state agency, and newspaper articles and editorials.  The documents informed both 
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my discussion of the historical context and my analysis of the differing understandings of 
scientific research that existed around wild rice and genetic engineering.   
 
My analysis of information from these sources supported two goals, one specific 
to learning about the committee and one specific to my research questions.  The first goal 
was for this information to inform my foundational learning about the committee so that I 
could better participate with and study the committee.  By reflecting upon the data, 
whether from participant observation, interviews, or documents, I was better able to 
contextualize and interpret the actions of the committee and their significance.  For this 
end, I analyzed the committee as a whole, including its process, its goals, and the key 
tensions it dealt with.  When I wanted to confirm my emerging understanding of an 
aspect of the committee or gain further insight on a question that persisted for me, I 
would seek out members of the committee for further conversations.   
 
The second goal was for this information to help address my research questions.  
For this end I followed a formal process of analysis that contained two parts.  The first 
part involved analyzing the understandings of science and risk that supported the 
University of Minnesota administration’s position on wild rice research and those that the 
committee built upon in reconceiving scientific research.  I focused on science and risk 
because these concepts were significant to the positions articulated by the University 
administration and the committee, and because the meanings provided for these concepts 
differed greatly.  This focus also allowed me to examine the understandings of science 
and risk that were compatible with the anticipatory approach developed by the committee 
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and those that stood counter to it.  I drew upon insights developed by the literature on 
discourse analysis to inform this examination (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002; Fischer 2003; 
Hajer and Versteeg 2005).  First, discourse, as “a particular way of talking about and 
understanding the world (or an aspect of the world),” is important to study because our 
ways of talking “do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, 
rather, play an active role in creating and changing them” (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002, 
1).  Furthermore, discourses, “by representing reality in one particular way rather than in 
other possible ways,… make certain types of actions relevant and others unthinkable” 
(Phillips and Jorgensen 2002, 145).  In studying understandings of science and risk, then, 
I am examined the specific meanings provided to these concepts and their implications.  
For example, by drawing upon certain understandings of science and risk, the University 
administration made certain actions towards wild rice research and the Ojibwe in 
Minnesota possible and other actions inconceivable.  The committee, in offering a 
different set of meanings to science and risk, made possible a different set of actions 
towards wild rice research and the Ojibwe in Minnesota.   
 
Finally, I identified the instances where science and risk were discussed within 
the documents I examined and within the interview transcripts.  I explored how the 
understandings of science and risk informed a particular understanding of scientific 
research that then influenced how the administration and committee sought to address the 
issues and research surrounding wild rice.  This analysis also revealed how the committee 
worked towards institutional change by challenging particular understandings of 
scientific research.  As Fischer argues,  
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“At the micro level of analysis, the focus turns to the relationships between 
discourse and the specific institutional practices.  The goal… is to uncover the 
ways that discourses embedded in institutional practices function to reproduce the 
existing power-structure relationships from the bottom up” (Fischer 2003, 89). 
 
I examined if, and how, the understandings of risk, science, and scientific research 
reinforced by the responses offered in support of the University administration’s position 
reproduced understandings that excluded the concerns of the Ojibwe from being 
considered.  I also explored if, and how, the understandings reconceived by the 
committee opened new questions to consideration and supported the anticipatory 
approaches they developed.  In the second component of this analysis, I examined the 
processes that supported the committee’s anticipatory efforts and its reconceived notion 
of scientific research.  I drew largely upon my participant observation, which involved 
reviewing my notes and reflecting upon my experiences and observations.  In particular, I 
analyzed the actions that helped foster the particular type of scientific research supported 
by the committee.  As part of the overall analysis process, I reviewed my findings with a 
key long-time member of the committee that I worked closely with to provide a check on 
my interpretation.   
 
3.4 Findings: Reconceiving scientific research 
 
 By reconsidering and reconceiving notions of scientific research, the committee 
confronted the institutionalized understanding of scientific research that was the 
foundation of the University of Minnesota administration’s position on issues concerning 
wild rice and genetic engineering.  After reviewing this institutionalized understanding of 
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scientific research, I explore how the committee reconceived scientific research in a way 
that contributed to its anticipatory approach.  First, I review key aspects of the process 
used by the committee in developing its anticipatory approach, specifically focusing on 
its utilization of the conceptual frame “bridging worldviews”.  Second, I review the 
understandings of scientific research arrived at by the committee through its process and 
approach.  Finally, I elucidate the distinct ways the committee’s anticipatory approach 
fostered change in relation to scientific research on wild rice at the University of 
Minnesota.   
 
3.4.1 Institutionalized understanding of scientific research 
 The institutionalized understanding of scientific research articulated by those 
within the University of Minnesota concerning wild rice perpetuated the historical 
tension and conflict with Ojibwe Nations.  This understanding of scientific research was 
articulated by certain members of the University of Minnesota administration and faculty 
and contributed to the justification of the University’s response to issues surrounding the 
genetic mapping of wild rice.  These ideas were made public through documents 
produced during the late 1990s and early 2000s when the Ojibwe first learned of and 
responded to the genetic mapping research and the committee was first formed.  Core to 
the University’s understanding of scientific research were particular understandings of 
science and of risk.  First, science was seen as creating universally beneficial knowledge 
in the most defensible fashion possible due to its methodology based on repetition and 
peer review.  Because of this presupposed unbiased and universally beneficial nature, the 
right to create this knowledge is seen as protected by academic freedom, a values-based 
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construct fundamental to 20
th
 century academic institutions (Menand 1996).  The Dean at 
the time articulated this view in an op-ed piece, defending the University’s position on 
wild rice genetic mapping: 
“In the Ojibwe culture, wild rice is central to the origin stories of the Ojibwe and 
to traditional rituals, feasts and ceremonies.  Wild rice is the sacred gift from the 
Creator.  The Ojibwe know this to be true.  They need not question.  
Alternatively, the culture of Western science is based on questioning.  Those who 
enter fields of science, medicine and engineering are educated, trained, evaluated 
and rewarded on their ability to successfully pursue the unanswered question.  
Nothing is accepted without the proverbial “defense” and replication of methods 
that are published for all to challenge.  In addition, the academic culture upholds 
the right of an individual scientist to pursue his or her interest, as long as that 
effort is consistent with procedural and ethical guidelines of the university, 
national accreditation requirements and federal requirements.  This ‘academic 
freedom’ ensures that the pursuit of knowledge is not hampered or subverted by 
political, ideological or other special interests” (Muscoplat 2004). 
 
One can see in this statement how science is constructed in such a way so as to subjugate 
the concerns and viewpoints of the Ojibwe.  Implicit in this op-ed column is the value 
that Western science has a right and/or obligation to study all unanswered questions, 
except for (and without consideration of) questions about the potential impacts of such 
research.  As long as basic institutional procedural and ethical guidelines are followed, 
the right to conduct this research subordinates any need to further contemplate how this 
research will be taken up and used in the world.  From the author’s perspective, taking 
impacts beyond basic procedural and ethical guidelines – which do not currently capture 
within their purview the concerns of the Ojibwe – into consideration would compromise 
academic freedom.  There is no conceptual space in this understanding for consideration 
of the potential negative impacts of science that the Ojibwe articulate.  There is no 
possibility that scientific integrity could be reconsidered and improved by giving serious 
 127 
consideration to the Ojibwe’s relationship to wild rice.  Here, such reconsideration of 
science can only be understood as an act that will hamper and subvert the pursuit of 
knowledge by “political, ideological or other special interests”.   
  
 Another pivotal aspect of the understanding of scientific research articulated by 
the University of Minnesota involved risk.  At one level, the understanding that science 
should exist and progress for its own sake, outside the consideration of its potential 
impacts (other than basic ethical and procedural guidelines) eliminates the need for the 
consideration of risk.  Science produces knowledge that, due to its method, is 
presupposed as beneficial to all; issues concerning technology and its impacts are seen as 
outside of the realm of science.  A more explicit understanding of risk that emerges from 
the University of Minnesota institutional perspective acknowledges that scientific 
research may indeed have negative impacts, but that any potential risk can be assessed by 
experts without a need to engage those impacted by or concerned about potential harms.  
The potential harm to wild rice, with this view, could be examined without reference to 
how the Ojibwe understand and relate to wild rice.  In the context of using the genetic 
mapping of wild rice to improve cultivated varieties, University of Minnesota President 
Yudof could assert in his 1998 response to the Chippewa tribes’ initial letter:  
 
“As you are already aware, our researchers are working on ways to improve 
certain qualities of cultivated varieties of wild rice...the intention is to make the 
plant more adaptable to agricultural practices common to cultivated wild rice, 
such as mechanical harvesting techniques. They have assured me that there is 
virtually no risk to the wild rice stock native to the reservations. Thank you for 
letting me know of your concern on this issue, and please contact me if you feel 
that there is not good progress on resolving it” (Yudof as quoted in Anishinaabeg 
Today 2002, 18). 
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Yudof assumes that he can assert, based on the researchers’ assurances, that there is 
“virtually no risk” from the research being completed.  Risk, here, is understood as 
something that can be assessed objectively by expert scientists doing the genetic research 
and situated outside of the worldview and values of those who are impacted by it.  In 
addition, “risk to the wild rice stock native to the reservations” is taken as something that 
adequately encompasses all of the possible concerns of the Ojibwe, or, at a minimum, 
legal responsibilities of the University.  Implicit here is a commonly held institutional 
presupposition that research not only extends the pursuit of scientific inquiry but carries 
with it an absolute validity that transcends culture and trumps any need for participation 
by Ojibwe people.  
 
A more nuanced view concerning the ecological risks from the genetic mapping 
and its potential impact on cultivated varieties was provided by Professor Ron Phillips, 
one of the researchers who contributed to mapping work.  In discussing the issues around 
the mapping he states:  
“It depends on what you’re willing to accept as a threshold [of risk]… The 
possibility of a trait coming in from one of the bred varieties that would 
significantly alter the wild type is probably not very great. But it is possible. So 
you can’t guarantee [that it won’t happen]. You can’t guarantee that a bird won’t 
pick up a seed and take it 20 miles away. So that’s where you have the conflict. . .  
You’ve got to agree on some threshold, and in our discussions [with the 
Anishinaabeg], some people said, ‘Well one in a million is too great a risk’” 
(Phillips in Clancy and Adamek 2005). 
 
This articulation acknowledges some of the values-based judgments inherent in the 
assessment and management of risk, such as the need to determine what level of risk is 
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acceptable and envision different pathways that could lead to an adverse effect.  It also 
makes apparent how certain values or worldviews can be seen as almost nonsensical 
when placed within a risk analysis context.  The inference of this statement is that not 
accepting a risk with a probability of one in a million is unreasonable.  Yet, because risk 
is a product of probability and consequence (referred to as exposure and effect in risk 
analysis), the severity of the consequence in this risk equation needs to be considered and 
can only be fully understood by involving the Ojibwe.  Given that natural stand wild rice 
is sacred and an essential part of cultural survival for the Ojibwe and given that genetic 
mapping research was conducted with the aim to create improved cultivated varieties – 
which do not protect natural stands of wild rice – then it would make sense that even a 
one in a million chance of harming natural stands of wild rice could be seen as 
undesirable.  Therefore, it is important not to conflate probability with risk and not to 
ignore the values-based judgments informing considerations of consequence (e.g. What is 
put at risk? For what reason? Who would benefit from certain actions and who would risk 
greater harm?).   
 
3.4.2 Reconceiving scientific research: Process & Understandings 
 In this section I describe key attributes of the process used by the committee to 
reconceive scientific research.  These findings provide important insights on how the 
committee pursued an anticipatory approach that could attend to differing worldviews.  
This process helped challenge the understanding of scientific research that the 
administration built upon.  I focus on two attributes of the committee’s process: 1) the 
specific actions that constituted the majority of the committee’s work – meetings and 
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symposia, and 2) the core concept that informed these actions – bridging worldviews.  
After outlining this process I describe how it allowed the committee to arrive at 
contrasting understandings of science and risk as compared to the institutionalized 
understanding of the University.   
 
3.4.2.1 Process: Bridging at Committee Meetings 
 First, the committee meetings were moments for committee members to interact 
with and learn from one another, set goals for the committee, plan for the symposia 
events.  The meetings that took place before the planning of the first symposia in 2009 
involved a small group of initial committee members and primarily focused on 
establishing common understandings of the issues which then created a platform for 
shared language from which to build.  These meetings involved discussions about the 
different ways of understanding wild rice and the issues surrounding it, including the 
historical context described previously (section 2.2), as well as exploration about what 
the committee could do to improve the situation.  After many meetings, over multiple 
years, the committee wrote a document articulating a shared understanding that was then 
used to plan the first symposium (Appendix D).  This document explained how the 
committee was formed and set forth the guiding philosophy that interaction and dialog 
could facilitate learning and change that would help address the issues around wild rice.  
It described the sacredness and importance of wild rice to the Ojibwe, outlined the 
conditions that led to the cultivation of wild rice, described the conflicting interpretations 
of what the wild rice genetic research signifies, and concluded with the charge:  
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“Must these diverse worldviews stand in opposition and conflict or can they be 
bridged by listening and learning, by mutually respectful conversation and 
discourse? Recent developments at the University of Minnesota indicate a 
willingness to shift away from a culturally exclusive approach embedded in 
conflict toward one that embraces this dissonance as a healthy opportunity for 
understanding and growth. Native American reservation communities and faculty 
at the University of Minnesota have embarked on a path to build increased 
cultural understanding and a broader range of scholarship generated by the 
interactions of opposing worldviews as held by community-based elders and 
knowledge-holders and agricultural research scientists” (Appendix D). 
 
The initial concept that the committee worked with was “bridging worldviews”.  This 
concept allowed the committee to establish and emphasize that there was more than one 
legitimate way of relating to and studying wild rice.  Furthermore, that there was more 
than one way of understanding what form scientific research should take.  The committee 
was explicit in their desire to shift away from an understanding of wild rice and scientific 
research they regarded as “culturally exclusive” and toward an approach that would 
acknowledge and take seriously Ojibwe teachings and worldviews.  Thus, the bridging 
worldviews concept, as used by the committee, implied a commitment toward 
maintaining scientific integrity while transforming or abandoning the ideal that good 
scientific practice is “hampered or subverted” by serious consideration of views from the 
Ojibwe community.   
 
A host of noteworthy implications emerged from the bridging worldviews concept 
that the committee members worked with in their meetings.  First, to better comprehend 
the Ojibwe’s worldview as it relates to wild rice and scientific research, it was necessary 
for committee members to engage with the complex and conflictual history that the 
Ojibwe have had with the University of Minnesota, including those surrounding land 
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dispossession and wild rice cultivation.  This helped make explicit the historical 
injustices that inform the current situation and how the interests and worldviews of the 
Ojibwe had been marginalized over time.  As one of the committee members reflected 
upon, 
“I think commonly shared is this idea that we want to protect the manoomin.  I 
also think there’s a growing interest and, probably pretty widely shared 
assumption that we want to protect, to the extent we can, protect the interests of 
American Indian communities and reservation communities and that the 
university has not paid attention to the interests of Indian people to the extent that 
it could have or should have.  There’s this common understanding of a legacy of 
the past relationships that is not something that people within the university are 
necessarily proud of and people beyond the university have had to deal with or 
put up with. I think there’s a common commitment to trying to improve that.”  
 
Second, the concept also allowed the committee to facilitate a space for acknowledging 
the existence of worldview and culture-related background assumptions within the 
University of Minnesota, and specifically within its agricultural science disciplines.  
Within a culture of no culture (Traweek 1988) that can be present within scientific 
research institutions, assumptions can remain subconscious or unacknowledged, and as a 
result uncontestable.  Within the intercultural working context of this committee, 
assumptions are frequently acknowledged as value-laden and become contestable in 
terms of how the University approached wild rice and scientific research.  By drawing 
attention to these assumptions and how they differ from an Ojibwe worldview, the 
committee encouraged questioning of what was at stake in certain conceptions of wild 
rice and scientific research.  In moving past the idea that there is a single way to approach 
these topics it became possible to contemplate what is at stake in differing assumptions.   
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Third, in creating the space for exchange and learning, it allowed committee 
members who came from differing backgrounds and worldviews to learn more about 
each other and to challenge established stereotypes of each other.  For example: the 
University as a monolithic institution that universally supported viewing wild rice as a 
commodity; the Ojibwe as anti-science, nature loving luddites; and scientists as amoral, 
profit seeking, power hungry technocrats.  It allowed people to work towards knowing 
and respecting each other, instead of seeing only nameless threats to their wellbeing.  It 
also helped all involved learn about the complexities and tensions existing on many sides 
of this issue.  Fourth, the framework of bridging worldviews placed the emphasis on 
achieving change by establishing long lasting relationships between individuals based on 
common understanding instead of acting only from temporarily aligning self-interest.  
This particular approach was seen as a way to help address the problems that had 
emerged from the lack of trust and understanding that had characterized past interactions 
between the University and the Ojibwe communities.  As explained by one committee 
member,   
“Well it wasn't in the interest of the tribal side of it to get it done quickly, to be 
task driven and to be oriented along those lines.  It was: why should we trust you?  
We can accomplish this task together today, sure…  But what happens when next 
week things shift for whatever reason and the university administration doesn't 
like what you're doing and we don't have a relationship?  You're just as likely to 
shift on a dime again because we're focused on tasks.  And what the tribe wanted 
to see was a real commitment, so in other words to build a trusting and working 
relationship based on authentic mutual shared understanding.  And that was going 
to be more important than a task-based focus for early committee effort.”   
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So although the committee certainly worked on tasks, such as those involved with 
organizing the symposia, there was also a widely supported acknowledgement of the 
importance of building trust and relationships.   
 
3.4.2.2 Process: Bridging at Symposia  
 The symposia represented a way for the committee to further their goals of 
establishing communication and bridging across the larger University and Ojibwe 
communities.  These three day events served as a larger macrocosm for the processes the 
committee was working through.  The symposium in 2009 focused on protecting natural 
wild rice and bridging worldviews.  The symposium in 2011 added the theme of water, or 
nibi in Ojibwe, in addition to wild rice and bridging worldviews.  The symposium in 
2013 shifted to “building lasting relationships” as an additional focus and sought to 
establish working groups that could carry on the priorities and strategies identified in the 
first two symposia.  People from both the University of Minnesota and from all of 
Minnesota’s Ojibwe communities were invited to the symposia, which were planned by 
the collaborative committee.  Speakers included both scientists and representatives from 
the University of Minnesota and academia more broadly as well as Ojibwe community 
members and elders.  Further descriptions and outcomes from these symposia can be 
found online
6, but with regards to the committee’s reconceiving of scientific research a 
few parts stand out from the first two symposia that emphasized bridging. 
 
                                                 
6
 The following website contains the documents from all three symposia.  The concept note created before 
the first symposium is not included on this website, so it is included as Appendix D.    
https://www.cfans.umn.edu/wildrice 
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First, there was a conscious effort to emphasize both speakers informed by 
Western scientific worldviews and those informed by indigenous worldviews.  Ojibwe 
elders, tribal community members intricately involved with ricing and managing stands 
of wild rice, scientists from the University of Minnesota, and other scientists from the 
western science tradition all spoke about wild rice.  They raised the questions they 
thought were important to consider and, implicitly or explicitly, highlighted the ways of 
knowing and ways of relating that they used for engaging with wild rice.  Given that the 
Ojibwe worldview and histories have been largely marginalized with respect to wild rice 
and within the University, the committee privileged them within the symposium.  Many 
Ojibwe speakers helped articulate the importance of wild rice to the Ojibwe and the 
limitations of the dominant worldview and Western scientific approach.  Scientists 
informed from a Western scientific background discussed their research exploring 
different aspects of wild rice and issues concerning plants and the impacts from genetic 
engineering.  This served as an opportunity for the attendees from Minnesota’s Ojibwe 
tribes to learn about and reflect on the issues and scientific research concerning wild rice.  
By exposing symposium attendees to different worldviews and the questions and 
approaches that emerge in each, the committee explicitly built the tension of differing 
worldviews into the symposium.  As a result, the attendees were able to see and grapple 
with what was at stake with differing worldviews and their related assumptions.   
 
Yet even as the differences between the two worldviews became apparent, so did 
the diversity within the two worldviews.  This further complexity helped make the 
existence and implications of differing assumptions more apparent.  Symposium 
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participants were faced with needing to understand and contemplate the differences 
between not two neatly defined and contained worldviews, but between distinct 
worldviews and assumptions with nuanced differences within them.  Scientists informed 
by the Western science tradition came from different disciplines, examined different 
research questions, and related differently to wild rice, their role as an expert, and their 
research.  For example, one Western science trained presenter from the first symposium 
who was particularly well received by attendees spoke as a concerned individual who 
was open to learning, appreciative of the teachings that had been shared by the Ojibwe 
elders throughout the symposium, interested in protecting wild rice, and able to share 
knowledge that may be useful to efforts to protect wild rice.  This was very different from 
speaking as a disinterested expert attending the symposium to educate the audience with 
authoritative knowledge.   
 
Second, for one entire afternoon and evening of the 2009 and 2011 symposia, 
attendees were invited to attend a traditional wild rice camp.  The wild rice camp 
provided an opportunity for bridging by allowing those unfamiliar to better understand 
wild rice and the Ojibwe’s relationship to it.  This included a chance to learn about and 
experience how wild rice is gathered and processed.  For example, during the 2009 
symposium attendees were provided an opportunity to gather wild rice in a canoe and see 
rice in the different stages of processing – drying, parching, hulling, and winnowing.  
Members of the Ojibwe community also shared traditional stories and their experience 
with ricing.  These teachings and the invitation to the camp were offered by members of 
the Ojibwe community who were willing to share these experiences with symposium 
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attendees, including members of the University community, in the spirit of bridging, 
protecting wild rice, and fostering improved relationships.  The rice camp was an 
opportunity for experiential learning that had the potential to foster bridging and 
understanding in ways different from listening to speakers in a conference center.  
Especially for the participants who had not previously experienced a wild rice camp, 
these activities provided another way to comprehend just how different wild rice is from 
other commodity crops for the Ojibwe.   
 
Third, the symposia also included many hours for small group talking circles – 
opportunities for further discussion, sharing, learning, and bridging that generally took 
place after the formal presentations.  As the program from the 2011 symposium explains,  
“The traditional “talking circle” is a very old Native way of bringing people of all 
ages together in a quiet, respectful manner for the purpose of teaching, listening, 
learning, and sharing. The talking circle is a traditional way for Native American 
people to solve problems. It is a very effective way to remove barriers and to 
allow people to express themselves with complete freedom.”  
 
Each circle contained approximately 6 to 8 people, had a facilitator, passed a bundle of 
wild rice to indicate whose turn it was to speak, and followed five simple guidelines: only 
one person speaks at a time, introduce yourself during the first round, speak from the 
heart, listen with respect, and what is said in the circle stays in the circle.  Although 
participants could speak on any topic that was real for them, a guiding prompt for each 
circle was provided based on the symposium themes, such as: “How do you feel about 
the collaboration between the University of Minnesota and the Tribal Nations on 
manoomin?”  These talking circles provided an opportunity for attendees to become 
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individually involved with other symposium participants coming from a different 
background than their own.  In personal conversations and in a post symposium survey 
that was conducted after the 2011 symposium, many symposium attendees spoke highly 
of these talking circles and cited them as a place where bridging took place.  One member 
of the organizing committee explained the transformation possible through these 
encounters,  “I come as a person with some understandings and expertise in my way of 
knowing the world but I need to learn here as much as you need to learn from me and I 
have to be open to being transformed in that.”  So the talking circles offered an 
interpersonal opportunity for bridging in addition to those that emerged from the formal 
presentations and the wild rice camps.  Overall, these differing moments for bridging at 
the symposium – formal presentations, wild rice camp, and talking circles – provided 
opportunities for attendees to reflect upon their own assumptions and grapple with the 
implications of differing worldviews and related assumptions for the issues around wild 
rice.   
 
3.4.2.3 Understanding of scientific research from committee 
 As I observed the collaborative committee, I found the processes utilized and the 
ideas built upon could be seen as supporting a reconceived understanding of scientific 
research.  This understanding supports participatory and anticipatory principles and 
questions the institutional understanding put forth by those supporting the University 
administration’s position, as described in section 4.1.  This understanding was not 
formally articulated by the members of the committee itself, it emerges from my own 
interpretation of the committee.  The first part of this understanding is that scientific 
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research is not universally beneficial and is based upon particular values-based 
assumptions.  Such assumptions can be exposed to scrutiny; therefore scientific research 
can take different forms based upon which assumptions inform it.  In addition, academic 
freedom does not remove the responsibility individuals and institutions have to consider 
the impacts of their work.  With regards to wild rice this means that it cannot be assumed 
that all scientific research taking place on wild rice will be of a beneficial nature.  Once 
this is acknowledged, it becomes necessary to explore what potential paths for science are 
most and least desirable.   
 
To explore what paths for science are desirable, the second part of the 
understanding becomes necessary: the impacts of science and its products can only be 
understood by engaging with those who are impacted by and have a close relationship 
with the topic in question.  Part of this involves considering impacts from the worldviews 
of those impacted, not assuming a similar set of assumptions or values.  As part of this, it 
is necessary to consider the history that shaped the present moment, once again from the 
perspective of those impacted.  So, inherent to scientific research is a commitment to 
consider the impacts of such research, which needs to involve engagement with those 
who will be impacted by it.  Of special importance, in this regard, is engaging with 
peoples who hold an extraordinary relationship to the topic at hand.  With regards to wild 
rice, this means that Ojibwe nations, due to their treaty protections and sacred connection 
to wild rice, would be critical to engage when determining the direction of research.   
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3.4.3 Reconceiving scientific research: Pathways to change 
 Another arena for the committee’s approach to bridging and reconceiving 
scientific research can be seen in their work to influence scientific research at the 
University of Minnesota.  The major strategies pursued were articulated in a white paper 
that was presented on behalf of Minnesota’s Ojibwe tribal nations to the University of 
Minnesota at the start of the second symposium (Preserving the Integrity of Manoomin in 
Minnesota 2011).  Pursuing these strategies has been a key part of the committee’s work 
since the second symposium in 2011.  These strategies work from the status quo at the 
University of Minnesota and suggest pathways for change based on the process and 
understanding of scientific research supported by the committee.  The strategies were 
placed under three topics: respect, reciprocity, and policy and regulation.   
 First, under respect were a host of desired changes at the University concerning 
transparency and communication.  Without knowledge of what research being conducted 
at the University, tribal communities cannot respond to it and cannot begin to influence it.  
Therefore transparency and communication in the form of annual disclosures, a website 
for reporting, and the symposia were identified as key needs.  Second, reciprocity 
involved creating opportunities for collaboration around research.  This first part of this 
collaboration involves a way for Ojibwe nations to determine which research is 
undesirable and a mechanism for them to be able to prevent research that is 
objectionable.  The second part of collaboration involves creating opportunities for 
collaboration around research deemed desirable by Ojibwe nations.  This involves 
pursuing a formal process for engaging with tribal communities as well as identifying 
funding for collaborative research between researchers at the University of Minnesota 
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and tribal colleges.  Once scientific research is opened to considering its potential 
impacts, both desirable and undesirable, then there is a natural need to determine 
opportunities to pursue one and prevent the other.  The third strategy involved changing 
research policy through a formal memorandum of understanding between key 
organizational units at the University of Minnesota and tribal nations.  The white paper 
makes the following request to the University of Minnesota (Preserving the Integrity of 
Manoomin in Minnesota 2011, 10):  
“We request the University of Minnesota acknowledge and agree that: 
1. Anishinaabe nations have the authority to prohibit scientific research about 
wild rice within their treaty territories. All wild rice research proposed to take 
place on Tribal lands and ceded territories must be approved by the Anishinaabe 
nation(s) before it can begin. 
2. Genetic engineering of wild rice shall be prohibited.” 
 
The genetic engineering of wild rice is widely agreed upon by the Ojibwe to be 
undesirable, so in addition to having the ability to prohibit future research on a case by 
case basis, there is also a desire to pass a formal agreement to prohibit wild rice genetic 
engineering.  Such a memorandum of understanding on the prohibiting genetic 
engineering has had a harder time gaining traction within the University than the first two 
strategies.  One major reason for this is that the University administration is unwilling to 
agree to permanent formal policy changes that may be seen as setting a precedent for 
prohibiting research based on the views of a particular group.  If they were to restrict 
research in this case, they feel they would be more susceptible to being forced to restrict 
research because of the views of other interest groups.  Yet, as many member of the 
committee pointed out during the interviews, the Ojibwe are not just another interest 
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group as they are a sovereign nation with treaty rights.  This sets them distinctly apart 
from other interest groups.   
 
A final, less formal strategy that integrates respect, reciprocity, and policy 
involves changing how individual researchers and administrators think about wild rice 
and the relationship between the University of Minnesota and the Ojibwe.  This bridging 
work helps make explicit how the desired forms of scientific research and the 
understandings of harm surrounding wild rice differ based upon the assumptions 
(including those based on worldviews) that inform them.  Furthermore, this work makes 
explicit that the relationship the Ojibwe have to wild rice is not compatible with treating 
wild rice as a commodity crop.  For those who have chosen to take part in the 
committee’s work or in the symposia, it becomes clear that certain scientific research is 
harmful to and undesired by members of the Ojibwe community.  Since there are so few 
University of Minnesota researchers working on this plant, influencing them individually 
can be an effective way to change research policy from the ground up at the University of 
Minnesota.  One of the only researchers at the University of Minnesota who has worked 
on wild rice and genetics was invited to become involved with the committee and 
accepted.  Although even before participating with the committee this researcher agreed 
with the widespread sentiment that there is no current need or desire for a genetically 
engineered variety of wild rice, this researcher’s involvement with the committee has 
increased the transparency around wild rice research.  It has also helped advance research 
directions based on genetics-based work that are more desirable to Ojibwe communities 
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such as understanding the genetic diversity of natural wild rice stands and why some are 
in decline.   
 
3.5 Discussion  
 
 How does scientific research need to be understood in order to require 
consideration of different worldviews?  And therefore, in relation to governance, how can 
different worldviews inform anticipatory processes for public scientific research?  I 
discuss how this study informs these questions in three parts.  First I review the 
implications of the differences between the two understandings of scientific research.  
Second, I discuss the specific anticipatory approach fostered by the committee and the 
insights that emerge from it for the anticipatory governance and responsible research and 
innovation literatures.  Finally, I review some of challenges faced by the collaborative 
committee and the tensions they point to.   
 
 There are foundational assumptions that differ between the two understandings of 
scientific research I examined.  The assumptions informing the institutionalized 
understanding of scientific research are incompatible with the approach fostered by the 
collaborative committee.  For example, if there is only one expert-derived, objectively 
correct way to conduct scientific research and assess the potential for harm then there is 
no reason to request input from communities, stakeholders, or other non-experts.  This is 
reinforced by the idea that the potential negative impacts of scientific research are 
sufficiently avoided by basic ethical guidelines and government regulations.  If scientific 
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research and risk assessment are not built upon contestable assumptions, then trying to 
question the assumptions informing scientific research and risk assessment can only ever 
be seen as detracting from their integrity.  If there are values-based assumptions present 
within scientific research and processes to assess the potential for harm like risk 
assessment, then it becomes necessary for the integrity of scientific research and risk 
assessment to consider the impacts of such assumptions.  In this way, the question of 
examining the implications and desirability of these assumptions cannot be raised when 
the institutionalized understanding of scientific research is imposed on the wild rice issue.  
Part of the work of the committee, therefore, can be seen as helping open up science and 
technology governance to broader deliberation, a necessary requirement from the view 
that science is built on values-based assumptions (Stirling 2008).  The committee 
challenged an understanding of scientific research that marginalized the consideration of 
worldview and assumptions and replaced it with an understanding that made such 
considerations essential.  It therefore challenged an Enlightenment notion of science, 
replacing it with one that emphasized the values-based assumptions in scientific research 
(Sarewitz 1996; Jasanoff 2003; Barben et al. 2008; Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 
2012).   
 
These values-based assumptions within scientific research and risk assessment in 
the wild rice case lead to the emphasis of key questions such as:  For what ends is this 
research being completed?  Who is likely to benefit?  Who is likely to be harmed or put at 
risk?  What is the desired state of the environment being worked towards?  What 
understandings of harm should be examined?  How should the relationship between 
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humans and the natural world be envisioned?  And since these questions are likely to be 
answered differently based one’s worldview, values and life history, it is important to 
gather such reflections from the people who will be impacted by such scientific research 
and risk assessment.  It is especially important to consider the assumptions that fall 
outside of the established societal norms because they will be excluded if the status quo 
goes unquestioned (Harris and Harper 2011; Holifield 2012).  In the case of wild rice, it 
is clear that this necessitates engaging with the Ojibwe who hold wild rice to be sacred 
and who have watched after wild rice for centuries.  And once the diversity of 
assumptions are gathered and reflected upon then one can consider what is at stake if one 
set of assumptions is privileged over another.  Reflecting upon the implications of certain 
assumptions can help contribute to better scientific research and risk assessment as, for 
example, Arquette argues in the case of risk assessment for toxic substances in Native 
American communities (2002).  Yet as long as the default institutional view that claims 
to question everything does not question the ends that scientific research is working 
towards, academic and publically funded research will continue to produce intended and 
unintended negative impacts for native communities and others whose interests and 
concerns fall outside the scope of institutional ethical guidelines and regulations.  The 
committee’s work, then, can be seen as supporting Smith’s argument that the knowledge 
production taking place at public research institutions needs to be decolonized (2012).   
 
In addition to working to establish an anticipatory approach for wild rice research, 
the committee’s process revealed many insights for the anticipatory governance and 
responsible research and innovation literatures.  A key concern for these literatures is 
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how to pursue an anticipatory approach that is informed by different worldviews, or 
different assumptions concerning the desired state of scientific research and technology 
(Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013).  The findings from this study of the wild rice 
collaborative committee provide an example of how a non-privileged worldview can 
inform an anticipatory approach to influence scientific research at a public research 
institution.  The committee’s approach had a couple noteworthy steps.  First, it supported 
a conceptual framework of “bridging worldviews” that made explicit the worldview-
based assumptions within scientific research.  It acknowledged that compared to 
university scientists a community holding a marginalized worldview could legitimately 
embrace different understandings of the desired process for and ends of scientific 
research.  Bridging work was explicitly incorporated into committee meetings as well as 
into organized symposia.  The committee’s approach recognized the potential that 
learning about different worldviews has for helping people critically examine their own 
worldview.  The design of the symposia and the committee process emphasized an 
explicit, yet productive and respectful, engagement with the tensions that form across 
different worldviews.  Second, the approach followed by the committee was not a top-
down anticipatory process initiated by the institution to inform its decision making.  
Rather, it was a bottom-up, less formal process that focused on the involvement of 
willing participants in bridging work and the propagation of certain understandings of 
scientific research and wild rice.  This fact allowed the committee to move at a pace that 
it set, and allowed it to emphasize relationships and mutual understanding.   
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 Despite the insights gained, the committee faces a variety of challenges.  First, 
changing the University’s official position and actions was and continues to be a slow 
process, whether the focus is transparent reporting of research activities or pursuing a 
memorandum of understanding on wild rice research.  Even when the University 
administration supported the symposia with significant funding, there was little further 
support for moving quickly to accomplish other desired goals.  Second, the committee 
faces the challenge of gathering support for protecting natural stands of wild rice from 
genetic engineering by influencing the University of Minnesota, while facing the realities 
of industry funded scientific research and technology development.  Even as the 
committee seeks to influence university research policy, there are many institutions 
outside of the university who could conduct research to develop an engineered variety.  
Even if current University of Minnesota researchers do not pursue a genetically 
engineered wild rice variety, there was no way to insure that large agricultural 
biotechnology companies could not take the existing publically available research on 
wild rice genetics and pursue an engineered variety, if it ever became profitable to do so.  
Therefore, it is important for the committee to realistically state its potential ability to 
influence research policy as well as the limits given the current research environment.  At 
the same time, however, by spreading the idea that certain types of research on wild rice 
are undesirable and not responsible research, the committee could indirectly help 
establish norms about what type of research is desirable.  If it became well accepted that 
research on this sacred plant is undesirable, then perhaps companies would be less likely 
to pursue such research if only to avoid the negative public relations issues.   
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
 This study examined the issues concerning wild rice and genetic engineering and 
the collaborative committee that formed to help address these issues.  This committee 
challenged the institutional understanding of scientific research that was used to justify 
the initial reaction by the University of Minnesota to the issues concerning wild rice and 
genetic engineering.  By making visible the assumptions that are built upon in conducting 
scientific research and by showing the necessity of a participatory approach to deciding 
upon such assumptions, this committee fostered an anticipatory approach to address the 
issues around wild rice and genetics research. Key to the committee’s approach was 
exploring how differing worldviews led to divergent views about the significance of wild 
rice and how and to what ends it should be researched.  
 
 Although this case was specific to a collaborative effort taking place at the 
University of Minnesota concerning wild rice, lessons from it are broadly applicable 
elsewhere.  First, it speaks to the importance of challenging objectivist notions of 
scientific research that negate the constitutive role of assumptions and worldview.  
Without challenging the understanding of scientific research that erases assumptions and 
impacts from consideration, it is hard to foster a process for reflecting upon such 
assumptions and impacts.  Second, once it is realized that scientific research can take 
differing forms with differing impacts based upon the assumptions and decisions that 
inform it, it becomes possible to highlight and reflect upon these assumptions and how 
they should be arrived at.  Furthermore, it becomes possible to see how certain paths for 
 149 
scientific research and how certain ways of assessing the potential for harm may be at 
odds with particular communities, worldviews, or values.  Given the importance of 
scientific research and risk assessment in decision making surrounding technology and 
the environment, the potential significance of this type of work is apparent.  
Consequential assumptions are being made, many of them unacknowledged, and it is 
through identifying them and calling attention to their implications that they can be 
improved upon.  As we look at the major decisions based on assessments of 
environmental impacts and investments in scientific research, from invasive species and 
emerging technologies to fracking and mining, it behooves us to open the processes to 
scrutiny to ensure that the assumptions being built upon are just and in the interest of 
those communities who will be impacted by them.  Finally, given the declining role of 
publically funded research in the United States, there is an imperative to ensure that the 
research that is publically funded is conducted in a broadly ethical and inclusive nature.  
This involves considering the impacts of research and the assumptions that lead to them 
and how they could be otherwise.   
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Appendix A: GMO ERA interview guide  
 
Introduction 
 
1. What are the ways that you been involved with genetically modified crop 
ecological risk assessment? 
a) Follow-up: ERA framework, transgenic crop risk science, etc.  
 
As I said in my initial email to you, I’m interested in the important disagreements or 
controversies concerning GM crop ecological risk assessment.   
 
2. What are some of the disagreements or controversies in your field concerning the 
study of the potential environmental impacts of GM crops?  
a) E.g.: Competing ideas of direct & indirect effects (including whether natural 
enemies are impacted through direct toxicity or prey-quality), proper ways to 
study non-target impacts.  
b) Controversies, differences of opinion or areas of disagreement  
 
3. Which of these disagreements or controversies have you been part of?  
a) How have you been involved?  
 
I’m interested in these disagreements.  I’d like to talk about them in more detail now.   
 
4. Could you describe your understanding of the disagreement, including who was 
involved, the sides that were established, how it began, and the specific points of 
contention?  
a) How far back does it go? 
b) Is it scientific?  Political? Both? 
 
5. What do you believe to be the differing underlying assumptions concerning 
ecological risk assessment that influenced this disagreement?  
a) What are the differing understandings of harm influencing the 
disagreement? 
b) How do others think differently from you? 
 
6. What is at stake in this disagreement?   
a) Why is it important? 
b) What are the potential implications?  
c) What might happen if another way of thinking about ____ were to prevail?   
 
7. How should this disagreement be addressed (or how was it addressed?) 
a) Will they be worked out internally through standard scientific paradigm 
processes?  
b) Who should be involved?  Should stakeholders be involved?   
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I’d like to return to a couple of broader questions now.  
 
8. What is your overarching objective in your work, what do you strive to achieve, 
or what do you hope to accomplish?  
a) Who are you responsible to?  
 
9. How do you think GMOs have impacted the world to this point? 
a) Environmentally, socially 
 
10. Who else do you think I should interview to learn more about these issues? 
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Appendix B: Plant TagMo interview guide 
 
1. What has been your experience with genetically modified organisms?  
And specifically plant targeted genetic modification? 
 
2. What do you believe are the major differences between targeted genetic modification 
and standard genetic modification techniques?   
o Where is the line between the two?  
o Probe: technically & environmentally as well as socially, (politically, 
ethically, legally)? 
 
3. How do you believe the world would change if the targeted genetic modification of 
plants was technically successful and widely adopted?    
o How would these impacts be distributed?  Effects on industry, environment, 
farmers, society?  [Could you elaborate a bit and discuss how these impacts 
would be distributed…] 
 
3b) How do you feel the world changed with the adoption of genetically modified plants? 
o How have these impacts been distributed?  Effects on industry, environment, 
farmers, society? 
 
4. What concerns do you have surrounding targeted genetic modification?   
o PROBE: Technically, environmentally and socially 
o PROBE (when relevant to interviewee): Intellectual property rights picture 
 
4b) How do they compare to the concerns you have surrounding GMOs? 
o [or, if needing further prompts: What possible risks you are concerned about?] 
o What should be done to address these concerns?   
o Probe: How are these concerns similar/different? 
 
5. What do you find most fascinating about the field of targeted genetic modification of 
plants?  What do you find most fascinating about genetically modified organisms? 
 
6. How would you describe the relationship between public (e.g. academia) and private 
(e.g. industry) in the TagMo (or GMO) field?   
o What do you believe are some of the effects (both positive and negative) of 
the current relationship between public and private in the TagMo field? 
o What form should the relationship between public and private take?  
o IPR issues 
o (How does this compare to other areas you have studied?  ) 
 
7. Are the current federal regulations for genetically modified organisms adequate for 
products resulting from the targeted genetic modification of plants?    
o Are they adequate for GMOs? 
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o In what ways should they be changed? 
o Should participatory processes be further utilized within the oversight and 
development of targeted genetic modification (or GMOs)? 
o What are your thoughts or concerns over international governance issues?  
o What are your key concerns surrounding the regulation of plants resulting 
from targeted genetic modification? 
 
8. In what ways may targeted genetic modification be less controversial than the first 
generation of genetically modified organisms?  In what ways may targeted genetic 
modification be more controversial than the first generation of GMOs?  
 
9. What additional opportunities do you see for TagMo (and/or GM plants)?  
o What conditions are necessary to achieve them?   
 
10. What additional concerns do you have surrounding GM plants?  
o How can such concerns be addressed? 
 
11. Do you have any other concerns, comments or issues that we haven’t raised that you 
feel are important?  
 
12. What is your affiliation (e.g. academia, NGO, government) and your area of 
expertise (e.g. ecological scientist, biotechnology scientist, social scientist, policy 
analyst).   
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Appendix C: Wild rice collaborative committee interview guide 
 
 
Introduction 
1. Could we begin by having you describe how you have been involved with wild 
rice? 
Wild rice committee 
2. How did you become involved with the wild rice committee?  What were you 
hoping to accomplish by becoming involved?  
 
Wild rice history 
3. Please share with me your understanding of the committee’s history(origin, events 
actors) 
 
4. What conceptual framework (way of thinking about problems, goals and means) 
has it been working with?   
a) What did this conceptual framework allow the group to do well?  Limitations? 
b) What common assumptions do people on the committee share?  
c) How does bridging take place? What is understanding?  
5. With regards to the first symposium, what worked well and what didn’t work 
well?  
 
Some broader questions about the committee 
6. What are some of the challenges that the committee runs up against? Concerns? 
7. What actions by particular committee members are most helpful to the group?  
8. What has surprised you most about the committee? 
9. In your opinion, what affect has this collaboration had?  Accomplishments? 
Implications? 
 
Wild rice strategy 
The wild rice white paper suggests many different actions to achieve its goals, such as 
communication opportunities (e.g. symposium), research collaboration opportunities (e.g. 
research protocol, involving tribal communities), and legal & policy options (e.g. U of 
MN MOU, state law);  
10. Which of these do you support most? 
11. U of Minnesota policy around wild rice 
a) Ban the creation of GM wild rice products by U of MN researchers?  
b) Ban U of MN genetic research that could help lead to GM wild rice 
products?  
c) Ban all genetic research on wild rice by University of Minnesota 
researcher  
12. Should the growing of genetically modified wild rice be banned in Minnesota?  In 
the US?  Why? 
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Personal understanding of issues around wild rice & genetic engineering 
Better understand the issues around WR and how different understandings come together 
in com 
13. Could you please describe to me your understanding of the conflicts around wild 
rice and genetic engineering?  
a) E.g. Key actors, interests, etc. 
b) What do you see as the differences that underlie the issue? 
c) How do you think these issues could be addressed?  
14. What are the biggest points of misunderstanding? 
 
15. What are your own concerns surrounding wild rice and genetic engineering?  
 
16. What would just outcome look like with regards to the WR and GE issue?  
 
17. What knowledge is needed to help address these issues?   
 
18. How has your thinking change through your involvement with the committee?   
o How has what you are trying to accomplish changed in your involvement? 
 
Broader issues 
1. One of the first things that interested me about the conflicts surrounding wild rice 
and genetic engineering, was the different understandings of harm that existed.  
Understandings of harm rely upon a desired state of the world, which could be 
detrimentally affected, knowledge to understand when harm is taking place or 
when there is potential for it, and a means for addressing the experienced or 
possible harm.   
a) Do you believe differing understandings of what constitutes harm (or not) 
underlie the conflicts around wild rice?   
 What are some of the differing conceptions of harm?   
 How are they navigated within the committee?  
 
2. The University of Minnesota and the question of knowledge production have been 
important to this issue. 
a) How do you see the University of Minnesota’s involvement with the 
issue? 
 What do you mean by the University of Minnesota? 
 Why do you think the University of Minnesota (administration) is 
now interested in collaborating on this issue? 
 
3. Another set of concerns surrounding wild rice involves questions of Native 
American sovereignty.   
a) What is at stake in the wild rice issue for Native American sovereignty?  
b) What is at stake in this collaborative effort for Native American 
sovereignty?   
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4. What are the similarities and differences between the wild rice and genetic 
engineering issues and the sulfate and water issues?   
 
5. What would you like me to look at in these interviews, what would you be 
interested in knowing about the committee?  
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Appendix D: Concept note from wild rice collaborative committee  
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